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Abstract	  
This	   thesis	  was	  motivated	   by	   the	   desire	   to	   explore	  more	   equitable	   patterns	   of	  
development	   in	   South	   Africa	   and	   how	   business	   could	   contribute	   to	   wider	  
developmental	  goals.	  It	  focused	  specifically	  on	  the	  emerging	  wind	  sector	  in	  South	  
Africa,	  drawing	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  community	  wind1	  farms	  that	  have	  emerged	  in	  
many	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   world	   such	   as	   England,	   Denmark	   and	   Canada.	   South	  
Africa’s	   wind	   sector	   was	   recently	   given	   impetus	   with	   the	   launch	   of	   the	  
Department	  of	  Energy’s	  Independent	  Power	  Producer	  Procurement	  Programme	  
(IPPPP)	   for	   renewables.	   The	   development	   of	   this	   sector	   will	   contribute	   to	  
various	  issues	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  such	  as	  climate	  change	  and	  security	  of	  supply,	  
this	  thesis	  intends	  to	  explore	  its	  potential	  to	  engage	  with	  social	  issues	  as	  well.	  
The	   first	   aim	   of	   this	   thesis	   was	   to	   investigate	   what	   legislative	   drivers	   could	  
potentially	   serve	   to	   incentivise	   community	   wind	   schemes.	   Those	   considered	  
included	   the	   renewable	   energy	   procurement	   programme,	   Broad-­‐Based	   Black	  
Economic	   Empowerment	   (BBBEE),	   the	   Clean	   Development	   Mechanism	   and	  
Environmental	   Impact	   Assessments.	   Secondly	   this	   thesis	   aimed	   to	   investigate	  
what	  community	  benefit	  projects	  wind	  developers	  are	  planning	  on	  implementing	  
and	   the	  potential	   of	   these	   to	   contribute	   to	   real	   and	   sustainable	   developmental	  
outcomes	  for	  local	  communities.	  	  Interviews	  were	  conducted	  with	  sector	  experts	  
exploring	   various	   legislative	   drivers	   as	   well	   as	   with	   five	   wind	   developers	   in	  
South	  Africa.	  	  
The	   analysis	   revealed	   that	   the	   procurement	   programme	   and	   its	   BBBEE	  
requirements	  play	   the	  predominant	   role	   in	  driving	   the	   initiation	  of	   community	  
benefit	   schemes	   in	   South	   Africa.	   The	   Clean	   Development	   Mechanism	   and	  
Environmental	  Impact	  Assessments	  were	  found	  to	  have	  no	  significant	  potential	  
to	   incentivise	   such	   schemes.	   The	   BBBEE	   scorecard	   in	   the	   procurement	  
programme	   includes	   a	   specific	   and	   dedicated	   focus	   on	   benefits	   that	   must	   be	  
directed	   towards	   local	   communities	   in	   the	   form	   of	   broad-­‐based	   ownership	  
schemes,	   enterprise	   development	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   development	  
contributions.	   This	   focus	   on	   local	   communities	   in	   the	   renewables	   scorecard	   is	  
more	   pronounced	   in	   comparison	   to	   most	   other	   Government	   tendering	  
requirements.	   The	   renewables	   procurement	   programme	   incorporates	  many	   of	  
the	   outcomes	   from	   a	   recent	   review	   process	   of	   the	   BBBEE	   Act	   undertaken	   in	  
2011,	  which	   strives	   to	   redirect	   the	   focus	  and	   implementation	  of	   the	   legislation	  
back	   to	   the	   broad-­‐based	   elements	   of	   the	   scorecard	   in	   Government	   tendering	  
processes.	  
The	   interviews	  with	  developers	   revealed	   that	  motivations	   for	   their	   community	  
benefit	   schemes	   ranged	   from	   compliance	   to	  moral	   drivers	   to	   the	   core	   focus	   of	  
operations	   for	   one	   developer.	   Despite	   differing	   approaches	   to	   their	   social	  
responsibilities	   however,	   all	   recognised	   the	   importance	   of	   BBBEE	   in	   South	  
Africa.	  An	  interesting	  feature	  in	  the	  sector	  is	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  developer	  with	  
the	   specific	   strategic	   objective	   of	   establishing	   community	   wind	   farms.	   He	   has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Community	  wind	  in	  this	  thesis	  refers	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  community	  ownership	  or	  other	  
types	  of	  benefits	  given	  to	  communities	  from	  large	  scale	  commercial	  wind	  farms	  which	  typically	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adopted	   an	   innovative	   business	  model	   that	   seeks	   to	   integrate	   commercial	   and	  
social	   considerations.	   His	   approach	   signifies	   a	   shift	   away	   from	   a	   charitable	  
donation	  type	  approach	  to	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  evidenced	  by	  some	  of	  
the	  other	  developers,	  to	  one	  that	  seeks	  to	  integrate	  social	  concerns	  into	  the	  core	  
nature	  of	  his	  activities.	  	  
Overall	  it	  is	  premature	  to	  be	  able	  to	  say	  with	  certainty	  what	  the	  potential	  is	  for	  
widespread	  and	   transformational	  development	  outcomes	   in	   local	   communities.	  
The	   procurement	   programme	   serves	   as	   a	   strong	   and	   proactive	   driver	   in	   this	  
regard	  and	  will	  catalyse	  significant	  amounts	  of	  expenditure	  in	  rural	  communities	  
around	   the	   country.	   However	   several	   weak	   points	  were	   identified	   namely	   the	  
lack	   of	   guidance	   or	   specifications	   for	   development	   interventions,	   leaving	   the	  
decisions	   regarding	   social	   development	   to	   the	   discretion	   of	   individual	  
developers	  whose	  core	  area	  of	  expertise	  does	  not	   lie	   in	   this	  area.	  Secondly	   the	  
proposed	   monitoring	   and	   verification	   mechanisms	   appear	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   weak	  
enforcer	  of	  performance	  and	  outcomes	  of	  projects.	  Finally	  the	  efficacy	  of	  BBBEE	  
in	  general	  to	  achieve	  its	  objectives	  especially	  around	  the	  elements	  of	  enterprise	  
development	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   development	   has	   not	   yet	   been	   sufficiently	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1. Introduction	  	  
On	  3	  August	   2011	   the	  Department	   of	   Energy	   (DoE)	   launched	   the	   Independent	  
Power	  Producer	  Procurement	  Programme	  (IPPPP)	  for	  renewables	  to	  support	  the	  
growth	  of	   this	  new	   industry	   in	  South	  Africa.	  This	  policy	  support	   is	  expected	   to	  
elicit	  a	  significant	  growth	   in	   the	   local	  wind	  sector,	  with	  1850	  MW	  allocated	   for	  
wind	   in	   the	   first	   round	  of	  procurement.	  Building	  on	   the	   concept	  of	   community	  
wind	  farms	  observed	  in	  other	  countries	  (for	  example	  Denmark,	  Germany	  and	  the	  
UK),	   this	   thesis	   intends	   to	   explore	   the	   potential	   for	   community	   benefits	   from	  
wind	   farms	   in	   South	   Africa	   by	   investigating	   legislative	   drivers	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
types	   of	   initiatives	   developers	   are	   undertaking.	   Community	   benefits	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  this	  thesis	  refer	  to	  any	  initiative	  to	  redistribute	  profits	  or	  revenue	  into	  
local	   communities	   where	   wind	   farms	   are	   located.	   This	   could	   be	   through	  
ownership	   agreements,	   direct	   investment	   in	   communities	   or	   other	   socio-­‐
economic	  initiatives.	  	  
Exploring	  the	  role	  of	  the	  wind	  sector	  in	  South	  Africa	  to	  also	  engage	  with	  issues	  of	  
poverty	   and	   sustainable	   development	   is	   highly	   relevant	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  
international	  focus	  on	  climate	  change,	  mitigation	  actions	  in	  developing	  countries	  
and	   the	   development	   of	   low	   carbon	   economies.	   Low	   carbon	   economies	   aim	   to	  
identify	  ways	  to	  reduce	  reliance	  on	  fossil	  fuels	  as	  well	  as	  contribute	  to	  economic	  
development.	  The	  wind	  sector	  in	  South	  Africa	  could	  therefore	  have	  the	  potential	  
to	   contribute	   to	   multiple	   environmental,	   economic	   and	   social	   objectives.	   The	  
question	   of	   the	   business	   sector	   exploring	   more	   equitable	   patterns	   of	  
development	  that	  takes	  cognisance	  of	  social	  and	  environmental	  issues	  is	  one	  that	  
has	   gained	   much	   momentum	   globally	   in	   the	   shape	   of	   corporate	   social	  
responsibility	  (CSR).	  Not	  only	  are	  businesses	  increasingly	  taking	  responsibility	  of	  
their	  own	  accord	  for	  behaving	   in	  an	  ethical	  manner	  but	  they	  are	  also	  being	  co-­‐
opted	   into	   the	   sustainable	   development	   agenda.	   The	  Millennium	  Development	  
Goals	   (MDGs)	   are	   international	   development	   goals	   developed	   by	   the	   United	  
Nations	   that	   relate	   to	   the	   eradication	   of	   poverty.	   The	   United	   Nations	   has	  
recognised	   and	   promotes	   the	   contribution	   of	   business	   to	   the	   achievement	   of	  
these	  goals	  through,	  for	  example,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Global	  Compact.	  This	  is	  an	  
intitiative	   that	   aims	   at	   mainstreaming	   ethical	   principles	   in	   business	   and	  
accelerating	   action	   by	   business	   in	   support	   of	   the	   MDGs.	   The	   concept	   of	  
sustainable	   development	   was	   first	   articulated	   in	   the	   Brundtland	   Report,	   Our	  
Common	   Future	   (United	   Nations	   World	   Commission	   on	   Environment	   and	  
Development,	   1987),	   and	   defined	   as	   development	   that	  meets	   the	   needs	   of	   the	  
present	   without	   compromising	   the	   ability	   of	   future	   generations	   to	   meet	   their	  
own	  needs.	  	  
1.1. Background	  	  
The	   development	   of	   the	   renewables	   support	   programme	   in	   South	   Africa	   has	  
been	   designed	   to	   achieve	  multiple	   objectives.	   Firstly	   to	   diversify	   an	   emissions	  
intensive	   electricity	   sector	   that	   is	   currently	   dominated	   by	   coal-­‐fired	   power	  
stations	   burning	   low-­‐grade	   coal	   (Kessides	   et	   al,	   2006).	   Government	   has	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2030	  below	  business	  as	  usual2	  (RSA,	  2010).	  Secondly	  the	  electricity	  sector	  faces	  
pressing	   security	   of	   supply	   issues,	   which	   led	   to	   a	   series	   of	   national	   rolling	  
blackouts	  in	  2007	  and	  2008.	  Tight	  demand	  and	  supply	  constraints	  on	  the	  system	  
continue	  and	  one	  of	  the	  key	  imperatives	  of	  the	  DoE’s	  IPPPP	  is	  therefore	  to	  bring	  
projects	   on	   line	   as	   quickly	   as	   possible	   to	   help	   alleviate	   supply	   constraints	  
(Breytenbach,	   2011).	   Thirdly	   the	   Government	   has	   specified	   that	   the	  
procurement	   programme	   must	   contribute	   to	   economic	   development	   in	   South	  
Africa	  (Department	  of	  Energy,	  2011b).	  	  
Social	  considerations	  permeate	  many	  aspects	  the	  South	  African	  policy	  landscape.	  
The	  country	  suffers	  from	  severe	  poverty,	  the	  incidence	  of	  which	  remains	  highly	  
skewed,	   concentrated	   mainly	   among	   black	   South	   Africans	   and	   in	   rural	   areas	  
(Mensah	  and	  Benedict,	  2009).	  Many	  rural	  areas	  typically	  face	  very	  low	  levels	  of	  
economic	  activity	  and	   limited	  opportunities	   for	  employment	   (ibid,	  2009).	   	  This	  
poverty	   and	   inequality	   is	   rooted	   in	   apartheid,	   but	   the	   persistence	   of	   it	   many	  
years	  after	  democracy	  is	  frequently	  attributed	  to	  the	  failings	  of	  the	  present	  ANC	  
Government’s	  administration	  (Mbeki,	  2009).	  Nevertheless	  the	  ANC	  Government	  
has	   laid	   out	   strong	   intentions	   to	   achieve	   transformation,	  which	   find	   their	  way	  
into	   a	   number	   of	   different	   policies.	   One	   of	   the	   most	   prominent	   policies	   is	  
undoubtedly	   the	   Broad-­‐Based	   Black	   Economic	   Empowerment	   (BBBEE)	   Act	  
which	  targets	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  transformation.	  The	  policy	  seeks	  
to	   redress	   past	   injustices	   of	   apartheid	   by	   promoting	   direct	   and	   indirect	  
empowerment	   through	   improving	   previously	   disadvantaged	   people’s	   ability	   to	  
participate	  in	  the	  mainstream	  economy	  (Glaser,	  2007;	  Ramathe,	  2009).	  
BBBEE	   permeates	   all	   aspects	   of	   Governments	   procurement,	   tendering	   and	  
licensing	  processes	  and	  will	  therefore	  be	  important	  in	  the	  renewables	  sector	  as	  
well.	  BBBEE	  is	  a	  defining	  feature	  in	  many	  business’	  CSR	  actions	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  
The	   policy	   intends	   to	   promote	   transformation	   that	   is	   ‘broad-­‐based’	   and	   this	   is	  
reflected	   in	   elements	  of	   the	   scorecard	   such	  as	   community	  ownership	   schemes,	  
skills	  development	  and	  corporate	  social	   investment	   (CSI).	  This	   thesis	   therefore	  
intends	   to	   analyse	   the	   way	   that	   BBBEE	   has	   been	   formulated	   to	   achieve	   the	  
IPPPP’s	   economic	   development	   objectives	   and	   how	   the	   spirit	   of	   this	   policy	  
transfers	  to	  developers’	  actions.	  	  
Why	  is	  CSR	  and	  local	  community	  benefits	  in	  the	  wind	  sector	  a	  relevant	  avenue	  of	  
research	  in	  SA?	  CSR	  in	  general	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  response	  to	  markets	  working	  
imperfectly	  or	  rewarding	  behaviours	   that	  are	  not	  socially	  optimal	   (Eccles	  et	  al,	  
2009).	  Commercial	  wind	   farms	  are	  extremely	   large	  and	  capital	   and	   technology	  
intensive	   developments	   with	   annual	   turnovers	   in	   the	   hundreds	   of	   millions	   of	  
rands.	   They	   are	   often	   located	   in	   rural	   areas	   which,	   in	   South	   Africa	   especially,	  
typically	  have	  poor	  development	  prospects.	  However	   these	  developments	  have	  
very	  limited	  traditionally	  local	  economic	  development	  (LED)	  benefits	  in	  the	  form	  
of	   local	   jobs	   and	   income	   (Munday	   et	   al,	   2011).	   This	   sector	   could	   therefore	   be	  
characteristic	   of	   one	   of	   SA’s	   key	   economic	   development	   challenges	   in	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  These	  commitments	  were	  made	  however	  subject	  to	  the	  following	  proviso	  “the	  extent	  
to	  which	  this	  action	  will	  be	  implemented	  depends	  on	  the	  provision	  of	  financial	  
resources,	  the	  transfer	  of	  technology	  and	  capacity	  building	  support	  by	  developed	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following	   of	   a	   capital	   intensive	   growth	   path	   that	   engenders	   little	   trickle-­‐down	  
benefits	   for	   the	   poor.	   The	   result	   of	   this	   is	   the	   existence	   of	   ‘two	   economies’	   in	  
South	   Africa,	   the	   formal	   and	   informal	   economies	   (Rogerson,	   2007)	   and	  
development	  that	  has	  limited	  potential	  to	  challenge	  the	  persistence	  of	  inequality	  
and	   poverty.	   Therefore	   exploring	   how	   this	   sector	   can	   proceed	   in	   a	   socially	  
responsible	   manner	   and	   contribute	   to	   the	   sustainable	   development	   of	  
communities	   in	  which	   they	   are	   located	   is	   extremely	   important	   and	   could	  have	  
wider	  implications	  for	  other	  sectors.	  	  
1.2. Research	  questions	  
This	   thesis	   is	  based	  on	   the	  proposition	   that	   all	   sectors,	   including	  business,	   can	  
and	  should	  contribute	  to	  a	  more	  equitable	  and	  sustainable	  society.	  South	  Africa	  
has	  acknowledged	   the	   importance	  of	  business’	   role	   through	   legislation	   such	  as	  
BBBEE.	   Community	   benefit	   schemes	   in	   the	   wind	   sector	   have	   emerged	   as	   a	  
distinct	  concept	  in	  many	  countries	  in	  the	  world,	  although	  with	  multiple	  different	  
approaches	  and	  drivers	  depending	  on	  the	  socio-­‐political	  context.	  The	  distributed	  
nature	   of	   renewable	   energy	   generation	   can	   induce	   a	   more	   geographically	  
dispersed	   pattern	   of	   development,	   and	   RE	   sites	   can	   be	   highly	   suited	   to	   rural	  
locations	  with	  otherwise	  poor	  potential	  to	  attract	   local	   inward	  investment	  thus	  
able	   to	   target	   particularly	   vulnerable	   areas.	   Although	   this	   research	   focuses	   on	  
wind	  only,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  similar	  developmental	  potential	  would	  apply	  to	  other	  
renewable	  energy	  technologies	  under	  the	  IPPPP.	  	  
The	  original	  intention	  of	  this	  research	  was	  to	  explore	  voluntary	  and	  mandatory	  
drivers	  for	  CSR	  activities	  by	  wind	  developers	  in	  the	  South	  African	  context.	  As	  the	  
research	   commenced	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   the	   renewables	   programme	   and	  
BBBEE	  legislation	  was	  strongly	  shaping	  the	  commitments	  from	  developers	  with	  
regards	   to	   community	   benefits.	   The	   focus	   therefore	   evolved	   to	   looking	   at	   the	  
legislative	   framework,	  how	   this	  was	  shaping	  developers	  activities	  and	  how	   the	  
potential	   for	  meaningful	  positive	  development	  outcomes	  could	  be	  enhanced.	   In	  
addition	   it	   aims	   to	   explore	   how	   developers	   are	   developing	   their	   community	  
benefit	   schemes	   and	   th 	   potential	   for	   these	   to	   deliver	   real	   developmental	  
benefits	  for	  local	  communities.	  
The	   specific	   research	   questions	   that	   this	   research	   intends	   to	   answer	   are	   the	  
following:	  
a)	  What	  role	  is	  existing	  legislation	  playing	  in	  stimulating	  community	  benefits	  in	  
the	  renewables	  sector	  in	  South	  Africa?	  	  
b)	  What	  community	  benefit	  projects	  are	  wind	  developers	  undertaking	  and	  what	  
is	   the	   potential	   for	   real	   and	   sustainable	   developmental	   outcomes	   for	  
communities?	  	  	  	  
1.3. Structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  
This	   thesis	   starts	   by	   reviewing	   the	   literature	   in	   chapter	   2	   on	   the	   concept	   of	  
community	  wind	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  world,	  focussing	  on	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  as	  a	  
case	  study.	  It	  then	  explores	  the	  role	  of	  business	  in	  society	  through	  CSR	  literature	  
both	   in	   general	   and	   in	   South	  Africa.	  The	   goals	   and	  application	  of	  CSR	   in	   South	  
Africa	   is	   inextricably	   linked	   to	   BBBEE,	   which	   promotes	   business’	   role	   in	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To	   explore	   this	   phenomenon	   in	   South	  Africa	   interviews	  were	  undertaken	  with	  
wind	   developers	   and	   other	   sector	   experts.	   The	   results	   and	   discussion	   are	  
presented	   in	   chapters	  4	  and	  5.	  The	   first	   results	   chapter	  explores	   the	   impact	  of	  
various	   pieces	   of	   legislation	   including	   the	   IPPPP	   for	   renewables,	   BBBEE,	   the	  
Clean	  Development	  Mechanism	  (CDM)	  and	  Environmental	   Impact	  Assessments	  
(EIAs).	   This	   section	   intends	   to	   gain	   insight	   into	   whether	   these	   pieces	   of	  
legislation	   can	   provide	   drivers	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   community	   benefit	  
schemes	   from	   wind	   farms.	   The	   second	   results	   chapter	   takes	   a	   look	   at	   what	  
community	   benefit	   schemes	   developers	   are	   planning	   on	   implementing.	   It	   will	  
investigate	   developers’	   approaches	   to	   community	   benefits,	   the	   type	   of	  models	  
being	   used	   to	   implement	   benefit	   schemes	   as	  well	   as	   the	   challenges	   they	   have	  
faced.	  It	  intends	  to	  give	  a	  more	  bottom-­‐up	  insight	  into	  how	  policy	  requirements	  
actually	   translate	   into	  actions	  and	  benefits	  on	   the	  ground.	   	   Finally	   the	   findings	  
are	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  6	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  implications	  for	  the	  potential	  for	  












	   13	  
2. Literature	  review	  	  
2.1. Introduction	  	  
This	   literature	   review	   aims	   to	   give	   a	   broad	   overview	   of	   specific	   areas	   of	  
literature	   that	   pertain	   to	   this	   research	   on	   community	   benefits	   from	   wind	   in	  
South	   Africa.	   This	   section	   explores	   the	   incidence	   of	   community	   benefits	   from	  
wind	  in	  other	  countries,	  focussing	  on	  the	  UK	  as	  a	  case	  study.	  	  It	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  
discuss	  the	  concept	  of	  CSR	  within	  which	  to	  view	  the	  concept	  of	  wind	  developers	  
business	  operations	  and	  the	  inclusion	  of	  considerations	  of	  social	  responsibilities	  
and	  equity	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  project	  benefits.	  The	  final	  part	  of	  this	  literature	  
review	  discusses	  BBBEE	  as	  this	  is	  inextricably	  linked	  with	  any	  discussion	  on	  CSR	  
in	   South	   Africa.	   It	   is	   also	   a	   feature	   of	   doing	   business	   in	   South	   Africa	   for	   any	  
sectors	   interacting	   with	   Government	   licensing	   or	   tendering	   activities,	   and	  
therefore	  very	  relevant	  to	  the	  renewables	  sector.	  
2.2. Community	  benefits	  from	  wind	  farms	  in	  the	  UK	  
There	   is	   broad	   consensus	   in	   the	   literature	   that	   wind	   farms	   in	   general	   have	  
limited	  potential	   to	  deliver	   traditional	   local	   economic	  development	   in	   terms	  of	  
increased	   opportunities	   from	   local	   jobs,	   income	   and	   business	   opportunities	  
(Walker,	  2008;	  Munday	  et	  al,	  2011).	  Despite	   this	   fact,	  or	  perhaps	  because	  of	   it,	  
the	   incidence	   of	   additional	   community	   benefits	   from	   commercial	   wind	   farms	  
(often	  referred	   to	  as	  community	  wind)	  has	  become	  a	  widespread	  concept.	   It	   is	  
commonplace	   in	   many	   parts	   of	   Europe,	   including	   Denmark,	   Germany,	   UK,	  
Netherlands	   as	   well	   as	   examples	   in	   Australia	   and	   Canada	   (Schreuer	   and	  
Weismeier-­‐Sammer,	   2010).	   	   Denmark	   is	   well	   known	   for	   a	   preponderance	   of	  
community	  owned	  wind	   farms,	  which	  arose	  due	   to	   factors	   such	  as	  a	   culture	  of	  
cooperatives	   (Mendonca,	   Lacey,	   and	   Hvelplund,	   2009),	   favourable	   policy	   and	  
financial	  instruments,	  and	  a	  strong	  grassroots	  anti-­‐nuclear	  movement	  in	  the	  70s	  
and	  80s	  (Schreuer	  and	  Weismeier-­‐Sammer,	  2010).	  	  
The	  UK,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  had	  none	  of	  these	  contributing	  factors	  and	  windfarm	  
development	   originally	   progressed	   in	   a	   traditional	   large-­‐scale	   private	   sector	  
development	   paradigm.	   Over	   time	   however	   there	   has	   been	   a	   growing	   and	  
voluntary	   shift	   to	   conferring	   greater	   project	   benefits	   to	   communities.	   This	  
literature	   review	   will	   focus	   on	   the	   context	   for	   community	   benefits	   in	   the	   UK,	  
looking	  at	  drivers,	  legislative	  and	  policy	  support	  and	  benefit	  schemes	  and	  models	  
of	   delivery.	   It	   is	   recognised	   that	   there	   are	   limitations	   in	   the	   degree	   to	   which	  
useful	  comparisons	  can	  be	  drawn	  between	  a	  developed	  country	  context	  such	  as	  
the	  UK	  and	  a	  developing	  country	  such	  as	  South	  Africa.	  There	  were,	  however,	  no	  
examples	  that	  this	  author	  could	  find	  of	  community	  wind	  in	  a	  developing	  country.	  	  
2.2.1. Drivers	  for	  community	  benefits	  from	  wind	  in	  the	  UK	  
In	  the	  UK	  wind	  farm	  development	  saw	  a	  transition	  from	  an	  originally	  large-­‐scale	  
private	   sector	   development	   pattern	   with	   limited	   benefits	   to	   a	   growing	  
phenomenon	  of	  voluntary	  monetary	  contributions	  to	  the	  communities	  in	  which	  
wind	   farms	   are	   located	   	   (Munday	   et	   al,	   2011;	   Aitken,	   2010a).	   Typical	   benefits	  
include	   contributions	   to	   community	   funds,	   education	   and	   energy	   efficiency	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ownership	  becoming	  more	  widespread.	  This	  section	  briefly	  explores	  the	  nature	  
of	  this	  shift	  in	  the	  UK,	  exploring	  the	  drivers,	  models	  and	  benefits.	  
Although	  several	  reasons	  are	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  literature,	  the	  primary	  driver	  for	  
the	   incidence	   of	   voluntary	   developer	   contributions	   has	   been	   to	   assuage	   the	  
substantial	  public	  opposition	  to	  wind	  farms	  in	  the	  UK	  (Aitken,	  2010b;	  Rogers	  et	  
al,	   2008;	  Walker,	   2008).	   It	   is	   estimated	   that	   this	   public	   opposition,	   expressed	  
through	  the	  UK	  planning	  system,	  results	  in	  the	  rejection	  of	  approximately	  60%	  of	  
all	  wind	  applications	  by	  local	  authorities	  (Toke	  et	  al,	  2008).	  This	  is	  significantly	  
higher	  than	  many	  other	  European	  countries	  and	  is	  one	  of	  the	  principal	  reasons	  
cited	  for	  lower	  deployment	  rates	  of	  onshore	  wind	  power	  in	  the	  UK	  compared	  to	  
other	  European	  countries	  (RAB,	  2007).	  
Public	  opposition	  often	  relates	  to	  the	  size	  and	  scale	  of	  projects	  which	  were	  often	  
unappealing	  to	  local	  communities	  and,	  coupled	  with	  little	  consideration	  paid	  by	  
developers	  to	  the	  desires	  of	  communities	   in	  their	  conceptualisation	  (Hain	  et	  al,	  
2005),	  this	  resulted	  in	  a	  strong	  Not-­‐In-­‐My-­‐Backyard	  (NIMBY)	  sentiment	  arising	  
(Aitken,	  2010a).	  NIMBY	  attitudes	  refer	  to	  people	  objecting	  about	  the	  siting	  of	  a	  
wind	   farm	   in	   their	   vicinity	   but	   would	   not	   object	   to	   it	   being	   sited	   elsewhere.	  
Objections	   often	   related	   to	   the	   inappropriate	   scale	   of	   developments,	   deemed	  
unfairness	  of	  local	  costs	  vs	  local	  benefits	  and	  lack	  of	  adequate	  consultation	  with	  
local	   residents	   (Rogers	   et	   al,	   2008).	   The	   UK	   is	   also	   characterised	   by	   a	   strong	  
presence	   of	   landscape	   protection	   organisations	   (such	   as	   Campaign	   to	   Protect	  
Rural	  England)	  that	  have	  taken	  an	  anti-­‐wind	  farm	  stance	  (Toke	  et	  al,	  2008).	  The	  
delays	   and	   uncertainty	   placed	   on	   developers	   associated	   with	   getting	   planning	  
approval	  significantly	  increase	  costs	  for	  developers.	  As	  a	  result	  there	  has	  been	  a	  
strategic	  focus	  by	  developers	  to	  include	  communities	  in	  planning	  processes	  and	  
the	  distribution	  of	  project	  benefits.	  	  
Interestingly,	  however,	  these	  community	  benefit	  schemes	  cannot	  form	  part	  of	  a	  
planning	  authorities	  decision	  making	  process.	  The	  UK	  planning	  system	  requires	  
that	   decisions	   about	   proposals	   be	   based	   on	   planning	   issues	   only	   or	   ‘material	  
considerations’,	  which	  must	  be	  related	  to	  the	  development	  and	  use	  of	  land	  in	  the	  
public	   interest	  (RAB,	  2007b).	  Community	  benefits	  are	  generally	  considered	  not	  
to	  relate	  directly	  to	  the	  proposed	  wind	  farm	  or	  planning	  issues	  and	  therefore	  fall	  
outside	   of	   the	   decision	   making	   process	   (Department	   of	   Trade	   and	   Industry,	  
2005).	  This	   is	  to	  prevent	  the	  perceived	  situation	  arising	  of	  developers	   	   ‘buying’	  
public	  support	  for	  otherwise	  inappropriate	  developments	  (Department	  of	  Trade	  
and	  Industry,	  2005).	  However	  it	  is	  considered	  that	  this	  aspect	  of	  planning	  policy	  
could	   change	   over	   time	   and	   give	   greater	   recognition	   to	   the	   “wider	   benefits”	  
(RAB,	  2007).	  	  
2.2.2. Models	  for	  delivering	  benefit	  schemes	  
There	  are	  no	  standards	  that	  govern	  community	  benefits	  in	  the	  UK,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  
there	   exists	   considerable	   variation	   in	   the	   scale	   and	   approach	   taken	   (Aitken,	  
2010a).	  Benefits	   range	   from	  various	   forms	  of	   local	  ownership,	   contributions	   to	  
local	  funds	  or	  provision	  of	  local	  services	  (Munday	  et	  al,	  2011).	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  
benefit	   schemes	   are	   highly	   contextual	   and	   often	   depend	   on	   the	   outcomes	   of	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Research	   initiated	   by	   the	   Renewables	   Advisory	   Board3	   investigated	   the	   most	  
appropriate	   bankable	   models	   for	   community	   ownership	   (RAB,	   2007).	   The	  
various	   community	   ownership	   models	   considered	   included	   part	   ownership	  
based	  on	  turbine	  ownership,	  community	  ownership	  of	  the	  whole	  project	  or	  joint	  
ventures	  with	  community	  organisations.	  The	   joint	  venture	  model	   is	  considered	  
the	  most	   feasible,	   already	   having	   been	   tried	   and	   tested	   through	   organisations	  
(e.g.	   Baywind)	   that	   use	   co-­‐operative	   structures	  with	   individuals	   investing	   into	  
the	  wind	  farm	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  amount.	  However	  issues	  with	  joint	  venture	  models,	  
raised	   by	   both	   developers	   and	   bank	   lenders,	   include	   concerns	   where	  
communities	   are	   represented	   on	   joint	   venture	   board	   and	   thereby	   take	   part	   in	  
decisions	  such	  as	  approving	  third	  party	  contracts.	  Additionally	  some	  developers	  
expressed	  reticence	  in	  having	  to	  deal	  with	  minority	  shareholders	  or	  making	  the	  
developer’s	  share	  harder	  to	  sell.	  Additionally	  benefits	  accrue	  only	  to	  those	  with	  
the	  ability	  to	  raise	  money	  or	  capital	  to	  invest,	  which	  may	  prove	  exclusionary	  for	  
those	  unable	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  South	  Africa	  the	  applicability	  and	  design	  of	  ownership	  
schemes	   would	   have	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	   lack	   of	   resources	   and	   capital	  
available	  to	  poor	  communities	  and	  therefore	  may	  have	  to	  look	  quite	  different.	  	  
Payments	  into	  a	  community	  fund	  are	  another	  option	  for	  community	  benefits	  and	  
are	   now	   fairly	   common	   in	   the	   UK	   (Department	   of	   Trade	   and	   Industry,	   2005).	  
These	  may	  consist	  of	  once	  off	  payments	  (a	  fixed	  payment	  per	  MW	  installed)	  or	  a	  
variable	   payment	   that	   varies	  with	   the	   power	   output	   of	   the	   farm	   or	   profits,	   or	  
may	  be	  a	  combination	  of	  both	  of	  these	  (Aitken,	  2010b;	  Munday	  et	  al,	  2011).	  	  The	  
research	   by	   the	   RAB	   (2007)	   found	   no	   consensus	   on	   a	   preferred	   method	   for	  
calculating	  benefits	  but	   in	  general	  however	   there	  appears	  a	  preference,	   from	  a	  
bankability	  perspective,	  for	  variable	  amounts	  that	  vary	  with	  the	  performance	  of	  
the	  wind	  farm.	  This	  does	  not	  then	  compromise	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  project	  to	  meet	  its	  
bank	  repayments	  (RAB,	  2007a).	  This	  benefit	  model	  is	  deemed	  more	  appropriate	  
than	   ownership	   options	   when	   communities	   are	   unable	   to	   raise	   significant	  
community	  funds.	  It	  also	  benefits	  all	  community	  members	  rather	  than	  just	  those	  
with	  the	  means	  to	  invest	  in	  ownership	  investment	  schemes.	  	  
2.2.3. Challenges	  with	  administering	  and	  implementing	  benefit	  
schemes	  
Community	   funds	   may	   be	   administered	   through	   local	   councils,	   charitable	  
organisations	   who	   specialise	   in	   handling	   such	   funds	   for	   communities,	   or	   by	   a	  
local	   structure	   set	   up	   specifically	   for	   the	   purpose	   (Aitken,	   2010a;	  Walker	   and	  
Devine-­‐Wright,	   2008).	   Administering	   through	   community	   charity	   or	   trust	  may	  
be	  a	  more	  effective	  means	  to	  ensure	  funds	  are	  spent	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  
whole	  community	  (Walker,	  2008).	  The	  vehicle	  for	  administering	  significant	  sums	  
of	  money	  needs	  to	  be	  independent	  and	  have	  transparent	  procedures.	  Options	  for	  
using	   existing	   body	  may	   be	   preferable	   as	   they	  may	   have	   the	   advantage	   of	   an	  
already	   established	   relationship	  with	   the	   community.	   Research	   has	   found	   that	  
the	  success	  of	  community	  projects	  is	  often	  linked	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  community	  
structures	  and	  networks,	  rather	  than	  relying	  on	  outside	  agencies’	  input	  (Rogers	  
et	  al,	  2008).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  Renewables	  Advisory	  Board	  is	  an	  independent	  public	  body	  providing	  advice	  to	  the	  UK	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Public	   participation	   and	   gaining	   trust	   of	   local	   communities	   can	   be	   a	   difficult	  
process,	   but	   is	   essential	   for	   achieving	   positive	   outcomes.	   In	   order	   for	  
communities	   to	   feel	   as	   if	   they	   have	   a	   degree	   of	   ‘ownership	   of	   the	   process’	  
developers	  need	  to	  give	  some	  degree	  of	  power	  to	  communities	  (Aitken,	  2010b)	  
or	  allow	  some	  capacity	  to	  influence	  decisions	  on	  certain	  aspects	  of	  design	  such	  as	  	  
reviewing	   and	   commenting	   on	   alternative	   options	   for	   the	   siting	   and	   size	   of	  
turbines	  or	  designing	  benefit	  schemes	  such	  as	  decisions	  on	  how	  to	  administer	  or	  
who	  the	  recipients	  should	  be	  (Aitken,	  2010b).	  	  	  
2.3. Corporate	  Social	  Responsibility	  	  
The	  incidence	  and	  profile	  of	  CSR	  has	  grown	  significantly	  in	  the	  last	  few	  decades.	  	  
The	   World	   Summit	   on	   Sustainable	   Development	   in	   2002	   saw	   significant	  
engagement	   with	   the	   business	   sector	   in	   developing	   inclusive	   approaches	   to	  
achieving	  the	  Millenium	  Development	  Goals	  (Wheeler	  and	  McKague,	  2002).	  The	  
World	  Business	  Council	  for	  Sustainable	  Development	  (WBCSD),	  founded	  during	  
the	   1992	   Rio	   Earth	   Summit,	   is	   a	   network	   of	   companies	   aligned	  with	   the	   core	  
philosophy	   of	   actively	   engaging	   business	   in	   sustainable	   development.	   The	  
organisation	  promotes	  an	  approach	  of	  ‘inclusive	  business’	  amongst	  its	  members.	  
This	  is	  articulated	  as	  creating	  market	  opportunities	  with	  the	  poor	  and	  promotes	  
practises	   that	   relate	   to	   the	   core	   business	   activities	   of	   companies	   rather	   than	  
philanthropy	   (WBCSD,	   2010).	   The	   inclusion	   of	   the	   business	   sector	   in	  
international	   sustainable	   development	   evidences	   what	   Kolk	   et	   al	   (2008)	  
describe	   as	   a	   new	   ‘collaboration	   paradigm’,	  which	   recognises	   that	   solutions	   to	  
complex	  problems	  such	  as	  poverty	  lie	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  any	  one	  institution	  or	  
sector.	   Additionally,	   business,	   as	   the	   key	   traders	   of	   resources	   and	   actors	   in	   a	  
market	   system	   that	   produces	   socially	   sub-­‐optimal	   outcomes	   (such	   as	  
unemployment,	  or	  environmental	  degradation),	  has	  a	  key	  role	  to	  play	  in	  solving	  
these	  issues	  (Louw,	  2006).	  	  
The	  nature	  of	  CSR	  activities	  is	  so	  wide	  ranging	  that	  the	  term	  has	  become	  difficult	  
to	   definitively	   describe	   (Auld	   et	   al,	   2008).	   The	   definition	   is	   often	   linked	   to	   its	  
application	   and	   context,	   and	   moreover	   may	   change	   over	   time	   as	   “new	   mores	  
become	  business	  as	  usual”	  (Moon,	  2007:	  pp.	  298)	  Some	  definitions	  of	  CSR	  specify	  
it	   as	   those	   ethical	   activities	   that	   go	   beyond	   what	   is	   legally	   required	   of	   a	   firm	  
(Falck	   and	   Heblich,	   2007;	   Auld	   et	   al,	   2008),	   however	   according	   to	   this	  
description,	   what	   may	   constitute	   CSR	   in	   one	   country	   may	   just	   form	   part	   of	   a	  
business’	  normal	  set	  of	  legal	  responsibilities	  in	  another	  (Moon,	  2007).	  Complying	  
with	   BBBEE	   legislation	   in	   South	   Africa	   is	   a	   relevant	   example	   of	   this.	   And	   as	  
government	   interest	   in	   promoting	   CSR	   through	   policy	   grows	   and	   laws	   change	  
the	   voluntary	   aspect	   of	   the	   CSR	   definition	   may	   hold	   less	   importance	   (Moon,	  
2007;	  Auld	  et	  al,	  2008).	  Other	  authors	  refer	  to	  it	  as	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  business	  
to	   society	   including	   social,	   environmental,	   legal	   and	   ethical	   considerations	   (Kolk	  
and	  Van	  Tulder,	  2006),	  this	  description	  however	  does	  not	  give	  insight	  into	  how	  
far	  a	  firm’s	  ‘responsibilities’	  should	  go.	  Despite	  ethics	  being	  noted	  as	  a	  legitimate	  
driver	   for	   some	   CSR	   activities,	   reference	   to	   ethics	   or	   morals	   tends	   to	   remain	  
outside	   of	   most	   formal	   definitions	   (Fig,	   2005).	   Because	   of	   the	   prominent	   role	  
that	   BBBEE	   legislation	   in	   the	   discourse	   and	   application	   of	   CSR	   in	   the	   South	  
African	  context,	  this	  thesis	  includes	  consideration	  of	  legislative	  requirements	  in	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The	  question	  of	  why	  firms	  engage	  in	  CSR	  has	  dominated	  the	  academic	  literature	  
(Margolis	  and	  Walsh,	  2003)	  and	  there	  are	  numerous	  studies	  devoted	  to	  trying	  to	  
establish	   the	   link	   between	   greater	   responsibility	   and	   financial	   returns.	   	   The	  
multitude	  of	  drivers	  for	  a	  firm	  engaging	  in	  CSR	  is,	  however,	  complex	  and	  context	  
specific,	   relating	   to	   competitors	   behaviour,	   societal	   norms	   and	   expectations	  	  
(Margolis	   and	  Walsh,	   2003;	   Kolk	   and	   van	   Tulder,	   2006).	   Drivers	   may	   include	  
financial	   advantage,	   necessity	   to	   accommodate	   state	   inadequacies	   to	   address	  
social	   issues,	   ethical	   considerations,	   compensation	   for	   negative	   externalities,	  
market	  and	  social	  trends	  and	  policy	  or	  legislative	  drivers	  (Moon,	  2007;	  Margolis	  
and	  Walsh,	  2003;	  Sadler	  and	  Lloyd,	  2009).	  
The	  application	  of	  CSR	  has	  also	  proved	  to	  be	  dynamic	  over	  time,	  what	  Auld	  et	  al	  
(2008)	   refers	   to	   as	   the	   ‘new	  CSR’.	   There	   has	   been	   a	   gradual	   shift	   from	   largely	  
philanthropic	  activities	  often	  unrelated	  to	  a	  firm’s	  core	  activities	  to	  activities	  that	  
focus	  on	  internalising	  a	  firm’s	  negative	  externalities	  and	  be	  a	  fundamental	  part	  of	  
the	  management	  and	  way	  of	  doing	  business	  (Auld	  et	  al,	  2008;	  Moon,	  2007).	   	   In	  
South	   Africa	   however	   CSR	   is	   often	   still	   criticised	   for	   its	   add-­‐on	   approach	  
consisting	  largely	  of	  philanthropic	  donations	  or	  CSI	  (Hamann	  et	  al,	  2005).	  	  Some	  
critics	   of	   CSR	   see	   the	   discourse	   as	   serving	   a	   strategic	   role	   to	   legitimise	   the	  
capitalist	   system	   and	   preserve	   the	   status	   quo.	   By	   branding	   companies	   as	  
responsible	   citizens	   and	   focussing	   on	   relatively	   minor	   adjustments	   to	   their	  
operations	  or	  social	  investments,	  it	  diverts	  attention	  and	  criticism	  away	  from	  the	  
fact	  that	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  their	  operations	  may	  be	  counter	  to	  the	  social	  interest	  
(e.g.	   oil	   companies),	   or	   serve	   to	   perpetuate	   socially	   undesirable	   structural	  
elements	   of	   the	   economy,	   such	   as	   free	   trade	   (Hamann	   and	  Acutt,	   2003;	   Sadler	  
and	  Lloyd,	  2009).	  	  
2.3.1. Stakeholder	  approach	  to	  business	  among	  wind	  developers	  in	  
the	  UK	  
The	   question	   of	   whether	   a	   business’s	   intention	   is	   “first	   to	   profit	   or	   to	   serve”	  
(Margolis	  and	  Walsh,	  2003)	  has	  been	  widely	  debated.	  Friedman’s	  (1970)	  seminal	  
paper	  on	  CSR	  proposed	  that	  the	  most	  appropriate	  way	  for	  business	  to	  contribute	  
to	   social	  welfare	  was	   through	   profit	  maximisation	   and	   that	   social	  welfare	  was	  
the	   domain	   of	   Governments,	   which	   were	   better	   equipped	   to	   deliver	   these	  
services	   (Moon,	   2007).	   Various	   opposing	   viewpoints	   to	   Friedman	   have	   since	  
emerged	   over	   the	   years.	   One	   of	   these	   that	   received	   great	   prominence	   is	  
Freeman’s	   (1984)	   stakeholder	   theory,	  which	   promoted	   that	   firms	   take	   greater	  
cognisance	   of	   the	   external	   environment	   in	   which	   they	   operate.	   This	   theory	  
proposed	   that	   companies	   should	   widen	   their	   understanding	   of	   which	   parties’	  
interests	   were	   of	   relevance	   to	   the	   firm	   from	   beyond	   shareholders	   to	   all	  
stakeholders.	  Stakeholders	  could	  include	  employees,	  consumers	  and	  customers,	  
communities	  and	  investors,	   in	  essence,	  “any	  group	  or	   individual	  who	  can	  affect	  
or	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  organisations	  objective”	  (Freeman,	  1984:	  
p.46	   in	  Margolis	  and	  Walsh,	  2003).	  All	  of	   these	  stakeholders	   it	  was	  argued	  can	  
impact	   a	   firm’s	   objective	   and	   profit-­‐making	   potential	   and	   should	   receive	   due	  
consideration	  (Falck	  and	  Heblich,	  2007).	  
From	  a	   review	  of	   the	  websites	   of	   nine	  wind	  developers	   in	   the	  UK,	   three,	   E.on,	  
Falck	   Renewables	   and	   Vattenfell,	   make	   explicit	   reference	   to	   adopting	   a	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implies	  extending	   the	  scope	  of	   relevant	  parties’	   interests,	   from	  shareholders	   to	  
all	   stakeholders,	   of	   which	   local	   communities	   would	   be	   one.	   By	   addressing	  
considerations	   of	   ‘being	   a	   responsible	   neighbour’	   and	   social	   considerations	   of	  
the	  needs	  and	  interests	  of	  the	  communities	  in	  which	  their	  operations	  are	  located,	  
they	  are	  able	  to	  create	  a	  strategic	  and	  financial	  advantage	  for	  their	  own	  business	  
operations.	   They	   are	   reducing	   the	   risks	   and	   costs	   to	   their	   business	   of	   appeals	  
taking	   place	   through	   planning	   process	   that	   could	   delay	   or	   even	   block	   their	  
project.	  	  
Community	   benefit	   schemes	   are	   now	   fairly	   commonplace	   in	   the	   UK.	   This	  may	  
lead	   to,	   if	   it	   has	   not	   already,	   a	   competitive	   pressure	   to	   provide	   community	  
benefits	   to	   keep	   on	   a	   par	   with	   competitors,	   as	   these	   become	   part	   of	   societal	  
expectations.	  Wind	  developers	  may	  also	  be	  drawing	  further	  strategic	  advantage	  
for	   their	   business	   by	   using	   these	   activities	   to	   promote	   their	   responsible	  
corporate	  image	  or	  linking	  it	  to	  their	  CSR	  portfolios.	  
2.3.2. CSR	  in	  South	  Africa	  	  
The	   application	   of	   CSR	   in	   South	   Africa	   has	   been	   influenced	   by	   the	   particular	  
historical	   and	   social	   conditions	   in	   the	   country.	  The	   entrenched	   socio-­‐economic	  
problems	   such	   as	   poverty,	   unemployment,	   HIV	   and	   racial	   disparities	   are	   all	  
reflected	   in	   the	   nature	   and	   discourse	   of	   CSR.	   	   Hamann	   et	   al	   (2005)	   note	   that	  
there	  is	  a	  diverse	  array	  of	  applications	  in	  South	  Africa	  ranging	  from	  voluntary	  to	  
mandatory	   compliance.	   Some	   of	   SA’s	   pervasive	   socio-­‐economic	   problems	  
affecting	  business	  are	  the	  impetus	  for	  action	  (e.g.	  workplace	  HIV	  programmes).	  
The	  most	   prominent	   face	   of	   CSR	   in	   South	   Africa	   however	   is	   probably	   through	  
BBBEE	  (Hamann	  et	  al,	  2005).	  Many	  companies	  do	  strategically	  link	  their	  BBBEE	  
compliance	  to	  their	  CSR	  in	  their	  corporate	  strategies	  (Hamann	  et	  al,	  2010).	  There	  
is	  obvious	  overlap	  in	  the	  discourses	  of	  CSR	  and	  BBBEE	  with	  the	  latter’s	  focus	  on	  
empowerment	  and	  business’s	  role	  in	  social	  transformation	  (Hamann	  et	  al,	  2010).	  
BBBEE	  	  arose	  out	  of	  the	  Government’s	  commitment	  to	  achieving	  transformation	  
in	   the	   economy	   and	   the	   slow	   pace	   of	   that	   change	   since	   the	   end	   of	   apartheid	  
(Hamann	  et	  al,	  2008).	  	  	  	  
Despite	   common	   usage	   of	   the	   term	   ‘corporate	   social	   responsibility’	   in	   the	  
literature,	  it	  is	  not	  as	  widespread	  in	  the	  South	  African	  business	  community.	  The	  
notion	   of	   responsibility	   in	   the	   South	  African	   context	  may	   entail	   an	   implication	  
that	  businesses	  may	  have	   some	   legacy	  or	  guilt	   to	  atone	   for	   from	   the	  apartheid	  
years.	   A	   more	   commonly	   used	   term	   in	   South	   African	   is	   therefore	   	   ‘corporate	  
social	   investment’	   or	   ‘corporate	   citizenship’	   (Fig,	   2005;	   Skinner	   and	  Mersham,	  
2008).	   Ndlovu	   (2009)	   describes	   the	   notion	   of	   corporate	   citizenship	   as	  
incorporating	   CSI	   aspects	   but	   is	   also	   inclusive	   of	   such	   concepts	   as	   business	  
ethics,	  good	  governance,	  health	  and	  safety	  and	  environmental	  standards.	  
2.4. Broad-­‐based	  black	  economic	  empowerment	  
An	   understanding	   of	   BBBEE	   in	   South	   Africa	   is	   extremely	   relevant	   as	   the	  wind	  
sector	  will	  be	  directly	   interacting	  with	  Government	   (through	   the	  application	  of	  
licenses)	  and	  will	  therefore	  be	  obliged	  to	  comply	  with	  BBBEE	  requirements.	  As	  
this	   legislation	  directly	  deals	  with	   issues	  aligned	   to	  CSR	  such	  as	  empowerment	  
and	   social	   transformation	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   understand	   its	   application	   to	   date	   in	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implementation	   and	   effectiveness	   to	   date.	   This	  will	   be	   important	   to	   informing	  
the	  ensuing	  analysis	  on	  BBBEE	  requirements	  placed	  on	  wind	  developers	  and	  the	  
potential	  for	  community	  benefits.	  
2.4.1. The	  development	  of	  Broad-­‐based	  black	  economic	  empowerment	  
in	  South	  Africa	  
The	  discourse	  on	  corporate	  citizenship	  is	  very	  firmly	  part	  of	  the	  agenda	  on	  social	  
transformation	   and	   redressing	   the	   injustices	   of	   apartheid.	   The	   South	   African	  
Government	  has	  played	  more	  of	  a	  direct	   role	   in	  establishing	  CSR	   than	   in	  many	  
other	   countries	   (Hamann	   et	   al,	   2008)	   with	   a	   mandate	   established	   in	   the	  
constitution	   (RSA,	  1996)	   to	  promote	   equality	   in	   future	   legislation	   “designed	   to	  
protect	   or	   advance	   persons,	   or	   categories	   of	   persons,	   disadvantaged	   by	   unfair	  
discrimination”	   (RSA,	   1996).	   	   BEE	   intends	   to	   support	   the	   participation	   of	  
previously	   disadvantaged	   individuals	   into	   the	  mainstream	   economy	   (Ramathe,	  
2009)	   and	   is	   an	   acknowledgement	   that	   business	   can	   play	   a	   prominent	   role	   in	  
transformation	  and	  redressing	  the	  injustices	  of	  the	  past	  which	  have	  manifested	  
into	   entrenched	   and	   ongoing	   social	   problems	   in	   the	   country	   (Hamann	   et	   al,	  
2008).	  	  
BEE	  as	  a	  concept	  emerged	  during	  the	  1990s,	  with	  the	  initial	  focus	  being	  on	  black	  
ownership	  in	  big	  corporations.	  Described	  as	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  BEE,	  this	  period	  of	  
empowerment	   deals	  was	   strongly	   criticised	   for	   catalysing	   the	   enrichment	   of	   a	  
few	  powerful	  individuals	  only.	  In	  response	  to	  this	  criticism	  the	  conceptualisation	  
of	   BEE	   was	   expanded	   to	   being	   more	   broad-­‐based.	   The	   term	   broad-­‐based	  
generally	   refers	   to	   the	   involvement	   of	   as	   wide	   a	   spectrum	   of	   participants	   as	  
possible.	  In	  SA’s	  BBBEE	  policy	  therefore	  this	  refers	  to	  the	  policy	  being	  directed	  at	  
achieving	   transformation	   and	   distributing	   wealth	   across	   as	   many	   previously	  
disadvantaged	   South	   Africans	   as	   possible.	   In	   policy	   terms	   this	   meant	   that	   the	  
policy	   expanded	   beyond	   its	   original	   narrow	   focus	   on	   equity	   ownership	   and	  
management	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   ‘seven	   pillars’	   of	   BEE	   in	   the	   Broad-­‐Based	  
Black	  Economic	  Empowerment	  Act	  (No	  53	  of	  2003).	  These	  included	  ownership,	  
management,	  employment	  equity,	  skills	  development,	  preferential	  procurement,	  
enterprise	   development	   (ED)	   and	   CSI.	   The	   BEE	   Codes	   of	   Good	   Practice	  
(established	   under	   section	   9	   of	   the	   BBBEE	   Act)	   were	   approved	   in	   2006	   to	  
provide	  guidelines	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  BBBEE.	  	  
Compliance	  with	  the	  codes	   is	  not	  enforced	  but	  rather	  relies	  either	  on	  access	   to	  
licenses	   (as	   would	   be	   the	   case	   in	   the	   renewables	   sector)	   or	   Government	  
contracts	   for	   procurement	   (Hamann	   et	   al,	   2010).	   However	   compliance	   also	  
requires	  that	  companies	  show	  that	  they	  procure	  from	  other	  companies	  that	  are	  
BBBEE	  compliant,	  thus	  in	  theory	  creating	  a	  wider	  ‘chain	  of	  compliance’	  (Ponte	  et	  
al,	  2007;	  Sartorius	  and	  Botha,	  2008).	  The	  reach	  of	  BBBEE	   in	   the	  private	  sector	  
has	   expanded	   and	   many	   companies	   report	   feeling	   normative	   and	   societal	  
pressure	  to	  be	  BEE	  compliant	  (Sartorius	  and	  Botha,	  2008),	  however	  the	  primary	  
driver	   for	   implementing	   BBBEE	   nonetheless	   appears	   to	   remain	   compliance	  
(Hamann	  et	  al,	  2010).	  	  
To	   deflect	   criticism	   on	   ownership	   deals	   empowering	   only	   a	   political	   elite,	  
Government	   has	   emphasized	   the	   broad-­‐based	   nature	   of	   the	   policy	   and	   the	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schemes.	   Companies	   can	   engage	   in	   ownership	   initiatives	   with	   internal	   or	  
external	  partners.	  Internal	  partners	  could	  be	  employees	  or	  managers.	  The	  choice	  
of	  a	  partner	  is	  often	  strategic	  and	  linked	  to	  a	  company’s	  intentions	  with	  regards	  
to	  expansion,	  making	  new	  connections	  or	  breaking	  into	  new	  markets.	  Sartorius	  
and	   Botha	   (2008)	   define	   the	   choice	   of	   an	   external	   BEE	   partner	   as	   being	  
operational	  (e.g.	  suppliers	  or	  business	  associates),	  influential	  (companies	  headed	  
by	  individuals	  with	  political	  connections)	  or	  broad-­‐based.	  External	  partners	  may	  
provide	  a	  higher	  public	  profile.	  	  
2.4.2. Criticisms	  
BBBEE	  has	  been	  widely	  criticised	  for	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  legislation	  actually	  
achieves	   its	   objectives	   of	   empowering	   the	   poor,	   with	   observations	   that	   it	   is	  
predominantly	   a	   select	   black	   elite	   that	   seems	   to	   reap	   most	   of	   the	   benefits	  
(Hamann	  et	   al,	  2005;	  Alessandri	   et	   al,	  2011).	  The	  extent	   to	  which	  criticisms	  of	  
elitism	   are	   justified	   is	   recognised	   as	   being	   dependent	   on	   each	   company’s	   own	  
interpretation	   and	   implementation	   of	   BEE	   (Hamann	   et	   al,	   2005),	   and	   how	  
meaningful	   the	   empowerment	   initiatives	   actually	   are.	   The	   policy	   intends	   to	  
promote	   empowerment	   and	   transformation	   through	   helping	   individuals	  
participate	   in	   the	  economy	  both	   through	  direct	   intervention	  such	  as	   increasing	  
black4	  ownership,	  management	  and	  employment	  equity,	  but	  also	  through	  direct	  
measures	  such	  as	  skills	  development,	  CSI	  and	  enterprise	  development.	  However	  
there	   is	   limited	   critical	   discourse	   questioning	   th 	   links	   between	   BEE	   and	  
sustainable	   development	   outcomes	   and	   whether,	   conceptually,	   this	   is	   an	  
effective	  policy	  choice	  to	  achieve	  these.	  
Another	  critical	  issue	  affecting	  BBBEE	  is	  that	  of	  fronting,	  which	  could	  be	  defined	  
as	   “a	   set	   of	   adverse	   business	   practises	   designed	   to	   circumvent	   the	  
implementation	   of	   BEE,	   thus	   undermining	   the	   effective	   implementation	   of	   the	  
objectives	   of	   BBBEE”	   (Business	   Unity	   South	   Africa,	   2005:	   p.9).	   Fronting	   in	  
ownership	   may	   be	   when	   companies	   appear	   to	   be	   owned	   or	   managed	   by	  
historically	   disadvantaged	   individuals	   (HDIs)	   but	   in	   essence	   control	   remains	  
under	  whites.	  Or	  for	  example	  fronting	  in	  employment	  equity	  could	  be	  employing	  
people	  for	  a	  role	  whilst	  never	  giving	  them	  the	  associated	  responsibility.	  BBBEE	  
verification	   agencies,	   accredited	   by	   the	   South	   African	   National	   Accreditation	  
System	   (SANAS)	   fulfil	   the	   role	   of	   authenticating	   BBBEE	   claims	   by	   businesses.	  
Whilst	   most	   of	   the	   focus	   on	   fronting	   is	   around	   the	   ownership	   element	   of	   the	  
scorecard,	   the	   research	   on	   fronting	   developed	   by	   Business	   Unity	   South	   Africa	  
(2005)	   notes	   that	   fronting	   can	   affect	   any	   one	   of	   the	   seven	   elements	   of	   the	  
scorecard.	  	  
2.4.3. Evaluating	  outcomes	  and	  success	  of	  the	  policy	  
What	  role	  can	  the	  legislation	  serve	  in	  contributing	  to	  sustainable	  development	  in	  
South	   Africa?	   The	   legislation	   is	   aimed	   at	   the	   empowerment	   of	   black	   people,	  
however	   this	   discourse	   tends	   to	   be	   overwhelmingly	   dominated	   by	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Reference	  to	  race	  in	  this	  thesis	  stems	  from	  South	  Africa’s	  apartheid	  history	  that	  was	  based	  on	  
discrimination	  against	  non-­‐white	  people	  in	  South	  Africa.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  discrimination	  the	  
ANC	  Government	  has	  instituted	  legislation	  that	  explicitly	  refers	  to	  the	  advancement	  of	  other	  
races	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  disadvantages	  they	  face.	  The	  term	  black	  in	  the	  context	  of	  BBBEE	  
refers	  to	  black,	  coloured,	  Indian,	  Asian	  and	  2nd	  generation	  Chinese	  who	  were	  naturalised	  citizens	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acquisition	  of	  black	  capital.	  The	  broad-­‐based	  aspects	  of	  the	  scorecard	  such	  as	  the	  
skills	   development,	   enterprise	   development	   and	   CSI	   bring	   some	   focus	   back	   to	  
more	   integral	   concepts	   required	   to	   empower	   people,	   but	   the	   success	   of	   the	  
policy	  in	  adequately	  targeting	  the	  poorest	  and	  neediest	  is	  questionable.	  	  
BBBEE	  has	  been	  challenged	  in	  a	  number	  of	  sectors	  for	  the	  slow	  and	  inadequate	  
implementation	  of	  virtually	  all	  elements	  of	  the	  scorecard.	  The	  policy	  lacks	  for	  a	  
critical	   evidence	   based	   evaluation	   of	   the	   impact	   that	   each	   element	   of	   the	  
scorecard	  has	  had	  in	  achieving	  its	  intended	  outcomes	  and	  transformation.	  Ponte	  
et	   al	   (2007)	   comment	   that	   relatively	   little	   academic	   research	   has	   been	  
undertaken	   on	   BBBEE	   to	   date	   and	   much	   of	   that	   which	   has	   been	   undertaken	  
emphasises	  aspects	  such	  as	  ownership	  and	  management.	  	  	  
Those	   studies	   in	   the	  academic	   literature	   that	  have	  been	  undertaken	  evaluating	  
the	  outcomes	  of	  BBBEE	  have	  focussed	  on	  specific	  sectors	  or	  particular	  elements	  
of	  the	  scorecard	  and	  are	  based	  on	  sample	  surveys.	  Findings	  of	  these	  studies	  tend	  
to	   concur	   that	   the	   overall	   pace	   of	   transformation	   has	   been	   slow.	   In	   respect	   of	  
ownership	   Ponte	   et	   al	   (2007)	   note	   that	   despite	   Government	  marketing	   of	   the	  
broad-­‐based	   focus	   of	   the	   policy	   on	   small	   and	   medium	   sized	   businesses,	  
transactions	   are	   still	   dominated	   by	   the	   enrichment	   of	   a	   small	   black	   elite	   often	  
with	   political	   connections.	   They	   note	   too	   that	   employment	   equity	   and	   skills	  
development,	  lacking	  any	  effective	  enforcement	  or	  penalty	  mechanism,	  has	  failed	  
to	  see	  significant	  improvements	  in	  improving	  the	  training	  and	  representations	  of	  
blacks	  within	  companies	  (ibid).	  	  
Mohamed	  and	  Roberts	  (2008)	  undertook	  a	  survey	  of	  a	  sample	  of	  companies	   in	  
the	   metals	   and	   engineering	   industries	   on	   aspects	   such	   as	   ownership,	  
employment	   equity,	   skills	   training	   and	   procurement.	   Despite	   this	   sector	   being	  
governed	   by	   a	   charter	   and	   having	   the	   pressure	   of	   direct	   Government	  
involvement	   through	   procurement,	   their	   findings	   showed	   no	   substantial	  
improvement	  in	  all	  areas	  of	  the	  scorecard	  and	  rather	  the	  strategic	  use	  of	  BEE	  to	  
manage	   public	   relations	   rather	   than	   effect	   real	   change.	   This	   finding	   is	  
corroborated	   in	  a	   study	  assessing	   the	   transformation	  achieved	  with	   regards	   to	  
women	   in	   business	   and	   management	   by	   Ndhlovu	   and	   Spring	   (2009).	   They	  
comment	  that	  “what	  gets	  measured	  gets	  done”,	  in	  that	  transformation	  was	  only	  
happening	   in	  areas	  that	  were	  being	  monitored	  or	  measured.	  This	  suggests	   that	  
transformation	  has	  not	  been	  adopted	  as	  part	  of	  general	  business	  practise.	  
An	   evaluation	   of	   preferential	   procurement	   and	   mentoring	   of	   HDI	   owned	  
companies	   in	   the	   construction	   sector	   by	  Martin	   and	   Root	   (2010)	   found	   that	   a	  
substantial	   knowledge	   transfer	   between	   established	   companies	   and	   emerging	  
companies	  was	   lacking	   despite	   the	  mechanisms	   established	   through	  BBBEE.	   A	  
study	  by	  Moyo	  and	  Rohan	  (2006)	  find	  the	  pace	  of	  transformation	  in	  the	  financial	  
services	  sector	  in	  respect	  of	  all	  elements	  of	  the	  Financial	  Services	  Charter	  (FSC)	  
to	  be	  disappointing	  and	  question	  whether	  its	  objectives	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  
self-­‐regulation	  as	  proposed	  in	  the	  FSC.	  
In	   recognition	   of	   criticisms	   and	   gaps	   between	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	  BBBEE	  Act	  
and	  its	  outcomes	  to	  date,	  Government	  commenced	  a	  five-­‐year	  review	  process	  of	  
the	  Act	  in	  2011,	  ahead	  of	  its	  originally	  stated	  intention	  of	  a	  ten-­‐year	  review.	  	  The	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the	   private	   sector	   in	   2010	   were	   still	   not	   fully	   compliant	   with	   BBBEE	   (Cloete,	  
2010).	   In	   2009	   the	   President	   established	   the	   BBBEE	   Advisory	   Council	   that	  
included	   representatives	   from	   government,	   business	   and	   trade	   unions.	   The	  
purpose	  of	  the	  advisory	  council	  was	  to	  provide	  guidance	  and	  monitoring	  on	  the	  
overall	  state	  of	  BBBEE.	  In	  November	  2011	  Cabinet	  approved	  amendments	  to	  the	  
BBBEE	  Act	   (Ensor,	  2011).	  The	  major	  emphasis	   in	   the	   revision	  of	   the	  act	  was	  a	  
shift	   away	   from	  a	  narrow	   focus	  on	  ownership	  and	  equity	  deals	   to	   increase	   the	  
focus	   on	   the	   broad-­‐based	   aspects	   of	   the	   scorecard,	   particularly	   enterprise	  
development	   and	   preferential	   procurement.	   One	   notable	   change	   was	   in	   the	  
awarding	  of	  Government	   tenders.	   	   Previously	   tendering	  had	  often	  been	  on	   the	  
basis	   of	   the	   Preferential	   Procurement	   Policy	   Framework	   Act	   no	   5	   of	   2000	  
(PPPFA)	   (National	   Treasury,	   2000)	   rather	   than	   the	   BBBEE	   Act,	   and	   tended	   to	  
focus	   on	   only	   a	   few	   elements	   of	   the	   scorecard,	   mainly	   ownership	   or	  
management.	  Subsequent	  to	  the	  amendments	  to	  the	  BBBEE	  Act,	  all	  elements	  of	  
the	  whole	  scorecard	  will	  now	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  (Econobee,	  2011).	  	  
Other	   amendments	   included	   a	   greater	   weighting	   for	   ED,	   especially	   in	   priority	  
sectors	   identified	   in	   the	   New	   Growth	   Path	   (Department	   of	   Economic	  
Development,	   2010)	   and	   Industrial	   Policy	   Action	   Plan	   (IPAP)	   (Department	   of	  
Trade	   and	   Industry,	   2011).	   Targets	   in	   respect	   of	   skills	   development,	  
procurement	   and	   enterprise	   development	   were	   revised	   as	   well	   as	   minimum	  
thresholds	   prescribed.	   Stricter	   penalties	   were	   outlined	   for	   fronting	   and	   non-­‐
compliance	  including	  fines,	  criminal	  sanction	  against	  executives	  and	  cancellation	  
of	   government	   contracts	   and	   BBBEE	   verification	   would	   now	   have	   to	   be	  
undertaken	  annually	  (Creamer,	  2011d).	  
The	  BBBEE	  Act	  has	  been	  in	  force	  only	  since	  2007	  and	  as	  such	  has	  not	  had	  that	  
long	   to	   be	   able	   to	   have	   achieved	   significant	   and	   lasting	   impacts	   on	   its	  
transformation	   objectives.	   The	   emergence	   of	   the	   five-­‐year	   review	   and	  
amendment	   process	   indicates	   a	   healthy	   evolutionary	   process	   to	   the	   policy,	  
responding	  to	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  legislation.	  The	  new	  changes	  to	  the	  Act	  show	  a	  
determined	   focus	   to	   redirect	   the	  policy	  back	   to	   its	   broad-­‐based	  objectives	   and	  
improve	  performance	  and	  implementation.	  The	  actual	  impact	  on	  transformation	  
and	   sustainable	   development	   in	   South	   Africa	   is	   still	   difficult	   to	   determine.	  
Proponents	  argue	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  black	  middle	  class	  is	  evidence	  of	  the	  
policy	   having	   already	   had	   a	  wider	   impact	   than	   just	   the	   enrichment	   of	   a	   small	  
elite	   (Noble,	   2011).	   Attributing	   direct	   causality	   between	   the	   new	  black	  middle	  
class	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  BBBEE	  is	  probably	  an	  overly	  simplistic	  conclusion	  to	  draw,	  
and	   a	  much	  wider	   range	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   and	   political	   factors	   probably	   also	  
come	   into	   play.	   The	   impact	   that	   BBBEE	   can	   have	   on	   poverty	   alleviation	   and	  
development	   outcomes	   might	   best	   be	   through	   building	   people’s	   capabilities	  
through	   skills	   development,	   small	   business	   development	   (through	   the	  
preferential	  procurement	  and	  enterprise	  development	  elements)	  as	  well	  as	   the	  
socio-­‐economic	   development	   (SED)	   element.	   This	   focuses	   on	   a	  wider	   range	   of	  
socio-­‐economic	  aspects	  to	  development	  (such	  as	  health,	  education	  etc).	  However	  
the	  implementation	  of	  these	  elements	  of	  the	  scorecard	  remains	  slow	  to	  date	  and	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2.5. Conclusion	  
This	   literature	   review	   has	   given	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   some	   of	   the	   key	   areas	   of	  
literature	  relevant	  to	  the	  exploration	  of	  community	  benefit	  schemes	  in	  the	  South	  
African	  wind	  sector.	  The	  UK	  was	  examined	  as	  a	  case	  study	  to	  give	  some	  context	  
in	  the	  literature	  for	  how	  this	  phenomenon	  has	  gained	  traction	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  
world,	  what	  some	  of	  the	  key	  drivers	  for	  developers	  were	  and	  the	  types	  of	  benefit	  
schemes	   that	   are	   typically	   established.	   Developers	   in	   the	   UK	   originally	  
encountered	  significant	  difficulties	  from	  public	  opposition,	  which	  resulted	  in	  low	  
deployment	  rates	  and	  a	  higher	  project	  risk	  profile.	  However	  by	  responding	  and	  
adopting	  a	  broader	  perspective	  of	  their	  role	  in	  society	  or	  a	  stakeholder	  approach	  
to	  their	  business	  operations,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  successfully	  overcome	  issues	  that	  
might	   otherwise	   have	   threatened	   their	   profitability	   and	   project	   success.	   They	  
successfully	   established	   a	   merging	   of	   social	   and	   financial	   interests	   in	   their	  
project	  development	  models.	  The	  most	  common	  models	   for	  benefit	   schemes	   in	  
the	   UK	   are	   payments	   into	   a	   community	   fund	   and	   community	   part	   ownership	  
schemes,	   made	   possible	   by	   individuals	   buying	   equity	   stakes	   in	   wind	   farm	  
projects.	  
This	  UK	  case	  study	  is,	  of	  course,	  highly	  contextual	  and	  dependent	  on	  factors	  such	  
as	  a	  difficult	  planning	  system	  and	  vocal	  community	  opposition	  groups	  intent	  on	  
preserving	  rural	  landscapes.	  How	  a	  similar	  phenomenon	  of	  community	  benefits	  
schemes	   could	   develop	   in	   South	   Africa	  would	   necessarily	   relate	   to	   the	   unique	  
socio-­‐political	   and	   legislative	   context	   here.	   It	   is	   likely	   that	   any	   application	   of	  
community	   benefit	   schemes	   in	   South	   Africa	   would	   be	   bound	   up	   with	   BBBEE	  
requirements.	   This	   legislation	   has	   made	   CSR	   a	   mandatory	   consideration	   for	  
companies	  doing	  business	  with	  the	  public	  sector	  in	  South	  Africa	  through	  the	  SED	  
element	   of	   the	   scorecard.	   	   Although	   the	   discussion	   of	   business’s	   social	   and	  
environmental	   responsibilities	   is	   a	   well-­‐entrenched	   concept	   internationally,	   it	  
remains	   largely	   voluntary.	   In	   contrast,	   South	  Africa	  has	   taken	   a	   very	  proactive	  
stance	   in	   legislating	   this	   and	   business	   has	   been	   assigned	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	  
sustainable	  development	  and	  transformation	  agendas	  of	  the	  country.	  This	  thesis	  
hypothesises	  that	  there	  is	  a	  potential	  for	  community	  benefits	  schemes	  from	  wind	  
farms	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  South	  African	  context	  and	  intends	  to	  explore	  this.	  It	  does	  
this	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  role	   that	   the	  South	  African	  Government	  has	  assigned	  
the	   private	   sector	   in	   contributing	   to	   social	   transformation	   through	   being	  
responsible	   corporate	   citizens	   and	   proactively	   supporting	   transformation	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3. Methodology	  
3.1. Methods	  of	  data	  collection	  
This	   thesis	   has	   adopted	   an	   emergent	   methodology	   which	   adopts	   a	   flexible	  
qualitative	  research	  design,	  in	  which	  “the	  detailed	  framework	  ...	  emerges	  during	  
the	   study”	   (Robson,	   2002:	   p.81).	   “It	   implies	   a	   researcher	   who	   is	   aware	   of	  
multiple	   possibilities	   in	   the	   early	   stages,	  who	   selects	   appropriate	   strategies	   as	  
s/he	   assimilates	   the	   material	   and	   begins	   to	   understand	   its	   significance	   and	  
makes	   iterative	   adjustments	   throughout	   the	   process”	   (Wright,	   2009:	   64).	   The	  
initial	  understanding	  and	   framing	  of	   the	  research	  questions	  were	  based	  on	   the	  
literature	   review	   undertaken,	   but	   very	   little	   was	   known	   about	   the	   different	  
drivers	  and	  local	  context	  for	  community	  benefits	  and	  the	  full	  range	  of	  issues	  that	  
were	  involved	  only	  became	  clear	  as	  the	  research	  got	  underway.	  This	  thesis	  has	  
therefore	   taken	   an	   inductive	   approach	   to	   the	   research.	   Rather	   than	   seeking	   to	  
test	   specific	   propositions,	   this	   research	   has	   sought	   to	   take	   an	   exploratory	  
approach	   investigating	   the	   context	   specific	   issues	   and	   drivers	   from	   which	   to	  
inductively	  explain	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  community	  wind	  in	  the	  South	  
African	  context	  (Merriam,	  1998).	  	  
The	  renewables	  industry	  is	  a	  new	  and	  emerging	  sector	  in	  South	  Africa	  with	  the	  
procurement	   programme	   still	   evolving	   whilst	   this	   research	   was	   being	  
undertaken.	  	  The	  activities	  of	  developers	  in	  the	  industry	  are	  therefore	  still	  being	  
formalised,	   as	   shaped	   by	   these	   legislative	   requirements.	   At	   this	   stage	   there	   is	  
limited	  information	  or	  literature	  on	  the	  aspects	  of	  the	  sector	  of	  relevance	  to	  this	  
study.	   	   Interviews	   were	   therefore	   considered	   the	   most	   appropriate	   means	   of	  
collecting	   primary	   data	   from	  which	   t 	   explore	   and	   develop	   insights	   about	   the	  
concept	  and	  potential	  for	  community	  wind	  in	  the	  unique	  socio-­‐economic	  context	  
of	   South	   Africa.	   Interviews	   were	   undertaken	   with	   various	   sector	   experts	  
including	  representatives	  from	  the	  sector’s	  trade	  association	  (SAWEA),	  legal	  and	  
BBBEE	   experts	   and	   planning	   consultants	   as	   well	   as	   a	   sample	   of	   wind	   energy	  
developers	   in	   South	   Africa.	   Interviews	   were	   undertaken	   in	   a	   semi-­‐structured	  
manner	   and	   left	   open-­‐ended.	   This	   approach	   to	   interviewing	   was	   considered	  
appropriate	  in	  light	  of	  the	  emergent	  and	  inductive	  nature	  of	  the	  research.	  	  
3.2. Participant	  selection	  and	  interview	  process	  
Semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   were	   undertaken	   with	   industry	   experts	   (legal	  
experts	   and	   representatives	   from	   the	   trade	   association),	   BEE	   expert,	   planning	  
consultants	  and	  developers	  in	  South	  Africa	  to	  gain	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  
legislative	  issues	  and	  extent	  of	  community	  benefit	  activities,	  types	  of	  models	  and	  
incentives.	   Participants	   (other	   than	   the	  wind	   developers)	  were	   identified	  who	  
would	   potentially	   be	   able	   to	   provide	   significant	   knowledge	   or	   insight	   into	   the	  
industry	   based	   on	   their	   direct	   involvement	   or	   experience	   in	   the	   sector.	   The	  
details	  of	  interviewees	  are	  outlined	  in	  the	  appendix.	  A	  snowballing	  approach	  to	  
identifying	   participants	   was	   used.	   Original	   contacts	   were	   established	   via	  
informal	   conversations	  with	   industry	   stakeholders	   at	   the	  African	  Wind	  Energy	  
Association	   (AfriWEA)	   Conference	   in	   Cape	   Town	   in	   May	   2011	   and	   from	   my	  
supervisor	  at	   the	  Energy	  Research	  Centre	   (UCT).	  This	   led	   to	   recommendations	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Five	  developers	  were	   interviewed	  whose	   identities	  will	   be	  kept	   confidential	   in	  
this	  thesis.	  They	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  Developer	  1,	  Developer	  2	  etc.	  An	  attempt	  
was	  made	   to	   speak	   to	  developers	  both	  with	  and	  without	  an	  outwardly	  explicit	  
commitment	   to	   social	   upliftment	   (on	   their	  websites	   for	   example)	   to	   explore	   a	  
spectrum	   of	   developers’	   approaches.	   Two	   of	   the	   developers	   interviewed	  were	  
South	   African,	   two	  were	   English	   and	   one	  was	   German.	   One	   of	   the	   developer’s	  
company	  was	  developed	  with	  the	  mandate	  to	  establish	  community	  wind	  farms.	  	  	  
An	   introductory	   email	   was	   sent	   to	   participants	   introducing	   the	   research	   and	  
asking	  if	  they	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  share	  their	  experiences	  and	  insight.	  Interviews	  
were	  mostly	  conducted	  telephonically	  except	  for	  a	  few	  undertaken	  face-­‐to-­‐face.	  
Interviews	   lasted	   between	   45	   minutes	   and	   an	   hour	   depending	   on	   the	  
conversation.	   Initial	   interview	   topics	  and	  prompting	  questions	  were	  devised	  at	  
the	  outset	  (based	  on	  the	  literature	  and	  initial	  conversations)	  to	  act	  as	  an	  opening	  
or	  guide	  for	  the	  conversation	  and	  to	  make	  sure	  all	  relevant	  issues	  were	  covered.	  
Interviews	  were	   conducted	   in	   a	   conversational	   and	   open-­‐ended	   style	   allowing	  
for	  unscheduled	  questions	  and	  previously	  unknown	  issues	  to	  emerge	  during	  the	  
course	   of	   the	   conversation.	   This	   allowed	   issues	   to	   be	   explored	   via	   the	   direct	  
experiences	  of	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  sector.	  	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  data	  collection	  process	  was	  to	  engage	  with	  selected	  participants	  
to	   explore	   a	   range	   of	   issues	   in	   greater	   depth	   and	   to	   gain	   insights	   about	   the	  
industry.	  It	  is	  recognised	  that	  there	  are	  limitations	  involved	  with	  this	  approach.	  
The	  findings	  may	  be	  quite	  specific	  to	  those	  developers	  interviewed	  and	  may	  not	  
be	   representative	   of	   others’	   experiences	   more	   generally.	   Additionally	   without	  
interviewing	   stakeholders	   from	   other	   sectors	   (e.g.	   developers	   of	   large	  
construction	   projects	   with	   BBBEE	   requirements)	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   draw	   sector	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4. Results	   and	  Analysis:	   The	   role	  of	   legislation	   in	   stimulating	  
community	  benefits	  from	  wind	  
4.1. Introduction	  
This	   section	   interrogates	   the	   first	   research	   question	   of	   this	   thesis,	   that	   of	  
investigating	  the	  various	  legislative	  drivers	  that	  might	  incentivise	  developers	  to	  
undertake	   community	   benefit	   contributions.	   This	   section	   presents	   the	   results	  
from	   interviews	  and,	   in	   some	  sections,	   additional	   literature	   in	  order	   to	  discuss	  
relevant	   issues.	   	   It	  starts	  by	   investigating	  the	  role	  of	  the	  choice	  of	  procurement	  
programme	   (feed-­‐in	   tariff	   versus	   a	   competitive	   bidding	   system)	   and	   the	  
economic	  development	  requirements	  placed	  on	  developers	   through	   the	  BBBEE	  
scorecard	   matrix.	   It	   then	   moves	   on	   to	   a	   discussion	   about	   CDM	   and	   the	  
requirements	  this	  may	  impose	  on	  developers	  to	  satisfy	  sustainable	  development	  
requirements.	  Finally	  it	  looks	  at	  the	  role	  that	  EIAs	  could	  play	  in	  regards	  to	  socio-­‐
economic	  impact	  assessments	  that	  projects	  must	  undertake.	  	  
4.2. The	  renewables	  procurement	  programme	  in	  South	  Africa	  	  
The	  policy	  support	  programme	  for	  renewables	  in	  South	  Africa	  has	  been	  evolving	  
over	  a	  number	  of	  years	  and	  has	  been	  characterised	  by	  many	  delays	  and	  surprises	  
along	  the	  way.	  Since	  its	  inception	  the	  procurement	  programme	  has	  had	  to	  satisfy	  
multiple	   objectives	   including	   energy	   security,	   emissions	   reductions	   and	  
economic	   development.	   This	   has	   lent	   a	   distinctly	   unique	   shape	   to	   the	   policy	  
options	   devised	   in	   comparison	   to	   approaches	   taken	   in	   other	   countries.	   This	  
section	   explores	   the	   development	   of	   the	   overall	   policy	   support	   programmes	  
considered	   in	  South	  Africa	   from	   the	  original	   renewable	  energy	   feed-­‐in	   tariff	   to	  
the	  final	  competitive	  bidding	  system	  and	  the	  concomitant	  evolution	  of	  economic	  
development	  requirements.	  It	  does	  so	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  providing	  insight	  into	  
the	  first	  research	  question	  of	  this	  thesis,	  which	  explores	  the	  role	  of	  legislation	  in	  
stimulating	  community	  benefits.	  The	  intention	  of	  this	  section	  is	  not	  to	  investigate	  
in-­‐depth	   the	   merits	   and	   efficacy	   of	   different	   policy	   support	   options	   for	  
stimulating	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  economic	  development	  requirements,	  but	  to	  look	  
at	   their	   impact	   and	   potential	   for	   stimulating	   local	   community	   benefits	   in	  
particular.	  
4.2.1. The	  development	  of	  the	  renewables	  procurement	  programme	  
The	   procurement	   programme	   was	   being	   finalised	   during	   the	   period	   that	   this	  
thesis	  was	  being	  written.	  This	   section	  briefly	   traces	   the	  development	   from	   the	  
National	  Energy	  Regulator	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  (NERSA’s)	  Renewable	  Energy	  Feed-­‐
In	  Tariff	  (REFIT)	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Energy’s	  (DoE)	  IPPPP	  for	  
renewables.	   Policy	   support	   for	   renewable	   energy	   in	   South	   Africa	   was	   first	  
officially	  outlined	  in	  the	  White	  Paper	  on	  Energy	  Policy	  (Department	  of	  Minerals	  
and	   Energy,	   1998)	   in	   its	   medium	   term	   policy	   priorities,	   which	   outlined	   the	  
objective	  to	  “stimulate	  the	  development	  of	  new	  and	  renewable	  sources	  of	  energy	  
(Department	  of	  Minerals	  and	  Energy,	  1998:	  p.28).	  	  This	  was	  later	  expanded	  on	  in	  
the	  White	  Paper	  on	  Renewable	  Energy	  in	  2003	  in	  which	  Government	  set	  a	  target	  
of	   10,000	   GWh	   of	   renewable	   energy	   by	   2013	   (Department	   of	   Minerals	   and	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development	  of	  renewable	  generating	  capacity	  until	  the	  announcement	  of	  plans	  
to	  investigate	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  REFIT	  in	  2007.	  	  
A	   REFIT	   is	   an	   economic	   instrument	   designed	   to	   incentivise	   the	   uptake	   of	   an	  
emergent	   industry	   such	   as	   renewable	   energy	   which	   is	   not	   yet	   economically	  
competitive	  with	  conventional	  energy	  generation,	  yet	  is	  desirable	  to	  incentivise	  
for	  other	  reasons	  e.g.	  environmental	  (Winkler,	  2005).	  REFITs	  guarantee	  a	   fixed	  
price	  paid	  to	  renewable	  energy	  generators	  for	  a	  specified	  time	  period.	  In	  Europe	  
feed-­‐in-­‐tariffs	   have	   shown	   to	   be	   most	   effective	   policy	   option	   at	   stimulating	  
investment	  and	  increasing	  capacity	  of	  renewables	  (Winkler,	  2005;	  Mendonca	  et	  
al,	  2009).	  
NERSA	  oversaw	  the	  development	  of	  the	  REFIT	  initiative	  in	  South	  Africa.	  Broader	  
policy	   support	   for	   a	   REFIT	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   support	   the	   procurement	   of	   new	  
renewable	   generation	   was	   laid	   out	   in	   the	   Electricity	   Regulations	   on	   New	  
Generation	  Capacity	  promulgated	  in	  August	  2009	  by	  the	  DoE.	  These	  regulations	  
explicitly	   laid	  out	  considerations	  for	  procurement	  of	  renewable	  energy	  under	  a	  
REFIT	   programme	   (Department	   of	   Energy,	   2009).	   In	   March	   2009	   REFIT	  
guidelines	  were	  approved	  and	  eventually	  in	  February	  2010	  NERSA	  released	  the	  
much-­‐anticipated	   draft	   document,	   Regulatory	   Rules	   on	   Selection	   Criteria	   for	  
Renewable	  Energy	  Projects	  under	   the	  REFIT	   (National	  Energy	  Regulator	  South	  
Africa,	  2010).	  	  	  
The	   private	   sector,	   attracted	   by	   generous	   tariffs,	   showed	   support	   and	  
enthusiasm	  for	  the	  REFIT	  (Waller,	  2010),	  but	  progress	  in	  policy	  implementation	  
was	   characterised	   by	   significant	   delays.	   Rumours	   started	   to	   emerge	   in	   early	  
2011	  that	  Government	  might	  be	  planning	  on	  dropping	  the	  REFIT	  programme	  in	  
favour	   of	   a	   competitive	   bidding	   process	   (Creamer,	   2011a).	   These	  were	   fuelled	  
when	  the	  new	  Electricity	  Regulations	  on	  New	  Generation	  Capacity,	  which	  were	  
promulgated	  in	  May	  2011,	  omitted	  all	  previous	  mention	  of	  a	  REFIT.	  	  
There	  was	  considerable	  uncertainty	  amongst	   industry	  stakeholders	  during	   this	  
time	   period.	   It	   eventually	   emerged	   that	   National	   Treasury	   had	   challenged	   the	  
legality	   of	   the	   REFIT	   programme.	   	   The	   issues	   raised	   by	   National	   Treasury	  
included	   whether	   NERSA’s	   mandate	   gave	   it	   the	   ability	   to	   run	   a	   procurement	  
programme.	  A	  legal	  opinion	  sought	  by	  SAWEA	  on	  the	  matter	  confirmed	  that	  the	  	  
“Electricity	  Regulation	  Act	  stipulated	  that	  NERSA	  only	  had	  discretionary	  power	  
to	   decide	   on	   licence	   applications	   and	   not	   the	   power	   to	   make	   upfront	   tariff	  
determinations.”	  (Businesslive,	  2011).	  	  
The	   REFIT	   was	   also	   challenged	   on	   a	   constitutional	   basis.	   Section	   217	   of	   the	  
Constitution	   states	   that	   “When	   an	   organ	   of	   state…	   contracts	   for	   goods	   or	  
services,	   it	   must	   do	   so	   in	   accordance	   with	   a	   system	   which	   is	   fair,	   equitable,	  
transparent,	   competitive,	   and	   cost-­‐effective”	   (RSA,	   1996:	   p.1331(26)).	   This	   is	  
given	  effect	  in	  the	  Preferential	  Procurement	  Policy	  Framework	  Act	  (PPPFA	  No.	  5	  
of	   2000),	  which	   states	   that	   in	  determining	   its	  preferential	   procurement	  policy,	  
any	  organ	  of	  state	  must	  base	  90%	  of	  its	  decision	  on	  price	  (if	  the	  tender	  price	  is	  
above	   a	   certain	   amount,	   and	   80%	   if	   below	   a	   certain	   amount).	   The	   remaining	  
10%	   (or	   20%)	  may	   be	   allocated	   for	   preference	   for	   historically	   disadvantaged	  
individuals	   (HDIs)	   or	   implementing	   the	   goals	   of	   the	   Reconstruction	   and	  










	   28	  
Policy	   Framework	   Act	   applied	   only	   to	   certain	   organs	   of	   state,	   defined	   in	   the	  
Public	  Finance	  Management	  Act	  (PFMA)	  of	  1999	  (National	  Treasury,	  1999)	  and	  
which	  did	  not	  include	  Eskom.	  However	  recently	  the	  Minister	  of	  Finance	  extended	  
the	  application	  of	  the	  Act	  to	  include	  all	  organs	  of	  state	  (Brodsky,	  2011).	  	  
There	   seemed	   to	   be	   a	  misalignment	   and	  misunderstanding	   of	   the	   roles	   of	   the	  
various	   stakeholders	   including	   DoE,	   National	   Treasury	   and	   NERSA.	   Treasury	  
questioned	  NERSA’s	  right	  to	  run	  the	  procurement	  process,	  whilst	  NERSA	  pointed	  
out	  that	  they	  had	  only	  been	  following	  the	  lead	  of	  the	  DoE	  (Creamer,	  2011a).	  The	  
confusion	  surrounding	  the	  choice	  of	  programme	  was	  evidenced	  in	  a	  report	  to	  the	  
Parliamentary	   Portfolio	   Committee	   on	   Energy	   on	   24	   June	   2011.	   During	   this	  
meeting	  NERSA	  presented	  on	  their	  progress	  with	  the	  REFIT	  followed	  by	  the	  DoE	  
presenting	  on	  a	  ‘Renewable	  Energy	  Programme’	  which	  appeared	  to	  be	  separate	  
from	  NERSA’s	  REFIT.	   It	  emerged	   that	   the	  DoE	  had,	  at	   the	  end	  of	  2010,	  already	  
made	   the	   decision	   to	   commence	   with	   the	   development	   of	   an	   alternative	  
procurement	   programme	   based	   on	   price	   competition	   (dubbed	   Rebid).	   Thus	  
during	   the	   beginning	   of	   2011,	   both	   the	   DoE	   and	   NERSA	   were	   concurrently	  
pursuing	   the	   development	   of	   separate	   procurement	   programmes.	   Overall	   the	  
legal	  opinion	  sought	  by	   the	  South	  African	  Wind	  Energy	  Association	  referred	   to	  
above	  found	  that	  the	  REFIT	  would	  not	  be	  legally	  binding	  and	  could	  be	  used	  only	  
as	  a	  guideline.	  The	  DoE	  stated	  they	  intended	  to	  follow	  a	  process	  of	  competitive	  
bidding	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   risk	   of	   a	   future	   legal	   challenge	   (Department	   of	  
Energy,	  2011b).	  	  
The	   request	   for	   proposals	   (RFP)	   bid	   documentation	   for	   the	   new	   IPP	  
Procurement	   Programme	   for	   Renewables	   was	   released	   on	   3	   August	   2011,	  
revealing	  a	  number	  of	  surprises	  in	  the	  new	  bid	  programme.	  Firstly	  there	  was	  a	  
substantial	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  MWs	  to	  be	  commissioned	  in	  the	  first	  phase.	  
This	  was	  increased	  from	  1,025	  MW	  to	  3,725	  MW,	  with	  wind	  allocated	  1,850	  MW.	  
This	   was	   purportedly	   to	   make	   the	   development	   of	   a	   local	   manufacturing	  
industry	   more	   attractive	   to	   equipment	   manufacturers	   (Creamer,	   2011b).	  
However	  it	  was	  also	  reportedly	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  wind’s	  relatively	  short	  lead	  
times	   to	  come	  on	   line	   to	  address	   the	  pressing	  energy	  supply	  constraints	   in	   the	  
system.	   The	   RFP	   documentation	   was	   designed	   to	   favour	   the	   ‘readiness’	   of	  
projects	   in	   order	   to	   proceed	   first	   with	   those	   that	   could	   come	   on	   line	   soonest	  
(Breytenbach,	  2011).	  	  
The	   IPPPP	  outlined	  a	   final	   selection	  process	   that	  was	  based	  on	  70%	  price	   and	  
30%	   economic	   development	   criteria	   (Creamer,	   2011c).	   An	   exemption	   was	  
obtained	   from	   the	   National	   Treasury	   relating	   to	   the	   application	   of	   the	  
Preferential	   Procurement	   Policy	   Framework	   Act	   (Brodsky,	   2011).	   This	   meant	  
the	  programme	  could	  have	  discretion	  in	  allocating	  the	  weighting	  between	  price	  
and	   economic	   development	   and	   did	   not	   have	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   90/10	   split	  
specified	   in	   the	   Preferential	   Procurement	   Policy	   Framework	   Act.	   A	   two-­‐stage	  
project	   evaluation	   process	   was	   outlined	   that	   included	   a	   qualification	   and	  
evaluation	   round.	   The	   first	   stage	   defined	   a	   set	   of	   ‘threshold’	   requirements	   in	  
respect	   of	   financial,	   legal,	   environmental	   consent,	   technical	   and	   economic	  
development	   considerations.	   These	   gate-­‐keeping	   criteria	   determine	   if	   a	   bid	   is	  
compliant	   and	   able	   to	   proceed	   to	   the	   second	   evaluation	   stage.	   In	   the	   second	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development	  criteria	   in	  a	  70/30	  split	  and	  comparatively	  ranked	  based	  on	  their	  
scores	  (Developer	  5,	  2011).	  	  
4.2.2. Support	  for	  economic	  development	  in	  the	  renewables	  
procurement	  programme	  
In	   a	   presentation	   on	   the	   IPPPP	   for	   Renewables	   by	   the	   DoE	   to	   Parliament	  
(Department	  of	  Energy,	  2011b),	   several	  key	  objectives	  were	  outlined	   including	  
job	  creation,	  localisation	  of	  technologies,	  skills	  development,	  energy	  security	  and	  
climate	   change	   mitigation.	   Although	   these	   multiple	   objectives	   in	   a	   renewable	  
procurement	   programme	   is	   unusual	   in	   comparison	   with	   other	   countries,	   it	   is	  
common	   in	   South	   Africa	   for	   any	   form	   of	   Government	   procurement	   to	   also	  
include	   objectives	   relating	   to	   economic	   development,	   localisation	   and	   BBBEE	  
(Brodsky,	   2011).	   In	   both	   renewable	  procurement	  programmes	   (the	  REFIT	   and	  
the	   Rebid)	   support	   for	   economic	   development	   had	   a	   prominent	   place.	   This	  
section	   briefly	   describes	   how	   this	   objective	   was	   articulated	   in	   the	   two	  
programmes.	  	  
The	   REFIT	   included	   a	   range	   of	   non-­‐price	   selection	   criteria	   on	   which	   projects	  
would	   be	   evaluated.	   This	   was	   fairly	   unusual	   compared	   with	   other	   examples	  
internationally,	   which	   commonly	   operate	   on	   a	   first	   come	   first	   served	   basis	  
(Winkler,	  2005)	  and	  do	  not	  have	  to	  compete	  against	  each	  other.	  These	  ten	  non-­‐
price	   criteria	   in	   the	   South	   African	   REFIT	   related	   to	   technical	   and	   social	  
considerations,	   ‘state	  of	   readiness’	   of	   the	  project	   and	   compliance	  with	   the	   IRP.	  
Two	  social	   criteria	  were	  proposed	  relating	   to	   local	  economic	  development	  and	  
BBBEE.	   The	   first	   social	   criterion	   required	   that	   project	   selection	   would	   show	  
“preference	   for	   a	   plant	   technology	   and	   location	   that	   contributes	   to	   local	  
economic	   development”	   (National	   Energy	   Regulator	   South	   Africa,	   2010:	   p.11).	  
The	  other	  was	  for	  “compliance	  with	  [BBBEE]	  legislation	  in	  respect	  of	  historically	  
disadvantaged	  individuals”	  (ibid:	  11).	  Together	  these	  accounted	  for	  10%	  and	  8%	  
respectively	  of	  the	  total	  score	  out	  of	  100.	  	  
The	  BBBEE	  requirements	  were	  only	  in	  respect	  of	  ownership,	  black	  management,	  
black	  female	  management	  and	  black	  skilled	  personnel,	  none	  of	  which	  were	  likely	  
to	  translate	  into	  locally	  realised	  benefits.	  The	  criteria	  did	  not	  include	  any	  of	  the	  
broad-­‐based	   aspects	   of	   the	   scorecard	   and	   appeared	   to	   be	   a	   generally	  
unambitious	  enactment	  of	   the	  BBBEE	   legislation.	  The	   jobs	  per	  MW	  criterion	  as	  
an	  indicator	  to	  represent	  local	  economic	  development	  also	  appeared	  inadequate.	  
There	   was	   no	   specification	   in	   the	   document	   of	   what	   constituted	   local	   and	  
thereby	  where	  these	   jobs	  should	  be	   located.	  For	  a	  technology	  such	  as	  wind	  the	  
local	   job	   creation	   from	   the	   operation	   and	  maintenance	   activities	   are	   relatively	  
limited	  and	  the	  opportunities	  for	  these	  to	  be	  localised	  is	  very	  low	  (Developer	  5,	  
2011).	   The	  most	   substantial	   job	   opportunities	   relate	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	  
manufacturing	  industry,	  which	  cannot	  be	  established	  in	  the	  short	  term	  (Hawes,	  
2011).	   Furthermore	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   a	   jobs	   indicator	   constitutes	   an	  
adequate	  measure	  of	  development	   is	   also	   contentious.	  Equating	   the	  number	  of	  
jobs	   with	   the	   broader	   concept	   of	   local	   economic	   development	   falls	   prey	   to	   a	  
narrow	  paradigm	  of	  development.	   It	  pays	  no	  heed	  to	  broader	  conceptions	  such	  
as	   consideration	  of	   the	  quality	   and	   type	  of	   jobs,	   reducing	   inequality,	   the	  wider	  
needs	   of	   the	   local	   area	   and	   promoting	   sustainability	   of	   investment	   in	   an	   area.	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In	   the	   IPPPP	   for	   Renewables	   the	   prominence	   and	   scope	   of	   economic	  
development	   criteria	   was	   significantly	   increased,	   with	   economic	   development	  
now	  accounting	  for	  30%	  of	  the	  final	  score	  on	  which	  projects	  would	  be	  evaluated.	  
The	  criteria	  outlined	  were	  much	  more	  comprehensive	  and	  wide-­‐ranging	  than	  in	  
the	  original	  draft	  REFIT	  selection	  criteria.	  A	  BBBEE	  scorecard	  was	  used,	  which	  is	  
much	   more	   aligned	   with	   how	   other	   Government	   tenders	   for	   public	   private	  
partnership	  are	  laid	  out	  (Brodsky,	  2011).	  	  	  
The	   renewables	   BBBEE	   matrix	   included	   the	   following	   elements:	   job	   creation,	  
local	   content,	   ownership,	   management	   control,	   preferential	   procurement,	  
enterprise	   development	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   development	   (SED)	   but	   excluded	  
employment	  equity	  and	  skills	  development.	  The	  rationale	  for	  this	  was	  based	  on	  
the	   fact	   that	   compliance	   with	   these	   elements	   is	   already	   required	   by	   other	  
legislation,	   namely	   the	   Employment	   Equity	   Act,	   55	   of	   1998	   and	   the	   Skills	  
Development	  Act,	  97	  of	  1998	  (Brodsky,	  2011).	  It	  included	  a	  specific	  focus	  within	  
the	   ownership,	   ED	   and	   SED	   criteria	   for	   benefits	   to	   be	   realised	   within	   local	  
communities	   in	   the	   vicinity	   of	  wind	   farms.	   Local	   communities	  were	  defined	   in	  
the	  RFP	  as	  those	  living	  within	  a	  50km	  radius	  of	  the	  site,	  or	  if	  there	  are	  none,	  then	  
the	  nearest	  community	  (Developer	  5,	  2011).	  	  	  
Minimum	   thresholds	  were	   specified	   in	   the	   RFP	   for	   job	   creation,	   local	   content,	  
local	  community	  ownership	  and	  SED	  that	  served	  as	  qualification	  criteria,	  without	  
which	  bids	  would	  be	  deemed	  non-­‐compliant.	  In	  respect	  of	  management	  control,	  
preferential	  procurement	   and	  enterprise	  development	  bidders	  were	  able	   to,	   at	  
their	   discretion,	   choose	   how	   much	   they	   planned	   to	   implement,	   if	   at	   all	  
(Developer	  5,	  2011).	  These	  BBBEE	  requirements	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  
in	  section	  4.3	  below.	  
4.2.3. The	  impact	  of	  different	  procurement	  programmes	  on	  
community	  benefits	  	  
This	  section	  compares	   the	   incentives	   for	  community	  contributions	  provided	  by	  
the	   two	   renewable	   procurement	   programmes	   that	   were	   considered	   in	   South	  
Africa	   (the	   REFIT	   and	   the	   competitive	   bidding	   process).	   It	   does	   not	   seek	   to	  
address	   the	   overall	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   programmes	   on	   increasing	   renewable	  
energy	  generating	  capacity	  or	  other	  aspects,	  but	  focuses	  specifically	  on	  how	  the	  
programme	  may	  positively	  or	  negatively	  affect	  developers’	  contributions	  to	  local	  
communities.	  	  
A	  REFIT	   should	  be	  designed	   to	  offer	  developers	   a	   reasonable	   rate	  of	   return	   to	  
make	   investing	   in	   this	   new	   market	   attractive.	   The	   original	   tariffs	   offered	   by	  
NERSA	  were	   considered	   to	   offer	   a	   generous	   rate	   of	   return	   to	  wind	  developers	  
(Waller,	   2010).	   This	   encouraged	   investment	   in	   a	   range	   of	   sites	   with	   different	  
wind	   resources.	   Sites	   with	   more	   limited	   wind	   resources	   only	   become	  
economically	   viable	   at	   higher	   tariffs	   (Developer	   5,	   2011)	   and	   therefore	   by	  
offering	   a	   generous	  REFIT	   tariff,	   Government	   communicated	   to	  developers	   the	  
viability	  of	  investing	  in	  a	  multitude	  of	  different	  sites,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  only	  the	  
best	  resourced	  sites.	  The	  move	  to	  a	  competitive	  bidding	  process	  based	  on	  price	  
however	  means	   that	   those	  projects	   that	   invested	   in	   sites	  with	   relatively	   lower	  
wind	   speeds	   may	   find	   it	   difficult	   to	   compete	   against	   better	   resourced	   sites,	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fixed	  amount	  of	  MWs	  (Developer	  1,	  2011).	  The	   first	   round	  of	   the	  procurement	  
programme	  allows	  for	  3,725	  MW,	  however	  Eskom	  announced	  they	  had	  received	  
applications	   for	   grid	   connections	   representing	   27,000	   MW	   so	   far	   (Creamer,	  
2011c).	  	  
There	   is	   a	   much	   stronger	   pressure	   for	   developers	   to	   reduce	   costs	   under	   a	  
competitive	   bidding	   programme	   than	   under	   a	   REFIT	   with	   its	   fixed	   price	  
certainty.	   The	   implications	   of	   this	   cost	   reduction	   pressure	   means	   that	   all	  
elements	  of	  the	  project	  that	  do	  not	  contribute	  commercially	  to	  a	  project	  will	  be	  
“under	  tremendous	  pressure	  to	  be	  removed	  from	  the	  balance	  sheet”	  (Developer	  
3,	   2011).	   For	   many	   developers,	   community	   benefits	   fall	   into	   this	   category	   of	  
items	   without	   a	   commercial	   contribution.	   Under	   the	   REFIT,	   developers	   could	  
afford	  to	  spend	  more	  on	  community	  benefit	  aspects	  (which	  would	  benefit	  them	  
through	   preferential	   selection	   in	   the	   procurement	   process)	   without	   impacting	  
their	  rate	  of	  return.	  A	  competitive	  bidding	  process	  however	  introduces	  a	  trade-­‐
off	   for	   developers	   between	   their	   community	   benefit	   contributions	   and	   the	  
competitiveness	   of	   the	   tariff	   they	   can	   offer.	   Furthermore	   in	   the	   IPPPP	   for	  
Renewables,	   price	   is	   weighted	   more	   heavily	   than	   economic	   development	  
contributions	  (70%/30%	  respectively)	  meaning	  that	  this	  trade-­‐off	   is	  skewed	  in	  
favour	   of	   price	   over	   economic	   development	   contributions.	   	   All	   the	   developers	  
interviewed	   during	   this	   study	   expressed	   the	   sentiment	   that	   moving	   to	   a	  
competitive	  bidding	  programme	  based	  on	  price	  would	  decrease	   the	  ability	  and	  
incentive	  to	  make	  greater	  community	  contributions.	  	  
Interestingly	  Developer	  5	  (2011)	  noted	  that	  the	  level	  of	  competition	  may	  differ	  
in	  different	  procurement	   rounds.	  The	   IPPPP	  strongly	   favours	   the	   ‘readiness’	  of	  
projects,	   which	   must	   have	   completed	   all	   the	   various	   technical	   and	   legal	  
requirements	   (such	   as	   EIAs,	   obtaining	  water	   licenses	   etc).	   Only	   a	   few	   projects	  
are	  likely	  to	  be	  ready	  by	  the	  first	  round	  in	  November	  2011.	  Those	  projects	  that	  
are	   ready,	   having	   this	   advantage,	   will	   have	   reduced	   competition	   in	   the	   first	  
round	   and	   may	   therefore	   be	   able	   to	   charge	   a	   higher	   tariff	   and	   still	   remain	  
competitive.	   In	   subsequent	   rounds	   as	  more	   and	  more	   projects	   become	   ‘ready’	  
the	  competition	  will	  increase	  (Developer	  5,	  2011).	  A	  potential	  implication	  of	  this	  
could	   be	   that	   projects	   in	   a	   relatively	   less	   competitive	   first	   procurement	   round	  
may	  have	  more	   leeway	   to	  spend	  on	   their	  economic	  development	  requirements	  
which	  they	  may	  choose	  to	  do	  in	  order	  to	  score	  more	  points	  on	  these	  aspects.	  	  	  
The	   finalised	   REFIT	   selection	   criteria	   were	   never	   released	   so	   this	   research	  
cannot	   make	   a	   true	   comparison	   between	   the	   final	   versions	   of	   the	   two	  
programmes.	   However	   the	   formulation	   of	   the	   criteria	   in	   the	   IPPPP	   are	   much	  
more	   stringent	   and	   comprehensive	   than	   those	   formulated	   in	   the	   draft	   REFIT.	  
Developer	  3	  expressed	  his	  preference	  for	  a	  scorecard	  approach	  that	  uses	  a	  points	  
system	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   potential	   to	   incentivise	   community	   benefits	   rather	   than	  
gatekeeping	  or	  pass/fail	  type	  criteria.	  A	  points	  system	  rewards	  projects	  that	  do	  
more.	   In	   the	   second	   evaluation	   stage	   of	   the	   RFP,	   bidders	   are	   scored	   on	   the	  
additional	  contributions	  they	  make	  over	  and	  above	  the	  threshold	  targets,	  up	  to	  
the	   specified	   targets.	  No	  points	   are	   awarded	  however	   for	   exceeding	   the	   stated	  
targets	   (Developer	   5,	   2011).	   This	   system	   thus	   establishes	   an	   appropriate	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choose	   to	   have	   greater	   economic	   development	   contributions.	   However	   there	  
remains	  the	  trade-­‐off	  between	  these	  contributions	  and	  the	  price	  they	  can	  offer.	  
The	   inclusion	  of	  all	   elements	  of	   the	   scorecard	   in	   the	   IPP	   rather	   than	   just	   the	  4	  
elements	  seen	   in	  NERSA’s	  REFIT	  draft	  selection	  criteria	  most	   likely	  reflects	   the	  
Government’s	   updated	   regulations	   for	   the	   Preferential	   Procurement	   Policy	  
Framework	  Act	  No	  5	  of	  2000.	  One	  of	   the	   changes	   to	   the	  Act	   stated	   that	  public	  
entities	  now	  have	  to	  consider	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  BBBEE	  scorecard	  when	  tendering	  
for	   goods	   and	   services,	   rather	   than	   being	   able	   to	   focus	   on	   only	   one	   or	   two	  
elements,	  such	  as	  ownership	  or	  management	  (BEE	  News,	  2011)	  which	  has	  led	  to	  
many	  public	  entities	  applying	  only	  the	  ‘narrow’	  aspects	  of	  the	  BBBEE	  policy.	  
In	   general	   REFITs	   offer	   greater	   certainty	   to	   a	   developer	   for	   planning	   and,	  
without	  the	  downward	  pressure	  on	  price,	  developers	  can	  afford	  to	  spend	  more	  
on	   other	   aspects	   of	   their	   projects,	   such	   as	   community	   contributions.	   Although	  
the	   IPPPP	   makes	   substantial	   provision	   for	   community	   benefits,	   and	   rewards	  
greater	  contributions	  with	  more	  points,	  price	  is	  still	  weighted	  more	  heavily	  than	  
economic	  development	  criteria.	  	  
4.3. BBBEE	  in	  the	  renewables	  procurement	  programme	  
As	  outlined	  in	  the	  Preferential	  Procurement	  Policy	  Framework	  Act,	  a	  portion	  of	  a	  
state	   entity’s	   procurement	   decisions	   must	   take	   BBBEE	   into	   consideration.	  
Therefore	   it	   is	   common	   for	   any	   public-­‐private	   partnership	   (PPP)	   or	   tendering	  
process	   put	   out	   by	   a	   Government	   department	   to	   specify	   BBBEE	   requirements.	  
These	   are	   usually	   articulated	   by	   means	   of	   a	   BBBEE	   scorecard	   that	   outlines	  
specified	   targets	   that	   have	   to	   be	  met	   over	   time.	   Failure	   to	  meet	   these	   usually	  
results	   in	  penalties	  or	  a	  revocation	  of	  the	   license.	   	  Three	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  
renewables	   scorecard	   have	   a	   direct	   bearing	   on	   local	   communities	   (local	  
community	   ownership,	   socio-­‐economic	   development	   and	   enterprise	  
development)	  and	  these	  will	  be	  discussed	  here.	  
4.3.1. Local	  community	  ownership	  requirements	  
The	   IPPPP’s	  RFP	  bid	  documentation	  outlines	  a	   threshold	  of	  12%	  ownership	  by	  
black	   people	   in	   the	   wind	   farm’s	   project	   company	   and	   a	   target	   of	   30%.	   As	  
discussed	   in	   the	   literature	   review	   this	   is	   commonly	   undertaken	   with	   an	  
established	  black	  empowerment	  company.	  Additionally,	  however,	  a	  broad-­‐based	  
local	   community	  ownership	  element	  has	  been	  made	  an	  explicit	   requirement	   in	  
the	   BBBEE	   scorecard	   matrix.	   It	   is	   a	   mandatory	   requirement	   to	   pass	   the	   first	  
round	  of	  evaluation	  and	  become	  a	  compliant	  bid.	  The	  RFP	  specifies	  a	  minimum	  
threshold	  of	  2.5%	  for	   local	  community	  ownership	  and	  a	   target	  of	  5%.	  Three	  of	  
the	   developers	   interviewed	   expressed	   that	   they	   had	   expected	   a	   community	  
ownership	   requirement,	   the	   others	  were	   surprised	   at	   its	   inclusion.	  Developers	  
could	  choose	  to	  fulfil	  the	  entire	  ownership	  requirements	  through	  the	  community	  
rather	  than	  through	  an	  empowerment	  company	  and	  two	  are	  planning	  to	  do	  this.	  
Choosing	   to	   fulfil	   their	   entire	   ownership	   requirements	   with	   a	   broad-­‐based	  
community	  partner	  would	  not	  however	  score	  any	  additional	  points	  over	  another	  











	   33	  
Observers	   have	   noted	   that	   in	   general	   the	   BBBEE	   generic	   scorecard	   does	   not	  
sufficiently	   incentivise	   broad-­‐based	   community	   ownership	   schemes	   (Hawes,	  
2011;	  Developer	   5,	   2011;	   Tshikululu	   Social	   Investments,	   2010).	  Hawes	   (2011)	  
notes	   that	   in	   addition	   to	   a	   fairly	   minimal	   points	   incentive,	   the	   value	   that	  
community	   groups	   bring	   to	   a	   company	   are	   usually	   minimal	   and	   in	   some	  
circumstances	   can	   even	   prove	   to	   be	   counterproductive	  when	   the	   community’s	  
interests	  are	  not	  aligned	  with	  those	  of	  others	  involved	  in	  the	  business.	  The	  local	  
projects	  that	  use	  the	  finance	  from	  ownership	  are	  usually	  charitable	  projects	  that	  
don’t	   add	   business	   value	   to	   a	   company.	   In	   comparison,	   linking	   with	   a	   big	  
empowerment	  partner	  may	  provide	  value	   in	   the	   form	  of	   technical	  expertise	  or	  
connecting	   to	   other	   business	   people.	   Developer	   5,	   for	   example,	   has	   partnered	  
with	   a	   BEE	   empowerment	   partner	   who	   is	   also	   providing	   the	   service	   of	  
undertaking	  the	  financial	  modelling	  for	  the	  project.	  
However	   despite	   minimal	   points	   or	   other	   value	   conferred	   from	   community	  
ownership	   schemes,	   there	   are	   significant	   moral	   and	   public	   relations	   (PR)	  
benefits	   from	  such	  broad-­‐based	   schemes	  and	  many	  companies	  engage	   in	   them	  
because	   of	   an	   intention	   to	   “do	   the	   right	   thing”	   (Hawes,	   2011).	   Such	   ethical	  
considerations	   driving	   their	   actions	  were	   expressed	   by	   all	   3	   of	   the	   developers	  
who	   had	   engaged	   in	   community	   ownership	   initiatives	   before	   the	   final	  
announcement	   of	   the	   IPPPP	   requirements.	   These	   broad-­‐based	   ownership	  
initiatives	   in	   general,	   however,	   do	   not	   contribute	   significantly	   to	   business	   and	  
scorecard	  value.	  
The	   BEE	   Codes	   of	   Good	   Practice	   (Department	   of	   Trade	   and	   Industry,	   2007)	  
require	   in	   respect	   of	   broad-­‐based	  ownership	   schemes	   that	   at	   least	   85%	  of	   the	  
benefits	  must	  accrue	  to	  black	  people.	  An	  interesting	  and	  unusual	  adjunct	  to	  the	  
local	  ownership	   requirement	   in	   the	   renewables	  RFP	  bid	  documentation	   is	   that	  
beneficiaries	  do	  not	  have	  to	  be	  black	  (Hawes,	  2011)	  but	  only	  have	  to	  fit	  into	  the	  
definition	   of	   local	   communities.	   It	   is	   unclear	   how	   this	   aligns	   with	   the	   overall	  
BBBEE	   objectives	   of	   benefiting	   previously	   disadvantaged	   black	   individuals.	  
Hawes	   (2011)	   comments	   that	   this	   is	   likely	   in	   recognition	   of	   the	   rural-­‐urban	  
socio-­‐economic	  disparities	  that	  exist	  regardless	  of	  race.	  	  However	  it	  is	  not	  clearly	  
defined	  in	  the	  bid	  documentation	  how	  many	  beneficiaries	  there	  would	  have	  to	  be	  
for	  it	  to	  constitute	  the	  ‘community’,	  nor	  whether	  one	  would	  have	  to	  demonstrate	  
white	  beneficiaries	   are	   in	   some	  manner	   socio-­‐economically	  disadvantaged.	  For	  
example	  could	  an	  ownership	  agreement	  with	  white	  farm	  owners	  on	  whose	  land	  
the	  wind	  farm	  is	   located	  satisfy	  this	  criterion?	   	   	  Hawes	  (2011)	  is	  of	  the	  opinion	  
that	  such	  an	  arrangement	  would	  not	  be	  viewed	  favourably	  and	  notes	  that	  there	  
would	   need	   to	   be	   a	   social	   element	   to	   the	   local	   ownership,	   demonstrating	   that	  
funds	  from	  ownership	  would	  be	  meeting	  social	  needs	  in	  the	  local	  area.	  	  	  
4.3.2. Socio-­‐economic	  development	  and	  enterprise	  development	  
contributions	  
Socio-­‐economic	   development	   is	   defined	   as	   activities	   that	   facilitate	   sustainable	  
access	   to	   the	   economy	   for	   beneficiaries	   (Department	   of	   Trade	   and	   Industry,	  
2007).	   	   This	   definition	   of	   promoting	   access	   to	   the	   economy	   is	   applied	   very	  
loosely	   and	   includes	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   permissible	   activities	   relating	   to	   rural	  
development,	   the	   environment,	   infrastructure,	   enterprises,	   reconstruction	   of	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education,	  health	  care	  as	  well	  as	  arts	  and	  culture	  and	  sports.	  These	  contributions	  
(which	  can	  be	  monetary	  and	  non-­‐monetary)	  are	  similar	  in	  substance	  to	  CSI.	  The	  
targeted	  beneficiaries	  are	  those	  who,	  due	  to	  circumstances	  such	  as	  living	  in	  rural	  
areas,	  unemployment	  or	  disabilities,	  remain	  outside	  of	  the	  mainstream	  economy.	  
The	   RFP	   bid	   documentation	   requires	   that	   developers	   must	   contribute	   a	  
minimum	  threshold	  of	  1%	  of	  their	  revenue	  up	  to	  a	  maximum	  target	  of	  1.5%	  of	  
revenue	  (Developer	  5,	  2011).	  	  	  
Enterprise	  development	  refers	  to	  contributions	  to	  black-­‐owned	  businesses	  with	  
the	  specific	  objective	  of	  assisting	  or	  accelerating	  the	  development,	  sustainability	  
and	  ultimate	  financial	  and	  operational	  independence	  of	  that	  enterprise.	  There	  is	  
no	  minimum	  threshold	  specified	  in	  the	  RFP	  so	  developers	  may	  choose	  whether	  
or	   not	   to	   implement	   this	   element	   at	   all.	   However	   there	   is	   a	   target	   of	   0.6%	   of	  
revenue	  specified	  (Developer	  5,	  2011).	  Contributions	  may	  be	  monetary	  or	  non-­‐
monetary	   (e.g.	   providing	   time	   or	   expertise,	   such	   as	   training	   or	   accounting	  
services),	   recoverable	  monetary	   contributions	   such	  as	   credit	   facilities,	   loans	  or	  
equity	   investments	   or	   non-­‐recoverable	   contributions	   such	   as	   grants	   and	  
donations.	  Often	  companies	  may	   look	  to	  share	  their	  expertise	  within	  their	  own	  
operational	   field	   by	   contributing	   to	   a	   beneficiary	   in	   the	   same	   field.	   	   It	   is	   also	  
commonly	  used	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  new	  markets	  by	  investing	  in	  
black-­‐owned	  businesses	   in	  those	  markets	  (Hawes,	  2011).	  The	  most	  sustainable	  
approach	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  one	  of	  integrated	  enterprise	  development	  whereby	  
a	  company	  might	  provide	  start-­‐up	  capital,	  sharing	  of	  expertise	  as	  well	  as	  procure	  
goods	  or	  services	  from	  the	  beneficiary	  entity	  and	  thereby	  helping	  to	  sustain	   its	  
cash	  flow.	  There	  will	  be	  limited	  opportunities	  in	  this	  regard	  for	  wind	  developers	  
to	  find	  or	  assist	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  enterprises	  in	  their	  supply	  chain	  or	  field	  
especially	   in	   the	   short	   term	   given	   the	   specialised	   nature	   of	   most	   of	   the	   skills	  
requirements	  (Developer	  5,	  2011).	  
Developers	  are	  required	  to	  outline	  a	  strategy	  that	  identifies	  local	  needs	  and	  how	  
these	  will	  be	  met	  with	  contributions.	  For	  ED,	  developers	  are	  required	  to	  identify	  
the	   types	   of	   enterprises	   that	   will	   be	   targeted	   and	   programmes	   that	   will	   be	  
implemented	  (Developer	  5,	  2011).	  There	   is	  no	  guidance	  however	  on	  the	  extent	  
of	   substantiating	   evidence	   that	   developers	   must	   provide,	   how	   much	   local	  
engagement	   to	   undertake	   or	   in	   what	   detail	   future	   programmes	   and	   projects	  
must	   be	   outlined.	   	   This	   therefore	   leaves	   it	   up	   to	   the	   discretion	   of	   individual	  
developers	   to	   decide	   on	   how	   to	   undertake	   and	   formulate	   their	   development	  
strategies.	  
The	  SED	  and	  ED	  elements	  of	  the	  BBBEE	  scorecard	  matrix	  include	  a	  “recognition	  
for	   localness”	   adjustment	   factor	   (Hawes,	   2011).	   This	   means	   that	   expenditure	  
allocated	   to	   persons	   or	   enterprises	  will	   be	   adjusted	   for	   localness	  with	   greater	  
weighting	   placed	   on	   local	   communities.	   Hawes	   (2011)	   noted	   that	   this	   was	   an	  
interesting	   feature	   he	   had	   not	   observed	   in	   other	   PPPs	   before.	   	   There	   are	   no	  
additional	  points	   to	  be	  earned	   for	  exceeding	   the	  expenditure	   targets	   (1.5%	   for	  
SED	  and	  0.6%	  for	  ED)	  outlined	  in	  the	  RFP.	  	  
4.3.3. Reporting,	  monitoring	  and	  compliance	  	  
Wind	  farm	  owners	  are	  required	  to	  monitor	  and	  audit	  their	  own	  compliance	  with	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on	   their	   obligations	   on	   a	   quarterly	   basis	   to	   an	   independent	   economic	  
development	  monitor	   in	  the	  DoE	  (Hawes,	  2011).	   In	  respect	  of	  ownership,	  wind	  
farm	   owners	   need	   to	   submit	   information	   on	   the	   shareholding	   by	   local	  
communities,	  expressed	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	   the	  total	  shareholding.	   In	  respect	  of	  
ED	  and	  SED	  contributions	  developers	  must	  submit	  the	  amount	  spent	  expressed	  
in	  rands.	  Verification	  will	  be	  undertaken	  by	  the	  economic	  development	  monitor	  
although	   the	   frequency	  of	   this	   is	  vague	  (Hawes,	  2011).	  Non-­‐compliance	  will	  be	  
treated	   with	   a	   variety	   of	   penalty	   measures,	   either	   financial	   or	   ‘termination	  
points’	   which	   could	   eventually	   lead	   to	   termination	   of	   the	   PPA.	   Hawes	   (2011)	  
comments	  that	  the	  system	  of	  penalties	  is	  generally	  difficult	  to	  comprehend	  and	  
decipher.	   It	   is	   questionable	  whether	   the	  DoE	  has	   the	   capacity	   to	  undertake	   an	  
adequate	   monitoring	   and	   compliance	   oversight	   role.	   Furthermore	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  voluntary	  nature	  of	  the	  reporting	  and	  monitoring	  system	  is	  
also	  questionable.	  	  Voluntary	  self-­‐regulating	  approaches	  in	  other	  sectors	  such	  as	  
financial	  services	  have	  been	  criticised	  as	  being	  ineffective	  in	  driving	  compliance	  
and	  performance	  	  (Moyo	  and	  Rohan,	  2006).	  	  
These	   reporting	   obligations,	   based	   on	   expenditure	   only,	   do	   not	   require	   wind	  
farm	  owners	   to	   report	   on	   the	  performance	  or	   outcomes	  of	   that	   expenditure,	   a	  
shortcoming	   of	   the	   BBBEE	   verification	   process	  more	   generally.	   Hawes	   (2011)	  
notes	   that	   a	  measured	  entity	  need	  not	  disclose	   to	   a	  BBBEE	  verification	  agency	  
how	  successful	  a	  project	  has	  been.	  So	   for	  example	  a	  company	  would	  be	  able	  to	  
score	   their	   points	   regardless	   of	   how	   successful	   the	   project	   outcomes	   are,	  
although	  Hawes	  (2011)	  notes	  that	   if	  a	  project	  were	  to	  outright	   fail,	   it	  generally	  
wouldn’t	  appear	  on	  the	  scorecard.	  Hawes	  (2011)	  discusses	   that	  he	  considers	   it	  
unlikely	   that	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   BBBEE	   verification	   system	   would	   be	  
imposed	   on	   companies	   however.	   Undertaking	   community	   development	  
initiatives	   is	   a	   complex	   process	   and	   projects	   frequently	   fail	   for	   a	   variety	   of	  
reasons,	  he	  argues	   it	  would	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  pin	  the	  non-­‐success	  of	  a	  project	  
on	  any	  one	  aspect	  attributable	  to	  the	  company.	  	  
4.3.4. Conclusion	  
Overall	   the	   IPPPP	   for	   renewables	   has	   developed	   a	   comprehensive	   BBBEE	  
scorecard,	   which	   incorporates	   a	   strong	   focus	   on	   local	   communities.	   	   Local	  
community	  ownership	  has	  been	  made	  an	  explicit	   requirement	  and	  spending	   in	  
the	   ED	   and	   SED	   categories	  made	   locally	   is	   strongly	   incentivised	   via	   additional	  
points.	   The	   programme	   is	   therefore	   specifically	   designed	   to	   promote	   local	  
community	   benefits	   from	   wind	   farms.	   Interestingly	   despite	   the	   BBBEE	  
legislation	  in	  general	  having	  a	  dedicated	  focus	  on	  black	  individuals,	  this	  has	  been	  
lifted	  in	  the	  renewables	  matrix	  for	  the	  local	  broad-­‐based	  ownership	  element.	  	  
ED	  and	  SED	  requirements	  are	  loosely	  specified	  leaving	  much	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  
individual	   developers.	   The	   monitoring	   and	   compliance	   appears	   generally	  
inadequate	  to	  ensure	  certainty	  of	  positive	  developmental	  outcomes.	  Compliance	  
is	   to	  be	  measured	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   expenditure	  only,	   giving	  no	   consideration	   to	  
what	   that	   expenditure	   achieves	   in	   developmental	   terms.	   In	   many	   ways	   the	  
renewable	  scorecard,	  reflecting	  a	  strong	  focus	  on	  the	  broad-­‐based	  aspects	  of	  the	  
scorecard,	   is	  reflective	  of	  the	  revisions	  laid	  out	   in	  the	  recent	  amendment	  of	  the	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been	   greatly	   enhanced	   in	   the	   renewables	  programme	   from	   the	  10%	   (specified	  
for	  tenders	  above	  R1	  million)	  to	  30%.	  
4.4. The	  Clean	  Development	  Mechanism	  	  
The	  CDM	  has	  dual	  objectives	  of	  reducing	  greenhouse	  gases	  and	  contributing	  to	  
sustainable	  development.	  Renewable	  energy	  projects	  in	  South	  Africa	  are	  eligible	  
for	   CDM.	   Therefore	   the	   CDM	   could	   theoretically	   serve	   as	   an	   incentive	   for	  
developers	  to	  implement	  sustainable	  development	  initiatives	  in	  their	  projects	  in	  
order	  to	  apply	  for	  CDM	  and	  earn	  carbon	  revenues.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  
to	  explore	  whether	  CDM	  requirements	   could	   influence	   companies	   to	  engage	   in	  
socially	   responsible	   initiatives	   in	   response	   to	   the	   financial	   incentive	  of	   earning	  
carbon	   revenues.	   This	   section	   will	   therefore	   interrogate	   CDM	   sustainable	  
development	   requirements	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   these	   requirements	   may	  
incentivise	   developers	   to	   initiate	   community	   benefit	   schemes	   in	   their	   wind	  
projects.	  	  
4.4.1. Sustainable	  development	  requirements	  of	  the	  Clean	  
Development	  Mechanism	  
The	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  established	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  
Climate	   Change	   (UNFCCC)	   committed	   industrialised	   (Annex	   I)	   countries	   to	  
reducing	   their	   carbon	   emissions	   in	   the	   commitment	   period	   2008	   –	   2012.	   Also	  
established	  were	   a	   number	   of	   so-­‐called	   flexible	  market	  mechanisms	   to	   enable	  
Annex	   I	   countries	   to	  meet	   emissions	   reductions.	   These	   included	   an	   emissions	  
trading	  system,	  Joint	  Implementation	  and	  the	  CDM.	  The	  CDM,	  established	  under	  
article	   12	   of	   the	  Kyoto	   Protocol,	   and	   elaborated	   and	   defined	   in	   the	  Marrakesh	  
Accords,	  was	   established	  with	   the	   dual	   objectives	   of	   achieving	   greenhouse	   gas	  
reductions	  and	  contributing	  to	  sustainable	  development	  in	  developing	  countries.	  
The	  mechanism	  allows	  Annex	  I	  countries	  to	  engage	  in	  carbon	  reduction	  projects	  
in	   developing	   countries	   and	   then	   claim	   the	   certified	   emission	   reductions.	  
Projects	   are	   approved	   and	   registered	   by	   the	   CDM	  Executive	   Board	   (EB)	   and	   a	  
Designated	  National	  Authority	  (DNA)	  in	  the	  host	  country	  is	  required	  to	  give	  host	  
country	  approval	  of	  the	  project.	  	  
The	  decisions	  relating	  to	  whether	  projects	  contribute	  to	  a	  country’s	  sustainable	  
development	  was	  placed	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  host	  countries	  rather	  than	  the	  
CDM	  EB.	  The	  DNA	  in	  the	  host	  country	  is	  required	  to	  develop	  national	  criteria	  on	  
which	  to	  evaluate	  a	  project’s	  contribution	  to	  sustainable	  development.	  In	  South	  
Africa	  the	  DNA	  sits	  within	  the	  DoE.	  The	  DoE	  refers	  to	  the	  National	  Environmental	  
Management	  Act	  (NEMA)	  108	  of	  1998	  (Department	  of	  Environmental	  Affairs	  and	  
Tourism,	  1998)	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  sustainable	  development	  as	  the	  “integration	  
of	  social,	  economic	  and	  environmental	  factors	  into	  planning,	  implementation	  and	  
decision	   making	   so	   as	   to	   ensure	   that	   development	   serves	   present	   and	   future	  
generations”	   (Department	   of	  Minerals	   and	  Energy,	   2004a:	   pp.10-­‐11).	   The	  DNA	  
has	  a	  checklist	  approach	  to	  evaluating	  the	  sustainable	  development	  aspects	  of	  a	  
project	   using	   a	   range	   of	   indicators	   to	   represent	   environmental,	   economic	   and	  
social	   criteria.	   These	   are	   outlined	   in	   the	   South	   African	   DNA	   Project	   Approval	  
Process	   (Department	   of	   Minerals	   and	   Energy,	   2004b).	   Economic	   indicators	  
include	  impacts	  of	  the	  project	  on	  foreign	  exchange,	  economic	  activity	  in	  the	  area,	  
cost	  of	  energy	  and	  foreign	  direct	  investment.	  Social	  indicators	  include	  alignment	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basic	   services,	   relocation	   of	   communities	   and	   contribution	   to	   specific	   sectoral	  
objectives	   (e.g.	   renewable	   energy	   targets).	   South	   Africa	   has	   not	   been	   very	  
successful	  to	  date	  in	  establishing	  CDM	  projects,	  with	  only	  20	  registered	  projects	  
as	  of	  May	  2011	  (Department	  of	  Energy,	  2011a).	  	  	  
This	   research	   was	   interested	   to	   what	   extent	   these	   criteria	   could	   incentivise	  
developers	  to	  establish	  ‘additional’	  benefit	  schemes	  in	  pursuit	  of	  the	  sustainable	  
development	   criteria	   that	   they	   might	   not	   have	   undertaken	   otherwise.	   From	  
those	   interviewed	   the	   general	   consensus	   was	   that	   the	   DNA’s	   specified	  
requirements	   in	   respect	   of	   sustainable	  development	  were	  not	   onerous	   (Gilder,	  
2011)	   and	   were	   more	   of	   a	   “ticking	   the	   box	   exercise”	   (Developer	   3,	   2011).	  
Developer	   1	   agreed	   that	   the	   typical	   benefits	   associated	   with	   a	   project,	   for	  
example	  stimulating	  a	  local	  industry	  and	  creating	  jobs,	  even	  if	  these	  were	  limited	  
as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   wind,	   would	   be	   sufficient	   to	   satisfy	   the	   requirements.	   The	  
question	  was	  also	  put	   to	   interviewees	  whether	  a	  particular	   community	  benefit	  
scheme	   initiated	   to	   comply	   with	   other	   legislation	   (e.g.	   BBBEE	   or	   IPPPP	  
requirements)	  would	  be	  eligible	  under	  the	  CDM	  or	  whether	  benefits	  would	  have	  
to	   be	   additional	   to	   what	   would	   be	   undertaken	   normally.	   None	   of	   the	  
interviewees	  were	  aware	  of	  such	  an	  issue	  ever	  having	  been	  tested,	  but	  generally	  
agreed	   that	   the	   mechanism	   was	   not	   designed	   to	   work	   that	   way	   and	   that	  
sustainable	   development	   initiatives	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   CDM	   need	   not	   be	  
‘additional’.	  
Why	  would	  SA’s	  DNA	  not	  impose	  more	  stringent	  criteria	  to	  reap	  more	  significant	  
benefits	   from	   projects?	   Boyd	   et	   al	   (2009)	   note	   that	   DNAs	   in	   general	   are	   in	   a	  
tenuous	   position	   in	   the	   definition	   and	   establishment	   of	   their	   sustainable	  
development	  criteria.	  Global	  competition	  for	  attracting	  CDM	  projects	  means	  that	  
DNAs	   want	   to	   make	   approval	   processes	   that	   are	   as	   attractive	   to	   investors	   as	  
possible,	   which	   typically	   means	   quick	   and	   easy.	   This	   implies	   setting	   low	  
sustainable	   development	   criteria.	   Sutter	   and	   Parreno	   (2007)	   refer	   to	   this	   as	   a	  
“race	   to	   the	   bottom”	   in	   the	   sustainable	   development	   aspects	   of	   projects.	  
Furthermore	   the	  market	   only	   recognises	   the	   greenhouse	   gas	   (GHG)	   reduction	  
potential	  of	  projects	   and	  not	   the	   sustainable	  development	  benefits	   (Boyd	  et	   al,	  
2009),	   and	   so	   there	   is	   little	   incentive	   from	   the	   market	   to	   make	   stricter	  
sustainable	   development	   criteria.	   	   CDM	   has	   been	   established	   with	   the	   dual	  
objectives	   of	   achieving	   greenhouse	   gas	   reductions	   and	   contributing	   to	  
sustainable	   development,	   however	   it	   appears	   that	   there	   may	   be	   an	   implicit	  
trade-­‐off	  in	  the	  achievement	  of	  these	  two	  objectives	  (Sutter	  and	  Parreno,	  2007).	  	  
Another	   issue	  with	   the	   sustainable	   development	   requirements	   placed	   on	   CDM	  
projects	   is	   how	   they	   are	   monitored	   and	   whether	   the	   benefits	   are	   actually	  
realised	  or	  sustainable.	  The	  mere	  existence	  of	  criteria	  does	  not	  ensure	  that	  they	  
are	   relevant	   or	   effective	   nor	   that	   they	  will	   be	   adequately	   fulfilled.	   	   The	   South	  
African	   DNA	   does	   not	   specify	   any	   requirement	   for	   sustainable	   development	  
benefits	   to	   be	  monitored.	   Olsen	   and	   Fenhann	   (2008)	   note	   that	   it	   is	   also	   not	   a	  
requirement	   at	   the	   international	   level	   either	   that	   SD	   benefits	   be	  monitored	   or	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A	   number	   of	   international	   studies	   undertaking	   assessments	   of	   CDM	   projects	  
contributions	   to	   sustainable	   development	   have	   found	   the	   mechanism	   to	   have	  
failed	   with	   regards	   to	   sustainable	   development	   (Boyd	   et	   al,	   2009;	   Olsen	   and	  
Fenhann,	   2008;	   Sutter	   and	   Perrona,	   2007).	   A	   point	   raised	   by	   the	   interviewees	  
during	   this	   research	   and	   confirmed	   in	   the	   literature	   is	   that	   in	   most	   cases	   a	  
developers	  business	  as	  usual	  activities	  are	  sufficient	  to	  satisfy	  the	  criteria	  (Boyd	  
et	   al,	   2009).	   So	   there	  need	  be	  no	   specific	   focus	  on	  other	  or	   additional	  benefits	  
accruing	  from	  the	  projects.	  	  
There	  is	  however	  another	  more	  stringent	  standard,	  known	  as	  the	  Gold	  Standard,	  
which	   aims	   at	   producing	   high	   quality	   projects	   with	   higher	   social	   and	  
environmental	   standards.	  The	  Gold	  Standard	   for	  CDM	  was	  established	   in	  2003	  
and	   the	   Gold	   Standard	   for	   voluntary	   offsets	   in	   2006.	   None	   of	   the	   developers	  
interviewed	  expressed	  intentions,	  at	  this	  stage,	  to	  pursue	  Gold	  Standard	  for	  their	  
projects.	   However	   the	   indicators	   developed	   in	   the	   standard	   for	   social	  
sustainability	   include:	   the	   quality	   of	   employment	   created	   (measured	   by	   skills	  
levels,	  temporary	  vs	  permanent	  jobs,	  job	  related	  health	  and	  safety),	  contribution	  
to	  local	  livelihoods,	  poverty	  alleviation	  (measured	  by	  the	  number	  of	  people	  living	  
above	  the	  poverty	  line),	  contribution	  to	  disadvantaged	  sectors	  of	  society	  such	  as	  
women	  or	  excluded	  social	  groups,	  access	  to	  essential	  services	  and	  clean	  energy	  
as	   well	   the	   project’s	   contribution	   to	   human	   capacity	   (measured	   through	  
empowerment,	  education	  and	  skills,	  and	  gender	  equality).	  
4.4.2. The	  eligibility	  of	  wind	  projects	  for	  the	  Clean	  Development	  
Mechanism	  	  	  
There	   is	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   uncertainty	   as	   to	   the	   future	   of	   the	   CDM	   and	   carbon	  
market	  post-­‐2012,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  recent	  announcement	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  that	  
they	  will	  only	  buy	  carbon	  credits	  from	  the	  least-­‐developed	  countries	  after	  2012	  
(Gorecki	   and	   Pretorius,	   17	   November	   2011).	   Aside	   from	   this	   high	   level	  
uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  future	  of	  the	  mechanism	  there	  is	  also	  much	  uncertainty	  as	  
to	  how	  the	  CDM	  will	  apply	  to	  the	  renewables	  sector	  in	  South	  Africa	  specifically	  in	  
the	   procurement	   programme.	   In	   theory	   developers	   have	   the	   choice	   to	   submit	  
their	  bid	  for	  the	  procurement	  programme	  with	  a	  price	  inclusive	  or	  exclusive	  of	  
the	   project	   earning	   carbon	   credits.	   However	   there	   is	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	  
uncertainty	   in	   the	   South	   African	   renewables	   sector	   surrounding	   CDM	   in	   the	  
renewables	   procurement	   process.	   This	   includes	   the	   difficulty	   of	   predicting	  
uncertain	   future	   prices	   of	   carbon	   credits,	   making	   it	   problematic	   to	   include	   in	  
financial	  models	  (Developer	  1,	  2011).	  Furthermore	  there	  is	  a	  lengthy	  approvals	  
process	   to	  go	   through	   for	  CDM	  and	  developers	  have	  no	  guarantee	  at	   this	  stage	  
that	   their	  projects	  will	  even	  be	  approved	   for	  CDM.	   If	  developers	  base	   the	  price	  
they	  submit	  in	  their	  procurement	  bid	  inclusive	  of	  CERs	  and	  their	  project	  doesn’t	  
get	  approved	  in	  the	  future,	  this	  will	  negatively	  impact	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  their	  
projects.	   Alternatively	   if	   they	   don’t	   include	   CERs	   in	   their	   bid	   price	   (and	   other	  
developers	  do)	  they	  may	  not	  be	  as	  price	  competitive	  in	  the	  procurement	  process	  
and	  increase	  the	  risk	  of	  not	  being	  selected	  (Developer	  3,	  2011).	  	  	  
At	   the	   time	   of	   undertaking	   this	   study	   there	   was	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	  
uncertainty	  among	  all	  interviewees	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  projects	  would	  be	  eligible	  
for	  CDM	  at	  all.	   	  With	  the	  move	  to	  a	  competitive	  bidding	  process,	   there	   is	  a	  risk	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UNFCCC	  (Gilder,	  2011).	  Projects	  may	  be	  assessed	  for	  additionality	  (proving	  that	  
the	  project	  would	  not	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  CDM)	  either	  through	  a	  
barrier	   test	  or	  a	   financial	  analysis.	  The	   financial	  additionality	   test	  requires	  that	  
projects	   show	   that	   they	   would	   not	   be	   financially	   viable	   without	   the	   carbon	  
revenue	   stream	   (Gilder,	   2011).	   In	   a	   competitive	   bidding	   programme	   if	   a	  
developer	  submits	  their	  bid	  with	  a	  proposed	  tariff	  that	  does	  not	  include	  carbon	  
revenues,	   they	   essentially	   prove	   that	   their	   project	   is	   financially	   viable	  without	  
this	   finance	   stream,	   thereby	   removing	   the	   justification	   for	   CDM	   application.	  
However	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  Developer	  2	  notes	   it	  may	  not	  be	  viable	   to	   include	  
CDM	  at	  this	  stage	  either.	  It	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  produce	  a	  bankable	  bid	  inclusive	  of	  
CDM	   as	   many	   investors	   may	   not	   accept	   a	   project	   where	   future	   revenues	   are	  
dependent	   on	   carbon	   credits.	   This	   is	   due	   to	   the	   considerable	   uncertainty	  
regarding	  their	  realisation	  (e.g.	  if	  projects	  don’t	  get	  accepted	  or	  predicting	  future	  
prices	   movements	   of	   carbon	   credits).	   Therefore	   the	   process	   of	   proving	   a	  
project’s	   financial	   viability	   for	   the	  procurement	  process	  may	  preclude	  projects	  
from	  demonstrating	  the	  financial	  additionality	  requirements	  for	  UNFCCC.	  
4.4.3. Conclusion	  
It	  appears	  to	  still	  be	  questionable	  at	  this	  stage	  as	  to	  whether	  local	  projects	  will	  be	  
eligible	   at	   all	   for	   CDM.	   Secondly	   even	   if	   projects	   do	   apply	   for	   CDM,	   the	  
sustainable	   development	   requirements	   are	   not	   stringent,	   benefits	   may	   not	  
necessarily	  be	  anything	  additional	   to	  what	   they	  are	  already	  doing	  and	  without	  
any	  clear	  enforcement	  or	  monitoring	  mechanisms	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  they	  
will	  be	  realised.	  Overall	  the	  potential	  for	  CDM	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  driver	  of	  community	  
benefits	  in	  the	  South	  African	  IPPPPP	  for	  renewables	  appears	  to	  be	  minimal.	  
4.5. Environmental	  Impact	  Assessments	  and	  the	  planning	  process	  
All	  wind	  farm	  projects	  need	  to	  conduct	  an	  EIA,	  which	  must	  include	  consideration	  
of	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   impacts	   of	   the	   proposed	   project.	   This	   section	   explores	  
firstly	  what	   role	   EIAs	  may	   play	   in	   stimulating	   the	   development	   of	   community	  
benefit	   schemes	   and	   secondly	   the	   interaction	   between	   public	   opposition	   and	  
community	  benefit	  schemes	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  
4.5.1. Role	  of	  Environmental	  Impact	  Assessments	  in	  promoting	  
community	  benefits	  
The	   purpose	   of	   EIAs,	   governed	   by	   the	   Environmental	   Impact	   Assessment	  
Regulations	  (Department	  of	  Environmental	  Affairs,	  2010),	  is	  to	  avoid,	  mitigate	  or	  
manage	   any	   adverse	   impacts	   and	   optimise	   positive	   impacts	   caused	   by	   new	  
developments.	  These	  regulations	  require	  that	  EIAs	  include	  “a	  description	  of	  the	  
environment	   that	  may	  be	  affected	  by	   the	  activity	  and	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   the	  
physical,	   biological,	   social,	   economic	   and	   cultural	   aspects	   of	   the	   environment	  
may	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  proposed	  activity”	  (Department	  of	  Environmental	  Affairs,	  
2010:	  p.31(2(d))).	  Issues	  must	  be	  assessed	  for	  the	  significance	  of	  their	  impact	  as	  
well	  as	  mitigation	  measures	  to	  address	  the	  issues.	  	  	  
A	  socio-­‐economic	  assessment	  as	  part	  of	  an	  EIA	  typically	   includes	  consideration	  
of	  impacts	  arising	  during	  construction	  and	  operation	  such	  as	  job	  creation,	  impact	  
on	   tourism,	   impacts	   from	   increased	   expenditure	   in	   the	   local	   area,	   impacts	   on	  
land	   owners,	   visual	   impacts	   on	   landscape,	   disturbance	   impacts	   during	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structures.	   Assessments	   also	   include	   recommendations	   for	   mitigation	   and	  
enhancement	   measures	   such	   as	   procuring	   labour	   locally.	   Twelve	   EIAs	   were	  
reviewed	  in	  this	  thesis,	  and	  most	  concurred	  that	  the	  local	  economic	  development	  
opportunities	   (for	   local	   workforce	   and	   businesses)	   associated	   with	   the	   wind	  
farm	  they	  were	  assessing	  were	  limited.	  	  	  
This	  research	  was	   interested	   in	  whether	  EIA	  practitioners	  may,	  as	  part	  of	   their	  
recommendations	   to	   enhance	   otherwise	   limited	   local	   economic	   development	  
impacts,	   include	   specifications	   relating	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   any	   community	  
benefit	   schemes.	   Interviews	   with	   two	   EIA	   consultants	   however	   revealed	  
conflicting	   responses.	   One	   said	   that	   they	  would	   and	   often	   do,	  whilst	   the	   other	  
said	   that	   they	  would	  not	   typically	  recommend	  schemes	  over	  and	  above	  what	  a	  
developer	  may	  be	  doing	  anyway	  in	  respect	  of	  other	  legislative	  requirements	  (e.g.	  
for	  BBBEE).	  In	  a	  review	  of	  EIAs	  undertaken	  during	  this	  research	  it	  appears	  that	  
where	  community	  benefit	  schemes	  such	  as	  a	  community	  trust	  are	  recommended,	  
these	  generally	  appear	  to	  be	  reporting	  on	  what	  the	  developer	   is	  doing	  anyway,	  
rather	   than	   recommending	   additional	   benefit	   schemes.	   A	   typical	  
recommendation	  might	  be:	  “[The	  Developer]	  should	  continue,	  as	   is	   their	  stated	  
intention,	  to	  explore	  ways	  to	  enhance	  local	  community	  benefits	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  
broad-­‐based	   BEE	   through	   mechanisms	   such	   as	   community	   shareholding	  
schemes	  and	  trusts”	  (ERM,	  2011:	  pp.14-­‐5).	  	  
The	   EIAs	   reviewed	   also	   treated	   community	   benefit	   schemes	   differently,	  whilst	  
some	  included	  this	  as	  an	  impact	  to	  be	  assessed	  for	  significance,	  most	  tended	  to	  
refer	  to	  them	  only	  in	  their	  recommendations	  section.	  In	  the	  UK	  planning	  system	  
community	  benefit	  schemes	  that	  are	  additional	   to	   the	   fabric	  of	   the	  project	   (e.g.	  
payments	  to	  a	  community	  fund)	  may	  not	  constitute	  a	  material	  factor	  in	  planning	  
approval	  decisions.	  This	  means	  they	  should	  not	  be	  specified	  as	  an	  impact	  which	  
must	  be	  assessed	   for	   significance.	   In	  South	  Africa	   this	   appears	   to	  be	  more	  of	   a	  
grey	  area	  and	  such	  schemes	  are	  treated	  in	  a	  conflicting	  manner.	  Whilst	  one	  EIA	  
consultant	   interviewed	   said	   that	   generally	   community	   projects	   would	   inform	  
their	  planning	  decision,	  guidance	  for	  economists	  in	  EIAs	  in	  Van	  Zyl	  et	  al	  (2005)	  
states	  that	  the	  inclusion	  of	  such	  schemes	  in	  considering	  whether	  a	  development	  
should	  be	  approved	  is	  not	  considered	  best	  practise.	  This	  guidance	  is	  interpreted	  
in	  an	  EIA	  for	  a	  wind	  farm	  undertaken	  by	  Council	  for	  Scientific	  Research	  (CSIR)	  as	  
requiring	   that	   consideration	   of	   such	   impacts	   should	   be	   included	   but	   not	   given	  
high	  levels	  of	  prominence	  in	  decision-­‐making	  (CSIR,	  2011).	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  
noted	   as:	   	   “it	  would	   be	   highly	   counter-­‐productive	   if	   a	   situation	  was	   to	   emerge	  
where	   applicants	   and	   their	   partners	   are	   able	   to	   use	   trusts	   and	   other	   profit-­‐
sharing	   or	   social	   responsibility	   measures	   to	   essentially	   over-­‐ride	   other	  
potentially	  more	  important	  concerns”	  (CSIR,	  2011:	  pp.11-­‐40).	  
It	   seems	   unlikely	   that	   EIAs	   may	   play	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   driving	   additional	  
community	   benefit	   schemes.	   EIA	   practitioners	   do	   not	   appear	   to	   make	  
recommendations	  over	  and	  above	  what	  developers	  are	  doing	  anyway,	  nor	  does	  
best	   practise	   promote	   that	   these	   schemes	   play	   a	   big	   role	   in	   decision-­‐making,	  
thereby	  eliminating	  any	  indirect	  incentive	  for	  developers	  to	  create	  such	  schemes	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4.5.2. Public	  opposition	  as	  a	  driver	  
In	   the	   UK	   one	   of	   the	   principal	   drivers	   for	   wind	   farm	   developers	   to	   include	  
community	  benefits	  is	  to	  assuage	  public	  opposition	  by	  including	  communities	  in	  
the	   process	   and	   outcomes	   of	   these	   projects.	   This	   improves	   local	   acceptance	   of	  
schemes	   and	   reduces	   the	   risk	   of	   appeals,	   thereby	   ensuring	   a	   quicker	   and	  
smoother	   process	   to	   get	   planning	   permission	   for	   their	   developments.	   This	  
section	   briefly	   explores	  whether	   there	   is	   potential	  within	   the	   context	   of	   South	  
Africa	  for	  similar	  indirect	  drivers	  to	  emerge	  for	  developers.	  	  
Whilst	  not	  all	  developers	   interviewed	   for	   this	  research	  had	  encountered	  public	  
opposition	  or	  NIMBY	  sentiments	  in	  their	  own	  projects,	  they	  had	  all	  observed	  or	  
heard	  accounts	  of	  other	  projects	  in	  South	  Africa	  experiencing	  such	  issues.	  Many	  
commented	   that	   the	  degree	  of	   the	   opposition	  was	  often	  directly	   related	   to	   the	  
scale	  of	  the	  wind	  farm	  and	  the	  number	  of	  proposals	  in	  the	  area.	  In	  areas	  that	  are	  
fairly	   crowded	   with	   proposals,	   such	   as	   the	   west	   coast	   of	   the	   Western	   Cape,	  
communities	  had	  raised	  quite	  a	  lot	  of	  resistance	  (Developer	  3,	  2011).	  Developer	  
2	  has	  a	  fairly	  large	  project	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Cape	  in	  a	  highly	  visible	  area	  frequented	  
by	  tourists	  and	  has	  experienced	  substantial	  and	  vehement	  opposition.	  Developer	  
5	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  whose	  project	  is	  in	  the	  same	  municipality,	  but	  is	  smaller	  and	  
less	   visible	   except	   to	   neighbouring	   farms,	   has	   had	   a	   relatively	   smooth	   public	  
consultation	  process	  and	  reported	   that	  he	  didn’t	  get	  any	  attendees	  at	  all	   at	  his	  
second	  round	  of	  public	  meetings	  required	  as	  part	  of	  the	  EIA.	  	  
The	   EIA	   process	   requires	   that	   consultation	   is	   undertaken	  with	   interested	   and	  
affected	   parties	   and	   comments	   raised	   must	   be	   responded	   to	   in	   the	   EIA.	  
Communities	  in	  South	  Africa	  are	  diverse	  entities	  (consisting	  of	  different	  classes	  
and	   races)	   with	   diverging	   interests	   and	   there	   is	   a	   discrepancy	   between	   the	  
communities	  who	   object	   and	   the	   targeted	   beneficiary	   communities	   for	   benefit	  
schemes.	   Those	  who	   object	   to	  wind	   farms,	  mostly	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   visual	  
intrusion,	   tend	   to	   be	   wealthier	   middle	   and	   upper	   landowners	   in	   the	   area.	   In	  
contrast	   impoverished	   black	   and	   coloured	   communities	   (the	   targeted	  
beneficiaries	   of	   developer	   contributions)	   typically	   are	   unlikely	   to	   raise	  
objections	  (Developer	  3,	  2011).	  Often	  they	  may	  be	  unaware	  of	  developments	  or	  
unable	  to	  attend	  public	  meetings	  which	  incur	  time	  and	  transport	  costs.	  	  
It	   would	   be	   politically	   unsavoury	   to	   direct	   spending	   towards	   wealthier	  
communities	   who	   are	   the	   principal	   objectors	   to	   mitigate	   their	   opposition.	  
Whether	   community	   contributions	   to	   poor	   communities	   would	   assuage	   rich	  
homeowners	  concerns	  about	  their	  landscape	  views	  seems	  unlikely.	  Developer	  5	  
considers	  that	  investing	  time	  and	  money	  in	  building	  up	  a	  dialogue	  with	  affected	  
objecting	  communities	  would	  be	  a	  far	  more	  effective	  way	  to	  smooth	  the	  process.	  
Developer	   2	   concurred	   that	   he	   felt	   community	   benefits	   were	   unlikely	   to	   add	  
value	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   public	   opposition	   and	   the	   planning	   process.	   In	   fact	   in	  
Developer	  2’s	  experience	  community	  benefits	  had	  had	  the	  opposite	  effect	  on	  his	  
planning	  application.	  A	  local	  homeowners	  association,	  vehemently	  opposing	  his	  
application,	  accused	  him	  of	  establishing	  a	  community	  trust	  as	  a	  tactic	  to	  buy	  local	  
political	   support	   for	   his	   project,	   thereby	   trying	   to	   discredit	   the	   initiative.	   The	  
public	  opposition	  and	  public	  appeals	  process	  therefore	  appears	  to	  have	   limited	  
potential	  to	  be	  a	  driver	  for	  local	  benefit	  schemes	  for	  impoverished	  communities	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4.6. Conclusion	  	  
This	  analysis	  section	  has	  explored	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  potential	  legislative	  drivers	  
that	  pertain	  to	  the	  wind	  sector	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  that	  could	  potentially	  play	  a	  
role	   in	   incentivising	   community	   benefit	   schemes.	   This	   has	   included	  
consideration	   of	   the	   IPPPP	   for	   renewables,	   BBBEE,	   CDM	   and	   EIAs.	   	   It	   would	  
appear	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  local	  wind	  sector	  in	  South	  Africa,	  the	  procurement	  
process	  and	  its	  BBBEE	  requirements	  are	  the	  over-­‐riding	  drivers	   for	  developers	  
to	  engage	   in	  community	  benefit	  schemes.	  The	  competitive	  bidding	  programme,	  
with	   its	   emphasis	   on	   price,	   in	   general	   reduces	   the	   incentive	   for	   developers	   to	  
spend	  more	  on	  community	  benefit	  projects	  than	  a	  REFIT	  might.	  However	  there	  is	  
a	  comprehensive	  BBBEE	  scorecard	  for	   the	  renewable	  procurement	  programme	  
that	   includes	   a	   strong	   focus	   on	   local	   communities	   through	   mandatory	  
requirements	   in	   respect	   of	   broad-­‐based	   ownership	   and	   local	   SED	   and	   ED	  
expenditure.	  	  	  
It	  is	  considered	  that	  CDM	  has	  a	  negligible	  role	  to	  play	  in	  incentivising	  community	  
benefit	   schemes.	   The	   CDM	   sustainable	   development	   criteria	   are	   fairly	  
unambitious	  and	  easy	  to	  comply	  with,	  serving	  as	  a	  ‘tick-­‐the-­‐box’	  exercise.	  This	  is	  
typical	  of	  many	  other	  developing	  host	  countries	  which	  are	  trying	  to	  attract	  CDM	  
projects,	   and	   thereby	   trying	   to	   simplify	   the	   process	   for	   CDM	   developers.	  
Additionally	  the	  carbon	  market	  recognises	  only	  the	  value	  of	  GHG	  reduction	  and	  
not	  the	  sustainable	  development	  aspects	  of	  a	  project	  and	  there	  is	  therefore	  little	  
market-­‐based	   incentive	   placed	   on	   a	   develo er	   to	   undertake	   ambitious	  
sustainable	  development	  initiatives.	  
EIA	   regulations	   in	   South	   Africa,	   too,	   appear	   to	   have	   little	   role	   to	   play	   in	  
incentivising	   local	   community	   benefit	   schemes.	   All	   projects	   are	   required	   to	  
undertake	   a	   socio-­‐economic	   impact	   assessment,	   which	   may	   include	  
recommendations	  for	  mitigation	  or	  enhancement	  measures.	  However	  most	  EIAs	  
only	   recommend	   measures	   that	   developers	   are	   undertaking	   anyway	   and	  
furthermore	   best	   practise	   denotes	   that	   such	   schemes	   should	   not	   influence	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5. Results	  and	  analysis:	  Developers’	  proposed	  community	  
benefit	  schemes	  
5.1. Introduction	  
This	   section	   intends	   to	   explore	   the	   community	   benefit	   schemes	   being	  
undertaken	   by	   wind	   developers	   in	   South	   Africa	   and	   the	   potential	   of	   such	  
schemes	  to	  contribute	  to	  meaningful	  development	  and	  empowerment	  outcomes.	  
It	  focuses	  on	  developers’	  activities	  relating	  to	  community	  ownership,	  SED	  and	  ED	  
as	   defined	   in	   the	   BBBEE	   scorecard	   in	   the	   RFP	   documents.	   Instead	   it	   aims	   to	  
present	   a	  more	   detailed	   insight	   from	   interviews	  with	   several	  wind	   developers	  
with	   the	   intention	   of	   drawing	   out	   particular	   issues	   and	   highlighting	   what	   the	  
potential	  could	  be	  for	  communities	  to	  benefit	  and	  be	  empowered.	  Understanding	  
the	   potential	   of	   such	   development	   initiatives	   is	   extremely	   relevant	   in	  
understanding	  the	  efficacy	  of	  a	  policy	  tool	  such	  as	  BBBEE	  in	  eradicating	  poverty	  
and	  inequality.	  	  
This	  chapter	  starts	  by	  looking	  at	  developers’	  approaches	  and	  perceptions	  of	  their	  
community	  benefit	  obligations	  and	  how	   they	  are	   incorporating	   them	   into	   their	  
business	   strategies.	   It	   then	   investigates	   how	   they	   are	   planning	   to	   fulfil	   their	  
scorecard	   obligations	   and	   key	   issues	   they	   have	   faced.	   Finally	   it	   explores	   how	  
developers	   are	   engaging	   with	   communities	   in	   the	   preparation	   of	   their	   benefit	  
schemes.	  
5.2. The	  motivations	  for	  community	  benefits	  among	  wind	  developers	  in	  
South	  Africa	  
5.2.1. Developers	  perceptions	  and	  approaches	  to	  community	  benefits	  
As	   outlined	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   developers	   have	   specific	   requirements	   in	  
terms	   of	   the	   procurement	   process	   to	   deliver	   benefits	   at	   a	   local	   level	   for	   the	  
communities	  in	  which	  their	  wind	  farms	  are	  located.	  On	  the	  whole	  the	  developers	  
interviewed	   did	   not	   find	   the	   community	   development	   requirements	   to	   be	   off-­‐
putting	   or	   a	   disincentive	   for	   the	   South	  African	   renewables	   sector.	  Developer	   1	  
noted	  that	  the	  BBBEE	  requirements	  are	  just	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  overall	  scope	  
of	   operating	   costs	   for	   developing	   a	  wind	   farm	   and	   “as	   long	   as	   developers	   can	  
make	   their	   required	   rate	   of	   return,	   they’re	   happy	   to	   contribute”	   (Developer	   1,	  
2011).	   Amongst	   the	   developers	   interviewed	   there	   had	   been	   expectations	   that	  
community	   benefits	   would	   play	   an	   important	   part	   in	   the	   project	   selection	  
process	   even	   before	   the	   final	   RFP	   documents	   were	   released.	   All	   had	   been	  
planning	  their	  projects	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  some	  form	  of	  local	  benefits	  would	  be	  a	  
requirement.	   They	   acknowledged	   the	   necessity	   of	   the	   BBBEE	   policy	   in	   South	  
Africa	   (in	   general)	   and	   the	   private	   sector’s	   role	   in	   contributing	   to	   social	  
transformation.	  None	   considered	  BBBEE	   (in	  general)	   to	  discourage	   investment	  
in	  South	  Africa.	  Developer	  3	  was	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  recognises	  
that	   having	   social	   returns	   is	   just	   part	   of	   the	   normal	   business-­‐operating	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All	   the	   developers	   interviewed	   agreed	   that	   the	   typical	   local	   economic	  
developments	   in	   terms	   of	   jobs	   and	   income	   for	   a	   local	   area	   are	   limited.	   For	   a	  
couple,	  this	  fact	  raised	  issues	  of	  equity	  and	  fairness	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  project	  
outcomes	  and	  they	   felt	   it	   important	   that	   local	  communities	  should	  also	  benefit.	  
Whilst	  legislation	  definitely	  defines	  the	  bigger	  picture	  of	  drivers	  for	  community	  
contributions,	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   developers	   have	   chosen	   to	   comply	   and	   the	  
extent	  of	  their	  effort	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  additional	  factors	  that	  motivate	  some	  
of	   their	   actions.	   From	   the	   interview	   discussions	   it	   was	   evident	   that	   some	  
developers	   had	   put	   a	   lot	  more	   time	   and	   expense	   into	   the	   preparation	   of	   their	  
community	   projects.	   For	   example	   some	   had	   already	   undertaken	   extensive	  
community	  consultation,	  or	  had	  commenced	  community	  ownership	  agreements	  
before	  knowing	  that	  this	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  mandatory	  requirement	  in	  the	  final	  RFP.	  	  
For	   three	   of	   the	   developers	   interviewed	   moral	   drivers	   linked	   to	   principles	   of	  
equity	  and	  redressing	  the	  wrongs	  of	   the	  past	  came	   into	  their	  social	   investment	  
decisions.	   	   For	   Developer	   3	   for	   example,	   whose	   company	   is	   linked	   to	   Oxfam,	  
community	  benefits	   are	  aligned	  with	   the	   strategic	  nature	  of	   their	  organisation.	  
Their	  focus	  is	  on	  “contributing	  to	  people’s	  livelihoods	  and	  making	  social	  change”	  
(Developer	   3,	   2011).	  However	  Developers	   2	   and	  4,	   both	  with	  more	   traditional	  
profit	   driven	   businesses,	   indicated	   that	   social	   considerations	   were	   also	  
important	  and	  aligned	  with	  their	  core	  business	  philosophy.	  Developer	  4	  referred	  
to	   a	   personal	   desire	   to	   “do	   business	   differently”	   but	   noted	   the	   challenges	   of	  
bringing	   these	   sentiments	   into	   the	   business	   world.	   Both	   of	   these	   developers	  
referred	   to	   a	   stakeholder	   approach	   of	   doing	   business,	   stating	   that	   it	   was	  
important	   that	   the	   community	   in	  which	   they	  were	   located	   should	   also	   benefit	  
from	  their	  operations.	  	  
The	  extent	  to	  which	  their	  community	  contributions	  do	  prove	  to	  be	  beneficial	  to	  
developers	  in	  the	  procurement	  process	  is	  contingent	  on	  many	  factors.	  Firstly	  the	  
costs	  and	  time	  associated	  with	  engaging	  with	  communities	  must	  be	  considered	  
in	   terms	   of	   whether	   it	   might	   impact	   on	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   the	   tariff	   a	  
developer	   can	   offer.	   Secondly	   whether	   fulfilling	   all	   their	   scorecard	   ownership	  
requirements	  with	  a	  community	  partner	  only	  (as	  opposed	  to	  community	  and	  an	  
empowerment	   company)	   offers	   a	   strategic	   advantage	   in	   the	   procurement	  
process	   is	   also	   contentious.	  Developer	   3	  was	   firmly	   of	   the	   opinion	   that	   having	  
only	   a	   community	   partner	   demonstrates	   a	   strong	   commitment	   to	   community	  
benefits	  that	  will	  offer	  them	  an	  advantage	  in	  the	  selection	  process.	  Developer	  2	  
on	   the	  other	  hand	  was	   concerned	   that	  not	  having	  an	   influential	   empowerment	  
partner	  could	  in	  fact	  be	  a	  disadvantage.	  	  
The	   presence	   of	   Developer	   3,	   whose	   business	   was	   established	   specifically	   to	  
establish	   community	   wind	   farms,	   is	   an	   interesting	   feature	   to	   emerge	   in	   the	  
market	   in	   South	  Africa5	   and	   could	   suggest	   significant	   potential	   for	   this	  market	  
segment	  to	  address	  social	  needs	  as	  well.	  	  Apart	  from	  this	  developer,	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	   the	   other	   developers	   interviewed	   would	   engage	   in	   community	   benefit	  
schemes	   without	   incentives	   like	   additional	   points	   is	   difficult	   to	   gauge.	  
Developers	  1	  and	  5	  appeared	  to	  be	  adopting	  a	  compliance	  approach,	  deciding	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  There	  is	  also	  another	  developer	  in	  the	  South	  African	  market,	  not	  interviewed	  here,	  who	  has	  










	   45	  
their	   contributions	   and	   benefit	   schemes	   based	   on	   maximising	   their	   scorecard	  
whilst	   keeping	   their	   tariff	   cost-­‐competitive.	   Developers	   2	   and	   4	   on	   the	   other	  
hand,	  spoke	  of	  the	  alignment	  with	  their	  business	  philosophies	  and	  had	  invested	  
substantial	  time	  and	  effort	  to	  date.	  	  Their	  actions,	  although	  driven	  by	  legislative	  
requirements,	  nonetheless	  appear	  indicative	  of	  a	  proactive	  effort	  to	  unlock	  win-­‐
win	  solutions	  where	  business	  can	  be	  undertaken,	  acceptable	  rates	  of	  return	  can	  
be	   achieved	   and	  meaningful	   social	   benefits	   can	   be	   realised.	   However	  whether	  
they	   would	   go	   to	   the	   same	   extent	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   incentives	   of	   earning	  
additional	   points	   in	   the	   procurement	   process	   is	   debatable,	   and	   probably	  
unlikely.	  	  
5.2.2. The	  value	  of	  community	  benefits	  to	  a	  developer’s	  business	  
Fulfilling	  the	  IPPPP	  requirements	  are	  effectively	  the	  social	  investment	  decisions	  
that	  a	  developer	  must	  undertake.	  There	  is	  an	  enduring	  focus	  in	  the	  CSR	  literature	  
on	   establishing	   a	   business	   case	   for	   engaging	   in	   CSR	   initiatives.	   Developer	   3	   is	  
trying	  to	  formulate	  a	  business	  model	  establishing	  just	  that.	  As	  mentioned	  above	  
the	   strategic	   objective	   of	   their	   business	   is	   to	   create	   community	   benefits	   from	  
wind.	   Their	   business	  model	   is	   premised	   on	   the	   belief	   that	   the	   involvement	   of	  
communities	   in	   a	   project	   offers	   a	   tangible	   financial	   benefit	   to	   the	   commercial	  
value	  of	  their	  project.	  This	  commercial	  contribution	  is	  not	  however	  retained	  by	  
the	  project	  company	  but,	   in	  line	  with	  their	  social	  objectives,	   is	  then	  transferred	  
to	  the	  community	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ownership	  equity6.	  	  
This	   developer	   believes	   that	   community	   involvement	   brings	   benefits	   to	   his	  
project	  in	  several	  ways	  that	  are	  mostly	  non-­‐monetary	  in	  nature.	  These	  are	  then	  
quantified	   to	   estimate	   the	   financial	   value	   to	   the	   wind	   project	   of	   community	  
involvement.	   This	   increased	   value,	   Developer	   3	   argues,	   would	   more	   than	  
compensate	   for	   the	   increased	   costs	   of	   establishing	   community	   projects.	  
Developer	  3	   cited	   several	  ways	   in	  which	  communities	  bring	  value	   to	  a	  project.	  
These	  include	  having	  a	  smoother	  and	  less	  time-­‐consuming	  development	  process.	  
He	  argues	  that	  local	  community	  benefits	  enhances	  community	  and	  political	  buy-­‐
in	   which	   reduces	   the	   chance	   of	   appeals	   and	   other	   delays	   that	   could	   be	  
encountered	   during	   the	   development	   phase.	   The	   developing	   phase	   is	   a	   highly	  
risky	  and	  costly	  undertaking	  and	  the	  quicker	  that	  a	  developer	  can	  bring	  a	  project	  
to	   financial	  close	   the	  more	  cost-­‐effective	   it	   is	   (Developer	  3,	  2011).	  Developer	  3	  
also	   cited	   the	   favourable	   public	   relations	   (PR)	   benefits	   for	   a	   business	   of	  
community	   development	   initiatives.	   There	   have	   been	   several	   news	   articles	   on	  
community	   wind	   farms	   in	   South	   Africa,	   bringing	   beneficial	   exposure	   to	   these	  
developers7.	   He	   also	   argues	   that	   community	   involvement	   can	   make	   projects	  
eligible	   for	   CDM	   Gold	   Standard,	   with	   has	   more	   stringent	   sustainable	  
development	  criteria	  and	  which	  are	  theoretically	  worth	  more	  in	  the	  market	  and	  
could	  bring	  greater	  revenue	  to	  a	  project.	  	  
As	  well	   as	   the	   added	   value	   for	   a	   project,	   Developer	   3	   notes	   that	   communities	  
make	  significant	  non-­‐monetary	  contributions	  during	  the	  engagement	  process	  in	  
setting	   up	   an	   ownership	   agreement,	   which	   do	   not	   normally	   get	   recognised	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  More	  on	  the	  transferral	  of	  equity	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  section	  5.3.1	  
7	  For	  example	  Wind-­‐energy	  developer	  teams	  up	  with	  E	  Cape	  traditional	  leaders,	  Engineering	  News,	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standard	   business	   models.	   These	   include,	   for	   example,	   regular	   attendance	   by	  
community	   members	   at	   meetings.	   Without	   this	   cooperation	   and	   regular	  
involvement	   from	  community	  members,	   establishing	   a	   community	   trust	  would	  
be	   much	   more	   difficult	   and	   time	   consuming.	   Developer	   3	   therefore	  
acknowledges	   and	   monetises	   these	   time	   contributions	   from	   community	  
members.	  In	  recognition	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  added	  value	  to	  the	  project	  wouldn’t	  
have	  been	  recognised	  without	  the	  community	  these	  monetised	  contributions	  are	  
then	   transferred	   to	   the	   community	   as	   equity	   in	   the	   project.	   Conceptually	  
Developer	  3	  prefers	  to	  view	  it	  as	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  community’s	  non-­‐monetary	  
contributions	  rather	  than	  a	  philanthropic	  gift.	  	  
Choosing	  a	  method	   to	  actually	  estimate	  any	  of	   these	  elements,	   for	  example	   the	  
cost	  savings	   from	  an	  avoided	  appeals	  process	  or	   the	  PR	  value	   to	  a	  company,	   is	  
complex	  and	  contestable.	  Developer	  3	  notes	  that	  the	  method	  could	  be	  debated	  in	  
a	   number	   of	   ways	   and	   is	   essentially	   moot.	   In	   their	   own	   words,	   the	   value	   a	  
business	  places	  on	  these	  elements	  essentially	  “comes	  down	  to	  what	  the	  project	  
can	   afford”	   (Developer	   3,	   2011).	   For	   a	   company	   such	   as	   Developer	   3’s,	  whose	  
strategic	  aim	  is	  to	  uplift	  communities,	  this	  rationale	  may	  be	  sufficient,	  however	  
whether	  such	  a	  business	  model	  would	  convince	  other	  developers	  is	  less	  certain.	  
The	   other	   developers	   interviewed,	   when	   asked	   about	   the	   value	   of	   community	  
contributions	  to	  their	  projects,	  did	  not	  corroborate	  these	  assertions	  of	  increased	  
commercial	   value.	   None	   could	   cite	   any	   examples	   of	   how	   these	   schemes	   could	  
bring	   value	   to	   their	   project	   or	   their	   company	   other	   than	   through	   preferential	  
selection	  in	  the	  procurement	  process.	  They	  also	  felt	  that	  the	  role	  that	  community	  
benefit	   schemes	   could	   bring	   in	   ensuring	   a	   quicker	   and	   smoother	   overall	  
development	  process	  (e.g.	  planning	  approval)	  as	  suggested	  by	  Developer	  3	  was	  
extremely	  limited.	  	  When	  asked	  about	  how	  other	  developers	  might	  accept	  such	  a	  
model,	   Developer	   3	   was	   optimistic,	   but	   acknowledged	   that	   there	   would	  
obviously	  be	  a	  spectrum	  of	  developers,	  and	  not	  all	  would	  be	  interested.	  He	  noted	  
that	   a	   project’s	   shareholders	   would	   also	   influence	   the	   acceptability	   of	   this	  
business	   model	   and	   that	   it	   would	   be	   difficult	   if	   there	   were	   pressure	   from	  
shareholders	  to	  keep	  costs	  minimised	  in	  the	  short	  term	  (as	  costs	  of	  community	  
projects	  would	  increase	  costs).	  He	  asserted	  however	  that	  he	  firmly	  believed	  that	  
a	  business	  model	   inclusive	  of	   community	  benefits	  would	   improve	   the	   financial	  
performance	  of	  a	  project	   in	  the	   long	  term	  from	  speedier	  processes,	  PR	  benefits	  
etc.	   The	  market	   is	   however	   in	   its	   infancy	   and	   it	  will	   be	   interesting	   to	   see	  how	  
Developer	   3’s	   business	   model	   develops	   and	   responds	   to	   challenges	   of	  
profitability	  in	  the	  longer	  term.	  	  
5.3. Fulfilment	  of	  the	  BBBEE	  scorecard	  criteria	  in	  the	  IPPPP	  
5.3.1. Establishing	  and	  financing	  community	  ownership	  structures	  
The	  most	  common	  legal	  structure	  utilised	  in	  community	  ownership	  models,	  and	  
the	  one	  being	  used	  by	  the	  developers	  interviewed	  for	  this	  study,	  is	  a	  community	  
trust.	  A	  trust	  is	  a	  legal	  entity	  (regulated	  by	  the	  Trust	  Property	  Control	  Act	  57	  of	  
1988)	  whereby	  a	  board	  of	   trustees	  administers	   funds	  or	  property	  on	  behalf	  of	  
beneficiaries	   to	   achieve	   a	   stated	   objective.	   Trusts	   are	   governed	   by	   a	   founding	  
document,	  known	  as	  the	  trust	  deed	  that	  establishes	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  trust,	  how	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named	  or	  the	  trust	  can	  be	  established	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  class	  of	  persons	  or	  the	  
achievement	  of	  an	  objective	  (RSA,	  1988).	  	  A	  trust	  could	  therefore	  be	  established	  
for	  the	  purposes	  of	  benefitting	  historically	  disadvantaged	  persons	  living	  within	  a	  
defined	  geographical	  area	  with	  representatives	  of	  the	  community	  established	  as	  
local	  trustees.	  	  
Developer	   2	   is	   establishing	   a	   community	   trust	   for	   unnamed	   beneficiaries,	   but	  
which	   are	   defined	   as	   previously	   disadvantaged	   persons	   living	   in	   the	   defined	  
community.	  He	  plans	  to	  establish	  the	  trust	  as	  an	  independent	  legal	  entity	  with	  its	  
own	   management	   structure,	   however	   he	   said	   that	   his	   company	   would	   retain	  
some	  measure	  of	  responsibility	  for	  financial	  oversight	  of	  the	  trust	  activities.	  The	  
trust	  deed	  specifies	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  minimum	  of	  5	  trustees,	  of	  which	  3	  have	  
to	  be	  community	  representatives,	  one	  from	  Developer	  2’s	  company	  and	  one	  from	  
the	  Development	  Finance	  Institute	  (DFI)	  providing	  the	  loan.	  	  	  
The	   key	   issue	   in	   developing	   community	   ownership	   models	   in	   South	   Africa	  
(compared	  with	  developed	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  UK)	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  financing.	  In	  
South	   Africa	   the	   communities	   in	   question	   are	   impoverished	   and	   unable	   to,	   of	  
their	  own	  accord,	  raise	  capital	  (via	  own	  savings	  or	  loans)	  to	  participate	  in	  equity	  
ventures.	  This	   issue	  of	  enabling	  those	  without	  capital	  to	  participate	  in	  business	  
ownership	   is	   not	   a	   new	   one	   in	   South	   Africa	   and	   has	   been	   brought	   to	   the	   fore	  
because	   of	   Governments	   BBBEE	   policy,	   which	   actively	   promotes	   broad-­‐based	  
community	   ownership	   deals.	   Various	   development	   finance	   institutions	   (DFIs),	  
such	  as	  the	  Development	  Bank	  South	  Africa	  (DBSA)	  and	  Industrial	  Development	  
Corporation	   (IDC),	   offer	   equity-­‐financing	   products	   specifically	   to	   facilitate	   BEE	  
transactions.	  	  
Both	   Developers	   2	   and	   3	   had	   approached	   the	   IDC	   for	   financing	   of	   their	  
community	  ownership	  trusts.	  The	  IDC	  is	  a	  government	  owned	  organisation	  that	  
provides	  funding	  for	  entrepreneurs	  and	  projects	  contributing	  to	  industrialisation	  
and	   job	   creation.	   It	   offers	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   financial	   products,	   which	   includes	  
financing	  of	  BEE	  transactions.	  DFIs	  typically	  offer	  equity	  financing	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
loans	  to	  communities	  in	  broad-­‐based	  ownership	  deals	  that	  can	  be	  repaid	  out	  of	  
the	   dividends	   earned	   from	   the	   equity	   shareholding.	   The	  DFI	  would	   then	   get	   a	  
preference	  shareholding	  (although	   they	  do	  not	  get	  voting	  rights)	  meaning	   they	  
are	  guaranteed	  priority	  in	  the	  payout	  of	  dividends.	  However	  a	  “trickle	  dividend”	  
is	   typically	   allowed	   to	   flow	   to	   the	   trust.	   This	   means	   that	   a	   percentage	   of	   the	  
overall	  dividend	  (e.g.	  10%)	  will	  go	  to	  the	  trust	  whilst	  the	  remaining	  90%	  will	  go	  
to	  the	  DFI	  as	  repayment.	  There	  are	  problems	  however	  in	  sustaining	  these	  equity	  
financed	   broad-­‐based	   trusts	   during	   the	   period	   of	   repayment.	   With	   only	   little	  
money	   coming	   in,	   it	   is	   challenging	   to	   sustain	   organisations,	   retain	   staff	   and	  
manage	   community	   expectations	   and	   cooperation	   (Tshikululu	   Social	  
Investments,	  2010).	  	  
Developer	   3	   has	   developed	   a	   slightly	   different	   and	   innovative	   approach	   to	  
assisting	   communities	   in	   obtaining	   their	   equity.	   As	   discussed	   above	   they	   have	  
developed	  a	  business	  model	  whereby	   they	  recognise	  and	  quantify	   in	  monetary	  
terms	   the	   value	   they	   see	   community	   involvement	   bringing	   to	   a	   project.	   This	  
initial	  equity	  that	  communities	  have	  can	  then	  be	  used	  as	  security	  for	  a	  loan	  to	  get	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loans	  (Developer	  3,	  2011).	  Hawes	  (2011)	  comments	  that	  gifting	  equity	  in	  broad-­‐
based	   ownership	   schemes	   is	   not	   uncommon,	   although	   he	   notes	   that	   the	  
incidence	  of	  such	  deals	  has	  definitely	  decreased	  since	  the	  recessionary	  period.	  	  
In	  a	  few	  of	  Developer	  3’s	  community	  ownership	  projects	  the	  community	  own	  the	  
land	  on	  which	  the	  wind	  farm	  is	  to	  be	  located.	  	  In	  theory	  this	  land	  could	  serve	  as	  
an	  asset	   that	   they	   could	  use	  as	   leverage	   to	  purchase	  equity,	   however	  he	  noted	  
that	   land	   ownership	   was	   not	   a	   material	   factor	   in	   pursuing	   a	   community	  
ownership	   model.	   From	   his	   experience	   their	   company	   has	   found	   it	   rare	   for	   a	  
piece	   of	   land	   that	   is	   community	   owned	   to	   also	   meet	   all	   the	   technical	  
requirements	   for	   a	   wind	   farm.	   These	   are	   manifold	   and	   include	   for	   example	  
sufficient	  wind	   resource,	   proximity	   to	   a	   grid	   connection	  and	  no	  environmental	  
constraints	  on	  the	  site.	  Furthermore	  even	  if	  a	  community	  does	  own	  land	  that	  is	  
developable,	  the	  value	  of	  that	  land	  is	  usually	  miniscule	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  value	  of	  
the	   shareholding	   that	   the	   community	  would	   be	   trying	   to	   raise.	   In	   South	  Africa	  
there	  are	  also	  many	  complications	  surrounding	  land	  tenure	  and	  securing	  access	  
to	   land	   that	   further	   complicate	   sites	   that	   are	   community	   owned	   (Developer	   3,	  
2011).	  	  
There	   are	   some	   risks	   associated	  with	   equity	   financing.	   These	   structured	   deals	  
assume	  a	  growth	  in	  the	  company	  share	  price	  so	  that	  dividends	  produce	  sufficient	  
cash	   flow	   to	   repay	   the	   debt.	  However	   share	   prices	   can	   devalue	   in	   response	   to	  
broader	  macro-­‐economic	   issues,	   as	  happened	   in	   the	  mining	   sector	  when	   share	  
prices	  drastically	  devalued	  in	  the	  2008/09	  recession	  leaving	  many	  BEE	  deals	  at	  
risk	  (Levenberg,	  2009).	  If	  shares	  devalue	  and	  a	  trust	  defaults	  on	  its	  repayments,	  
the	  security	  (shares)	  would	  revert	  to	  the	  financier	  (DFI)	  and	  the	  trust	  could	  lose	  
its	  shareholding	  (Hawes,	  2011).	  The	  stability	  of	  the	  assets	  and	  company	  a	  trust	  is	  
investing	   into	   therefore	   becomes	   important.	   The	  wind	   developers	   interviewed	  
here	  assert	  that	   large	  infrastructural	  energy	  generating	  projects	  are	  considered	  
fairly	  stable	  and	  that	  once	  a	  project	  is	  operational,	  risks	  become	  fairly	  low.	  	  
5.3.2. The	  developmental	  benefits	  of	  community	  ownership	  
Before	  the	  final	  RFP	  documents	  were	  released	  and	  the	  mandatory	  requirement	  
for	   community	   ownership	   revealed,	   only	   two	   of	   the	   developers	   (Developers	   2	  
and	   3)	   interviewed	   were	   pursuing	   community	   ownership	   models.	   A	   third	  
(Developer	  4)	  had	  engaged	  in	  negotiations	  with	  a	  community	  but	  had	  abandoned	  
the	  partnership	   initiative	  after	   the	  difficulties	  encountered.	  Developers	  2	  and	  3	  
were	   choosing	   to	   fulfil	   their	   entire	   ownership	   requirements	   through	   local	  
community	  participation,	  although	  Developer	  2	  noted	  that	  he	  might	  still	  decide	  
to	   bring	   in	   an	   empowerment	   partner	   after	   all,	   in	   addition	   to	   their	   community	  
partner.	  	  	  	  
The	   two	   developers	   who	   originally	   and	   voluntarily	   chose	   to	   engage	   in	   local	  
community	  ownership	  models	  equated	  it	  with	  showing	  a	  greater	  commitment	  to	  
delivering	   real	   empowerment	   to	   local	   communities.	   Both	   these	   developers	   felt	  
that	  ownership	  offered	  an	  array	  of	  benefits	   to	   the	  community	  beyond	  that	  of	  a	  
revenue	  share	  agreement	   (e.g.	   contributing	   to	  a	  community	   fund).	  Developer	  3	  
stated	   that	   ownership	   starts	   to	   build	   a	   sense	   of	   personal	   empowerment	   as	   a	  
citizen	   with	   economic	   assets	   involved	   in	   the	  mainstream	   economy.	   It	   exposes	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earning	   returns	   and	   how	   broader	   macroeconomic	   issues	   can	   affect	   their	  
investments.	  As	  an	  equity	  holder,	  communities	  have	  an	  asset	  that	  they	  can	  use	  in	  
various	   ways,	   for	   example	   to	   borrow	   against	   to	   develop	   an	   agricultural	  
enterprise.	  Communities	   can,	  however,	  only	  borrow	  against	   that	   equity	  once	   it	  
has	   been	   fully	   paid	   off.	  Ownership	   can	   therefore	   offer	   communities	   a	   platform	  
from	  which	  to	  further	  grow	  their	  economic	  potential	   in	  other	  ways,	  and	  just	  as	  
importantly,	   psychologically	   affords	   them	   the	   personal	   power	   to	   develop	   their	  
own	  ambitions.	  
Developer	   3	   also	   believes	   their	   ownership	  models	   that	   transfer	   equity	   on	   the	  
basis	  of	   the	  value	  that	  beneficiaries	  bring	  goes	  a	  significant	  way	  to	  altering	  the	  
relationship	  between	  beneficiaries	  and	  the	  benefits	  they	  are	  receiving.	  Instead	  of	  
being	   passive	   recipients	   of	   aid-­‐like	   charitable	   donations,	   individuals	   and	  
communities	   can	   become	   aware	   that	   their	   involvement	   has	   value	   and	  
importance	   to	   the	   project.	   The	   interactions	   can	   build	   interpersonal	   skills	   and	  
enhance	   self-­‐confidence	   thereby	   building	   social	   capital.	   Social	   capital	   can	   be	  
described	   as	   “a	   broad	   term	  encompassing	   the	   norms	   and	  networks	   facilitating	  
collective	  action	  for	  mutual	  benefit	  (Woolcock,	  1998	  in	  Bebbington,	  1999).	  It	  can	  
also	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   value	   from	   “interpersonal	   interactions	   and	  
organisation”	  (Chee	  Tahir	  and	  Darton,	  2010).	  	  
Developer	  4	  however	  believes	  that	  there	  are	  too	  many	  risks	  for	  the	  community	  
involved	  with	   ownership	   schemes	   and	   argues	   that	   ownership	   is	   best	   pursued	  
through	   an	   established	   empowerment	   company	   instead.	   He	   argues	   that	  
communities	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  engaging	  in	  ownership	  
agreements	   and	   are	   unable	   to	   absorb	   shocks	   such	   as	   economic	   downturns	   or	  
periods	  of	  uncertainty	   to	   the	  same	  degree	   that	  a	   large	  empowerment	  company	  
might.	  Market	  fluctuations	  could,	  for	  example,	  devalue	  shares,	  or	  loans	  taken	  out	  
to	   finance	   ownership	   agreements	   be	   recalled	   during	   recessionary	   times.	  
Communities	  may	  battle	  to	  handle	  the	  economic	  uncertainty	  and	  risks	  involved.	  
In	  his	  opinion	  an	  established	  empowerment	  company	   is	  much	  better	  placed	   to	  
absorb	   and	   handle	   this	   risk	   and	   he	   considered	   it	   unfair	   to	   place	   that	   on	  
vulnerable	   communities.	  Developer	   4	   therefore	   argued	   that	   lower	   risk	   options	  
for	  community	  benefits	  (e.g.	  a	  community	  fund)	  were	  more	  appropriate.	  
5.3.3. Socio-­‐economic	  development	  and	  enterprise	  development	  
contributions	  
The	   BBBEE	   scorecard	   requirements	   in	   the	   RFP	   specify	   that	   developers	  
contribute	   a	   minimum	   of	   1%	   and	   up	   to	   1.5%	   of	   revenue	   to	   socio-­‐economic	  
development	   and	   up	   to	   0.6%	   of	   revenue	   to	   enterprise	   development.	   Hawes	  
(2011)	   considers	   that,	   in	   general,	   SED	   and	   ED	   are	   easy	   scorecard	   wins	   for	  
companies;	   their	   loose	   definition	   means	   that	   companies	   have	   large	   discretion	  
over	  how	  they	  spend	  the	  money.	  The	  RFP	  does	  not	  outline	  any	  specifications	  for	  
developers	   as	   to	   how	   to	   fulfil	   their	   SED	   and	   ED	   requirements	   nor	   how	   they	  
should	   demonstrate	   their	   intentions	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   procurement	  
process	   (Developer	   5,	   2011).	   	   In	   respect	   of	   SED,	   the	   RFP	   states	   only	   that	  
developers	  develop	  a	  strategy	  in	  which	  they	  identify	  community	  needs	  and	  how	  
these	  will	  be	  addressed	  using	  the	  contributions.	  For	  ED	  it	  requires	  developers	  to	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In	  order	  to	  fulfil	  their	  SED	  and	  ED	  contributions	  developers	  need	  to	  establish	  and	  
outline	  a	  long-­‐term	  process	  approach	  for	  development	  interventions	  rather	  than	  
a	  project-­‐based	  approach.	  A	  key	  part	  of	  planning	  the	  development	  programme	  is	  
to	   establish	   an	   appropriate	   governance	   structure	   to	   administer	   the	  wind	   farm	  
contributions	   over	   the	   life	   of	   the	   project.	   The	   operation	   of	   the	   development	  
programme	   includes	  managing	   such	   processes	   as	   community	   and	   stakeholder	  
liaison,	   identifying	  and	  planning	  projects	  with	  beneficiary	   input,	   tendering	  and	  
appointing	   service	   providers,	   project	   management	   and	   coordination,	   financial	  
oversight	   as	   well	   as	   monitoring	   and	   evaluation.	   	   The	   choice	   of	   governance	  
structure	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  approach	  that	  wind	  farm	  owners	  wish	  to	  follow	  in	  
implementing	   their	   development	   interventions.	   Husted	   (2003)	   defines	   a	  
company’s	   options	   in	   respect	   of	   their	   CSR	   programme	   as	   to	   “contribute,	  
collaborate	   or	   internalise”.	   In	   South	   Africa,	   wind	   developers	   may	   choose	   to	  
donate	   to	   a	   local	   charity	   or	   NGO	   or	   to	   outsource	   it	   to	   an	   organisation	   that	  
specialises	   in	   managing	   BEE	   funds	   and	   implementing	   projects	   on	   behalf	   of	  
companies,	   allowing	   the	   company	   to	   earn	   points	   on	   their	   scorecard.	  
Alternatively	   a	   company	   may	   choose	   to	   manage	   the	   impleme tation	   of	   the	  
development	   programme	   themselves	   or	   in	   partnership	   with	   NGOs	   or	  
development	  agencies.	  Or	  they	  could	  choose	  to	  establish	  a	  community-­‐governed	  
structure	  such	  as	  a	  community	  trust	  to	  administer	  the	  wind	  farm	  contributions	  
on	   behalf	   of	   the	   community.	   	   The	   degree	   of	   involvement	   that	   a	   wind	   farm	  
company	  may	  have	  will	  differ	  depending	  on	  their	  preferences	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  
control	  they	  wish	  to	  retain	  over	  how	  funds	  are	  spent	  (Hawes,	  2011).	  	  
All	   the	   developers	   interviewed	   appeared	   to	   be	   internalising	   or	   adopting	   some	  
sort	  of	  hybrid	  partnership	  approach	  to	  their	  SED	  and	  ED	  contributions.	  Retaining	  
some	  measure	  of	  direct	   involvement	  may	  be	  to	  demonstrate	  greater	  credibility	  
of	  their	  development	  interventions	  for	  the	  procurement	  process,	  and	  not	  to	  just	  
be	  seen	  to	  be	  outsourcing	  this	  aspect.	  Developers	  1	  and	  5	  specified	  that	  the	  most	  
preferable	   option	   in	   their	   opinion	   would	   have	   been	   to	   partner	   with,	   a	   local	  
organisation	  or	  BEE	  consultancy	  that	  had	  experience	  in	  the	  local	  area.	  However	  
both	  had	  found	  there	  wer 	  none	  in	  the	  specific	  communities	  they	  were	  focussing	  
on.	   In	   response	   both	   were	   choosing	   to	   manage	   it	   themselves	   and	   contracting	  
with	   delivery	   agents	   to	   implement	   projects.	   Developer	   1	   was	   planning	   on	  
establishing	   a	   section	   21	   company	   to	   administer	   the	   funds;	   and	   Developer	   5	  
would	   be	   retaining	   the	  management	   of	   the	   community	   benefit	   schemes	   in	   the	  
wind	  farm	  company	  itself.	  Neither	  of	   these	  developers	  mentioned	  the	   inclusion	  
of	  community	  representatives	  in	  their	  governance	  structure.	  Developers	  2,	  3	  and	  
4	  were	   all	   planning	   on	   establishing	   community	   trusts	   to	   administer	   their	   SED	  
and	  ED	  contributions.	  This	  is	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
At	   this	   still	   relatively	   early	   stage	   of	   the	   wind	   farms’	   development,	   there	   was	  
limited	   information	   that	   developers	   were	   able,	   or	   willing,	   to	   elicit	   during	   the	  
interviews	   on	   their	   actual	   benefit	   schemes	   or	   how	   their	   contributions	   might	  
respond	  to	  developmental	  needs	  in	  the	  local	  communities.	  This	  may	  have	  been	  to	  
protect	   what	   they	   considered	   sensitive	   information	   that	   they	   did	   not	   want	   to	  
share,	  or	  it	  may	  reveal	  that	  developers	  themselves,	  whose	  area	  of	  expertise	  is	  not	  
social	   development,	   had	   not	   considered	   the	   development	   aspects	   of	   their	  
contributions.	  A	  couple	  of	  the	  developers	  made	  generic	  references	  to	  health	  and	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of	   undertaking	   local	   needs	   assessments	   of	   communities	   and	   two	   of	   the	  
developers	   revealed	   that	   they	   were	   enlisting	   the	   services	   of	   development	  
specialists	  to	  assist	  them	  in	  their	  development	  strategy	  formulation.	  	  
5.4. Community	  engagement	  and	  participation	  
Community	  engagement	  has	  a	  fundamental	  role	  to	  play	  in	  building	  social	  capital	  
and	  engendering	  real	  empowerment.	  The	  process	  of	  managing	  and	  maintaining	  
working	  relationships	  can	  however	  be	  challenging	  and	  fraught	  with	  difficulties.	  
This	   section	   explores	   the	   experiences	   and	   challenges	   developers	   have	  
encountered	   to	   date	   in	   their	   community	   engagement	   during	   the	   procurement	  
process.	   It	   also	   explores	   the	   benefits	   and	   difficulties	   associated	   in	   establishing	  
community	  governance	  structures	  such	  as	  community	  trusts.	  	  	  
5.4.1. Engagement	  during	  the	  procurement	  process	  
Developers	   are	   required	   for	   the	   procurement	   selection	   process	   to	   develop	   a	  
strategy	  for	  how	  they	  will	  contribute	  to	  local	  communities	  with	  their	  ED	  and	  SED	  
contributions.	   Although	   no	   explicit	   requirement	   is	   laid	   out	   in	   the	   RFP	   (nor	  
BBBEE	   legislation)	   relating	   to	   community	   engagement,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   it	   is	   a	  
precondition	   for	  demonstrating	   legitimacy	   and	  understanding	  of	   the	   local	   area	  
for	   the	   procurement	   process	   (Hawes,	   2011).	   Bidders	   need	   to	   demonstrate	   in	  
their	   applications	   that	   they	   are	   sufficiently	   familiar	  with	   the	   local	   area	   and	   its	  
needs	  in	  order	  to	  outline	  a	  development	  strategy	  in	  a	  credible	  manner.	  	  
However	   developers	   face	   particular	   challenges	   in	   engaging	   with	   communities	  
this	   early	   during	   the	   development	   stage	   of	   their	   projects,	   which	   is	   still	  
characterised	   by	   significant	   uncertainty.	   Developer	   1	   discussed	   the	   delicacy	   of	  
their	   interactions	   with	   the	   community	   and	   the	   challenges	   associated	   with	  
working	  with	  the	  community	  before	  a	  power	  purchase	  agreement	  with	  the	  DoE	  
is	   secured.	   At	   this	   stage	   there	   is	   no	   certainty	   which	   round	   a	   project	   may	   be	  
successful	  in	  nor	  even	  if	  it	  will	  be	  selected	  at	  all.	  To	  start	  discussing	  benefits	  and	  
monetary	   flows	  may	   introduce	  difficulties	   in	  managing	  expectations	  and	  hence	  
future	  working	  relationships	  (Developer	  1,	  2011).	  As	  research	  into	  the	  success	  of	  
BBBEE	  trusts	  in	  South	  Africa	  notes	  “beneficiaries	  will	  always	  expect	  results	  long	  
before	   the	   income	   generating	   asset	   can	   produce	   them”	   (Tshikululu	   Social	  
Investments,	  2010:	  p.43).	  	  
It	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   timing	   and	   nature	   of	   how	   the	   development	   programme	   is	  
introduced	   to	   the	   community	   needs	   to	   be	   carefully	   considered.	   Engaging	   in	  
projects	  whereby	  money	  or	  other	  benefits	  are	  to	  be	  transferred	  to	  communities	  
can	  increase	  the	  potential	  for	  contention	  and	  conflict.	  The	  requirements	  for	  the	  
procurement	  process	  of	  engaging	  this	  early	  increase	  the	  challenge	  of	  engaging	  in	  
a	  sensitive	  manner.	  Interacting	  prematurely	  and	  in	  an	  unstructured	  manner	  can	  
raise	  unreasonable	  expectations	  and	  damage	  future	  working	  relationships.	  Long-­‐
term	   relationships	   need	   to	   be	   developed	   and	   preserved	   over	   time.	   Inadequate	  
communication	  frequently	  jeopardises	  working	  relationships	  as	  well	  as	  effective	  
governance	   and	   implementation	   of	   projects	   (Tshikululu	   Social	   Investments,	  
2009).	  	  
Perhaps	   in	  recognition	  of	   this,	  not	  all	  developers	  had	  necessarily	  engaged	  with	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stakeholders	   (e.g.	   the	   local	  municipality	   or	   business	   sector).	   There	  might	   have	  
been	   limited	  consultation	  with	   individuals	  who	  were	  part	  of	   the	  community	  or	  
had	  knowledge	  of	  it	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  information.	  But	  are	  those	  developers	  who	  
are	  developing	  their	  strategies	  without	  full	  consultation	  risking	  the	  efficacy	  and	  
success	  of	   the	   community	  benefit	  projects	   they	   implement?	  Developers	  will	   be	  
committed	  to	  implementing	  this	  strategy	  for	  the	  life	  of	  their	  wind	  farm.	  Getting	  
local	   input	   from	   beneficiaries	   themselves	   into	   the	   strategy	   formulation	   is	  
essential	   to	   ensure	   that	   projects	   and	   programmes	   are	   appropriately	   targeted,	  
address	  priority	  needs	  and	  have	  local	  buy-­‐in.	  Following	  a	  top-­‐down,	  outsider	  led	  
approach	  which	   fails	   to	   adequately	   account	   for	   local	   dynamics	   can	   lead	   to	   ill-­‐
suited	   interventions	  which	   can	   ultimately	   fail	   (Tritter,	   2006;	   Tshikululu	   Social	  
Investments,	  2009).	  
Developer	   3	   however	   had	   already	   launched	   into	   full-­‐scale	   community	  
engagement	   and	   consultation,	   with	   many	   meetings	   already	   held	   with	   the	  
community	  to	  introduce	  the	  project,	  discuss	  the	  process,	  set	  up	  trust	  structures	  
etc.	  He	   felt	   that	   expectations	  were	   a	  normal	  part	   of	   any	  new	  venture,	   “if	   there	  
weren’t	   positive	   expectations	   of	   outcomes	   people	   wouldn’t	   get	   involved”	  
(Developer	  3,	  2011).	  He	  felt	  that	  expectations	  would	  just	  be	  managed	  over	  time	  
through	   ongoing	   communication	   with	   the	   community,	   stating	   that	   they	   try	   to	  
make	   it	   as	   clear	   as	   possible	   upfront	   that	   there	   are	   risks	   and	   uncertainties	  
involved.	   	  He	  gave	  an	  example	  of	  one	  potential	   site	  on	  which	   they	  had	  erected	  
measuring	  masts	  but	  had	  ultimately	  found	  there	  was	  insufficient	  wind	  resource	  
to	  make	   the	   site	   viable.	   They	  had	   taken	  particular	   care	   to	   communicate	   to	   the	  
community	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  they	  were	  testing	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  site	  only	  
and	   that	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   project	   not	   going	   ahead	   were	   a	   lack	   of	   wind	  
resource.	  	  
The	  success	  of	  engagement	  is	  also	  dependent	  on	  the	  context	  of	  the	  community,	  
their	  attitudes	  and	  expectations	  and	  overall	   level	  of	  preparedness	   to	  engage	   in	  
collaboration	  (Bowen	  et	  al,	  2010).	  There	  might	  be	  high	  levels	  of	  distrust	  among	  
the	   community,	   based	   on	   previous	   negative	   experiences	   with	   development	  
initiatives,	  as	  Developer	  1	  experienced.	  Developer	  1	  announced	  they	  had	  decided	  
against	   setting	   up	   a	   community	   trust	   structure	   after	   encountering	   significant	  
negative	   perception	   of	   trusts	   from	   the	   community.	   To	   build	   the	   trust	   of	   the	  
community	   and	   demonstrate	   to	   them	   their	   commitment	   to	   the	   development	  
process,	   this	   developer	   commented	   that	   they	   may	   consider	   establishing	   a	  
“demonstration	  project”	  once	  their	  PPA	  has	  been	  secured.	  	  	  
5.4.2. Community	  governance	  structures	  
Development	  that	  is	  outsider	  led	  and	  consists	  of	  one-­‐way	  information	  flows	  can	  
offer	   socio-­‐economic	   benefits	   (although	   there	   are	   risks	   of	   mis-­‐targeted	  
interventions)	  but	  keeps	  beneficiaries	  in	  a	  passive	  role	  in	  their	  own	  development	  
process.	   It	   misses	   the	   chance	   to	   use	   the	   process	   of	   engagement	   itself	   as	   a	  
transformative	   and	   empowering	   mechanism.	   Involving	   the	   community	   in	  
decision-­‐making	   can	   build	   social	   cohesion	   and	   expose	   individuals	   to	   new	  
concepts	  and	  ideas.	  	  It	  can	  develop	  the	  agency	  of	  people	  to	  be	  key	  players	  in	  their	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Bowen	  et	  al	  (2010)	  refer	  to	  a	  ‘continuum	  of	  community	  engagement’	  “from	  one-­‐
way	   information	   sharing,	   through	   two-­‐way	   dialogue	   and	   collaboration,	   to	  
community	   leadership”	   (Bowen	   et	   al,	   2010:	   p.303).	   The	   authors	   define	   the	  
different	   types	   of	   engagement	   as	   transactional,	   transitional	   and	  
transformational.	  Transactional	  may	  be	  in	  the	  form	  of	  donations	  and	  investment	  
in	   the	   community.	   It	   consists	   of	   a	   one-­‐way	   transfer	   of	   information	   from	   the	  
company	   about	   development	   initiatives,	   where	   the	   company	   retains	   overall	  
control	   of	   the	   engagement	   process.	   Transitional	   is	   characterised	   by	   “two-­‐way	  
communication,	   consultation	   and	   collaboration”	   (ibid:	   p.306).	   In	   comparison	  
transformational	  engagement	   is	   characterised	  by	   joint	  management	  of	  projects	  
and	   community	   leadership	   in	   decision-­‐making.	   Control	   over	   the	   engagement	  
process	   is	   shared.	  Transformation	   is	   only	   feasible	  when	   interacting	  with	   a	   few	  
partners	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  community	  trust.	  	  
As	   indicated	  above,	  3	  of	   the	  developers	  were	   choosing	   to	  establish	   community	  
trust	  structures	  that	  include	  community	  representatives	  on	  the	  board	  of	  trustees	  
that	  decides	  on	  how	  wind	  farm	  contributions	  will	  be	  spent.	  In	  theory	  this	  type	  of	  
engagement	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  transformational.	  This	  structure	  allows	  for	  a	  
credible	   interaction	  with	   the	  community	  and	  establishes	  a	  platform	  for	  gaining	  
vital	   local	   knowledge	   and	   input	   to	   the	  development	  process.	   It	   also	   empowers	  
communities	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  decision	  making	  process.	  However	  the	  actual	  
process	  of	  engagement	  and	  selection	  of	  trustees	  who	  are	  legitimate	  community	  
representatives	   can	   be	   difficult.	   Two	   of	   the	   developers	   intended	   to	   select	  
community	   trustees	   themselves,	   with	   Developer	   2	   intending	   on	   choosing	  
representatives	   from	  health,	   education	   and	   business	   organisations	   in	   the	   area.	  
Ideally	   a	   selection	  process	   should	   take	  place	   in	   a	   transparent	   and	   consultative	  
manner,	   such	   that	   communities	   have	   a	   say	   in	   their	   chosen	   representatives.	   	   If	  
such	   trustees	   are	   not	   necessarily	   themselves	   previously	   disempowered	  
individuals	   from	   the	   community,	   the	  potential	   for	   transformational	   community	  
engagement	  outcomes	  is	  also	  negated.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  danger	  that	  trustees	  may	  
not	   be	   truly	   representative	   of	   the	   community	   or	  may	   be	   promoting	   their	   own	  
interests	   or	   a	   particular	   groups	   interest	   over	   another.	   (Tshikululu	   Social	  
Investments,	   2010).	   Inappropriate	   or	   ineffective	   trustees	   threaten	   the	   very	  
governance	  and	  success	  of	  the	  trust.	  	  
Developer	   2	   had	   already	   experienced	   the	   intrusion	   of	   local	   politics	   in	   his	  
community	   interactions.	  He	  had	  had	  to	  manage	  different	   interest	  groups	  trying	  
to	  promote	  their	  own	  interests	  or	  gain	  some	  measure	  of	  control	  over	  how	  trust	  
moneys	  would	  be	  spent.	  He	  felt	  however	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  funds	  being	  diverted	  for	  
illegitimate	   purposes	   could	   be	   sufficiently	   protected	   against	   through	   the	  
structuring	  of	  the	  trust	  deed,	  which	  outlines	  exactly	  how	  the	  money	  can	  be	  spent.	  
He	   felt	   that	  a	   trust	  structure,	  with	   its	  board	  of	   trustees	  and	  trust	  deed,	  made	   it	  
more	   difficult	   for	   money	   to	   get	   diverted	   or	   manipulated	   for	   specific	   needs.	  
However	  a	  recent	  evaluation	  of	  BEE	  trusts	   in	  South	  Africa	  found	  they	  are	  often	  
fraught	  with	  issues	  and	  seems	  to	  question	  whether	  they	  should	  even	  be	  regarded	  
as	  a	  successful	  mode	  of	  delivery	  (Tshikululu	  Social	  Investments,	  2010).	  Some	  of	  
the	   key	   risks	   that	   the	   document	   highlights	   include	   ensuring	   legitimate	  
representation	  of	  communities	  and	  the	  interference	  of	  local	  politics	  or	  personal	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Developer	   4	   had	   abandoned	   his	   first	   attempt	   at	   a	   community	   ownership	  
initiative	  after	  the	  difficulties	  they	  encountered.	  They	  are	  now	  “very	  conscious	  of	  
avoiding	   local	   political	   issues”.	   They	   would	   choose	   credible	   trustees	   very	  
carefully	  and	   then	  employ	  a	   local	  agency	   to	  deliver	   the	  benefits.	  They	  also	  had	  
difficulties	   with	   lack	   of	   skills	   and	   capacity	   as	   well	   as	   raising	   finance	   for	   the	  
ownership	   initiative.	   In	   their	   instance	   the	   community	   who	   owns	   land	   had	  
defaulted	  on	  a	  loan	  they	  had	  previously	  taken	  out	  for	  an	  agriculture	  project	  and	  
now	  were	  unable	  to	  raise	  further	  finance.	  Developer	  4	  referred	  to	  having	  to	  deal	  
with	  unrealistic	  expectations	  and	  an	  attitude	  of	  entitlement	  from	  the	  community	  
“expecting	  shares	  for	  free”.	  	  	  
5.5. Conclusion	  
This	   chapter	  has	   explored	   the	   approaches	   taken	  by	  developers	   in	  planning	   for	  
the	  implementation	  of	  their	  community	  benefit	  schemes	  with	  regards	  to	  broad-­‐
based	  ownership,	  SED	  and	  ED	  contributions.	  The	  underlying	  motivations	  behind	  
developers	  approaches	  vary	  ranging	  from	  purely	  compliance	  to	  moral	  drivers	  to	  
it	  being	  the	  core	  focus	  of	  their	  operations.	  However	  across	  the	  board	  it	  appears	  
that	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  procurement	  programme	  is	  the	  predominant	  factor	  
shaping	  their	  community	  activities.	  All	  had	  been	  operating	  with	  the	  expectation	  
that	   community	   benefits	   would	   form	   a	   key	   part	   of	   the	   final	   procurement	  
programme.	  Regardless	  of	   their	  company’s	  approach	  to	  social	   responsibility	  all	  
agreed	  that	  BBBEE	  had	  an	  important	  role	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  did	  not	  regard	  it	  as	  
a	  disincentive	  to	  do	  business	  here.	  	  
An	  interesting	  emergence	  in	  the	  market	  is	  that	  of	  Developer	  3,	  whose	  company	  
has	   been	   established	   to	   develop	   community	   wind	   farms.	   He	   has	   adopted	   an	  
innovative	   business	   model	   aimed	   at	   integrating	   social	   and	   financial	  
considerations	   by	   recognises	   the	   value	   that	   community	   projects	   bring	   to	   this	  
wind	   farm	   project.	   There	   seemed	   to	   be	   little	   take-­‐up	   of	   his	   core	   underlying	  
assumptions	  among	  the	  other	  developers	  however,	  who	  at	  this	  stage	  recognised	  
little	   value	   that	   community	   projects	   could	   have	   for	   them.	   The	   procurement	  
programme	  has	  made	  community	  ownership	  schemes	  a	  mandatory	  requirement.	  
Most	  developers	  felt	  that	  there	  are	  significant	  developmental	  benefits	  from	  such	  
schemes	   and	   that	   they	   have	   a	   stronger	   potential	   to	   build	   personal	  
empowerment.	   An	   approach	   like	   Developer	   3’s	   can	   also	   build	   on	   empowering	  
people	  by	  altering	   the	  donor/beneficiary	   relationship.	  His	  approach	   recognises	  
that	   both	   parties	   have	   value	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   partnership.	   Ownership	  
schemes	  also	  give	  people	  access	  to	  a	  productive	  asset	  in	  the	  economy.	  
In	   general	   the	   procurement	   programme	   gives	   little	   guidance	   to	   developers	   on	  
how	  they	  should	  fulfill	   the	  community	  aspects	  of	   the	  scorecard.	   It	  does	  not,	   for	  
example,	  specify	  that	  developers	  report	  on	  community	  engagement	  undertaken,	  
an	  essential	  component	  of	  development	  interventions.	  As	  such	  it	  leaves	  much	  to	  
the	   discretion	   of	   developers,	   however	   whose	   main	   area	   of	   expertise	   lies	   in	  
business	   and	   not	   in	   social	   development.	   The	   procurement	   process	   has	   also	  
introduced	   challenges	   for	   developers	   in	   engaging	   with	   communities	   for	   the	  
purposes	  of	  developing	  their	  strategies	  whilst	  at	  the	  same	  time	  having	  to	  avoid	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6. Discussing	  the	  potential	  for	  community	  benefit	  schemes	  
and	  sustainable	  development	  outcomes	  
This	   section	  will	   discuss	   the	   implications	   of	   some	   of	   the	   findings	   presented	   in	  
chapters	   4	   and	   5	   from	   the	   interviews	   with	   a	   view	   to	   answering	   the	   central	  
questions	   of	   the	   potential	   for	   community	   benefit	   schemes	   and	   sustainable	  
development	  outcomes.	  It	  explores	  more	  specifically	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  around	  
the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   legislation	   and	   the	   potential	   for	   replicability	   from	   the	  
South	   African	   example	   to	   elsewhere.	   It	   also	   explores	   how	   the	   approaches	   of	  
different	  developers	  to	  their	  social	  requirements,	  and	  how	  these	  may	  affect	  the	  
choice	  of	  scheme	  and	  their	  outcomes.	  Lastly	   it	   identifies	  recommendations	  and	  
suggestions	  for	  further	  research	  in	  this	  area.	  	  
6.1. Comparability	  and	  replicability	  of	  the	  South	  African	  example	  
Three	  key	  legislative	  drivers,	  BBBEE	  in	  the	  IPPPP,	  CDM	  and	  EIAs,	  were	  assessed	  
with	   regards	   to	   their	   potential	   to	   influence	   developers	   to	   engage	   in	   socially	  
responsible	   activities	   and	   in	   particular	   to	   incentivise	   benefits	   for	   the	   local	  
communities	   in	   which	   wind	   farms	   are	   located.	   The	   research	   found	   that	   the	  
predominant	   drivers	   for	   community	   benefit	   schemes	   is	   inextricably	   bound	   up	  
with	   the	   BBBEE	   requirements	   laid	   out	   in	   the	   DoE’s	   IPPPP	   renewables	  
programme.	   The	   inclusion	   of	   economic	   development	   objectives	   in	   the	  
renewables	   procurement	   programme	   in	   South	   Africa,	   although	   unusual	   by	  
international	   standards,	   is	   a	   typical	   example	   of	   the	   integration	   of	   such	  
considerations	  into	  all	  policy	  domains	  in	  South	  Africa.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  a	  BBBEE	  
scorecard	   is	   standard	   procedure	   in	   Government	   tenders	   and	   contracts,	   as	  
enforced	   by	   the	   Preferential	   Procurement	   Policy	   Framework	   Act.	   However	  
whilst	  usually	  only	  a	  few	  elements	  of	  the	  scorecard	  get	  considered,	  as	  was	  seen	  
in	   NERSA’s	   draft	   REFIT,	   the	   DoE’s	   renewables	   tendering	   process	   includes	  
consideration	  of	  the	  whole	  scorecard.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  renewables	  scorecard	  
has	  a	  much	  stronger	  focus	  on	  the	  broad-­‐based	  elements	  of	  the	  scorecard,	  and	  in	  
particular	   a	   focus	   on	   local	   benefits	   not	   normally	   emphasized	   in	   other	  
Government	  PPPs.	  The	  renewables	  scorecard	  incentivises	  local	  benefits	  through	  
mandatory	   broad-­‐based	   ownership	   schemes,	   as	   well	   as	   through	   SED	   and	   ED	  
contributions	  that	  are	  awarded	  more	  points	  if	  spent	  locally.	  	  
The	   wind	   sector	   in	   South	   Africa	   appears	   to	   continue	   the	   trend	   observed	  
elsewhere	   in	   the	   world	   (e.g.	   UK,	   Denmark,	   Germany)	   of	   so-­‐called	   ‘community	  
wind’.	  The	  socio-­‐political	  context	  in	  South	  Africa	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  community	  
benefits	   is,	  however,	  quite	  unique	  and	  probably	  has	   limited	  comparability	  with	  
the	  phenomenon	   in	   the	  UK.	  One	  significant	  difference	   is	   the	  compliance	  versus	  
voluntary	  nature	  of	  the	  phenomena	  in	  the	  two	  countries.	  In	  the	  UK	  the	  inclusion	  
of	   community	   benefit	   schemes	   could	   provide	   added	   value	   to	   projects	   and	  
therefore	  made	  financial	  sense	  for	  developers	  to	  voluntarily	  include	  such	  social	  
aspects	   in	   their	   projects.	   The	   commercial	   value	   that	   communities	   can	   bring	   to	  
projects	  in	  South	  Africa	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  demonstrated.	  Although	  one	  developer	  
has	   set	   up	   his	   business	   model	   based	   on	   this	   assumption,	   the	   value	   that	   most	  
other	   developers	   recognise	   is	   limited	   to	   preferential	   selection	   in	   the	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Africa	   appear	   to	   be	   largely	   compliance	   with	   the	   procurement	   programme’s	  
requirements.	  
NIMBY	  sentiments	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  South	  Africa	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  they	  do	  in	  
the	  UK.	  This	  could	  be	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  sector	  is	  still	  in	  its	  early	  stages	  and	  
this	   could	   change	   over	   time	   as	   landscapes	   become	  more	   populated	  with	  wind	  
farms.	  However	  even	  if	  this	  were	  the	  case	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  a	  similar	  scenario,	  as	  
occurred	   in	   the	   UK,	   would	   be	   replicable	   in	   South	   Africa	   mainly	   because	   the	  
communities	   most	   likely	   to	   object	   would	   not	   be	   the	   targeted	   recipients	   for	  
benefit	   schemes.	   Even	   though	   the	   requirement	   for	   beneficiaries	   of	   ownership	  
schemes	   to	   be	   black	   has	   been	   removed	   in	   the	   IPP	   programme,	   contributions	  
would	  probably	  still	  need	  to	  be	  directed	  to	  the	  needier	  parts	  of	  communities	  and	  
so	  would	  not	  target	  wealthier	  landowners	  who	  are	  the	  most	  typical	  objectors	  to	  
wind	  farms.	  	  	  	  
The	  replicability	  of	  the	  South	  African	  example	  of	  such	  community	  schemes	  may	  
have	   limited	   potential	   for	   other	   developing	   countries.	   The	   incidence	   of	   such	  
schemes	   derives	   from	   a	   particularly	   South	   African	   policy	   environment	   that	  
proactively	   legislates	  socially	  responsible	  behaviour	  by	  the	  business	  sector	  and	  
includes	  economic	  development	  objectives	   in	  all	  policy	  domains.	  The	   incidence	  
of	  benefit	  schemes	  is	  set	  in	  a	  wider	  context	  of	  social	  transformation	  that	  finds	  its	  
roots	   in	   the	   constitution.	   The	   replicability	   of	   South	   Africa’s	   approach	   to	  
community	   benefit	   schemes	   would	   therefore	   depend	   on	   policy	   and	   societal	  
norms	   elsewhere	   and	  whether	   the	   inclusion	   of	   social	   considerations	   in	   energy	  
policy	  would	  be	  acceptable.	  In	  South	  Africa,	  the	  concept	  (if	  not	  the	  application)	  of	  
BBBEE	  has	  come	  to	  be	  fairly	  well	  known	  and	  forms	  part	  of	  the	  business	  sector’s	  
expectations	   when	   doing	   business,	   especially	   with	   Government.	   From	   those	  
developers	   interviewed	   it	   does	   not	   appear	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   disincentive	   to	   do	  
business	   in	   this	   sector.	   Moreover	   the	   market	   here	   has	   developed	   appropriate	  
supportive	   financing	   products	   to	   facilitate	   ownership	   transactions	   to	   poor	  
communities	  who	  have	  little	  financial	  resources	  of	  their	  own.	  Such	  support	  may	  
not	  exist	  in	  other	  developing	  countries	  and	  the	  appetite	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  
other	   countries	   for	   fairly	   onerous	   social	   requirements	   will	   depend	   on	   the	  
particular	  business	  and	  political	  environment	  there.	  
The	   CDM,	   for	   which	  most	   developing	   countries	   are	   eligible,	   was	   not	   found	   to	  
have	   significant	   potential	   to	   incentivise	   community	   benefit	   schemes.	   Although	  
one	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   CDM	   is	   to	   promote	   sustainable	   development	   in	  
developing	  countries,	  the	  sustainable	  development	  criteria	  by	  which	  projects	  are	  
assessed	   and	   selected	   are	   not	   strict	   and	   would	   not	   necessitate	   developers	   to	  
undertake	   any	   benefit	   schemes	   additional	   to	  what	   they	  may	  be	   doing	   anyway.	  
This	  situation	  of	  lenient	  criteria	  is	  typical	  of	  most	  developing	  countries	  vying	  for	  
projects	  and	  so	  is	  likely	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  similarly	  weak	  incentive	  of	  local	  community	  
benefit	  schemes	  in	  other	  developing	  countries.	  	  
EIAs	   were	   also	   assessed	   for	   their	   potential	   to	   promote	   socially	   responsible	  
behaviour	   through	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   impact	   assessments	   that	   each	   wind	  
project	  must	   undertake	   as	   part	   of	   the	   EIA	   process.	   A	   review	   of	   EIAs	   in	   South	  
Africa	   found	  that	  most	  practitioners	  would	  not	  recommend	  schemes	  additional	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best	   practise	   in	   South	   Africa	   to	   consider	   these	   schemes	   in	   planning	   decisions.	  
This	  finding	  is	  similar	  to	  how	  the	  planning	  system	  works	  in	  the	  UK	  where	  benefit	  
schemes	  may	   not	   constitute	   a	  material	   consideration	   in	   planning	   decisions,	   to	  
avoid	  the	  issue	  of	  developers	  ‘buying’	  planning	  approvals.	  Whether	  EIAs	  and	  the	  
planning	  system	  could	  serve	  as	  a	  driver	  in	  other	  countries	  would	  depend	  on	  the	  
planning	  systems	  there	  and	  how	  such	  considerations	  are	  treated.	  
6.2. How	  effective	  is	  a	  BBBEE	  approach	  to	  achieving	  development	  in	  local	  
communities?	  
The	   efficacy	   of	   BBBEE	   in	   general	   as	   a	   policy	   tool	   to	   contribute	   to	   sustainable	  
development	  is	  difficult	  to	  establish.	  The	  policy	  has	  only	  been	  in	  existence	  since	  
2007	  and	  there	  is	  a	  paucity	  of	  impact	  evaluations	  of	  the	  wider	  enactment	  of	  the	  
policy	  to	  draw	  insight	   from,	  particularly	  regarding	  the	  enterprise	  development,	  
socio-­‐economic	  development	  and	  community	  ownership	  elements,	  which	  are	  of	  
relevance	  to	  this	  thesis.	  The	  policy	  has	  however	  just	  been	  through	  a	  review	  and	  
amendment	  process,	  and	  the	  IPPPP	  for	  renewables	  appears	  to	  be	  representative	  
of	  a	  renewed	  commitment	  to	  effective	  implementation	  in	  a	  broad-­‐based	  manner.	  
The	   IPPPP	   evidences	  many	   of	   the	   proposed	   amendments	   to	   the	   Act,	   including	  
mandatory	   consideration	   of	   the	   whole	   scorecard	   rather	   than	   just	   the	   narrow	  
elements	   as	   well	   as	   inclusion	   of	   mandatory	   minimum	   thresholds.	   The	  
renewables	  scorecard	  differs	  however	  in	  that	  ED	  is	  a	  voluntary	  expenditure	  item	  
with	   a	   much	   lower	   weighting	   than	   that	   outlined	   in	   the	   amendments	   to	   the	  
BBBEE	  Act.	  The	  broad-­‐based	  aspects	  of	  the	  renewables	  scorecard	  have	  a	  strong	  
local	   focus,	   meaning	   that	   multiple	   rural	   communities	   in	   South	   Africa	   will	   be	  
beneficiaries	   of	   targeted	   developmental	   expenditure.	   This	   is	   very	   important	   in	  
light	   of	   the	   continued	   bias	   in	   CSR	   spend	   in	   urban	   rather	   than	   rural	   contexts	  
(Trialogue,	  2011).	  	  
However	   the	   key	   challenge	   to	   date	   with	   the	   BBBEE	   legislation	   has	   been	   poor	  
implementation	  of	  the	  policy.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  ways	  to	  ensure	  effective	  
compliance	   and	   implementation	   is	   by	   effective	   monitoring	   and	   verification	  
processes.	  The	  BBBEE	  scorecard	  includes	  no	  performance	  indicators	  for	  ED	  and	  
SED	  contributions	  and	  wind	  farm	  owners	  will	  be	  monitored	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  
expenditure	  only.	  With	  weak	  verification	  measures	  to	  evaluate	  the	  performance	  
of	   these	   schemes,	   the	   legislation	  may	   serve	  as	   a	  weak	  enforcer	  of	  positive	   and	  
long-­‐term	   developmental	   outcomes.	   Indeed	   without	   effective	   performance	  
verification	  it	  “begins	  to	  make	  the	  likelihood	  of	  ineffective	  or	  illegitimate	  actions	  
by	  an	  organisation	  much	  more	  probable”	  (Edwards	  and	  Hulme,	  1995	  in	  Connolly	  
and	   Hyndman,	   2004).	   Ineffective	   reporting	   obligations	   and	   weak	   monitoring	  
standards	  do	  not	  promote	  ambitious	  undertakings.	  In	  order	  to	  support	  goals	  of	  
accountability,	  necessary	   information	  must	  be	  reported	  on.	  A	   lack	  of	   impact	  or	  
performance	  evaluation	   is	   typical	  of	  CSI	   reporting	  expenditure	  more	  generally,	  
which	  is	  often	  insufficient	  to	  demonstrate	  true	  accountability,	  with	  only	  limited	  
impact	  assessments	  undertaken	  and	  underreporting	  on	  performance	  (Blowfield,	  
2004;	  Connolly	  and	  Hyndman,	  2004;	  Bouten	  et	  al,	  2011).	  	  
The	  question	  of	  how	  ambitious	  developers	  will	  be	  in	  their	  endeavours	  cannot	  be	  
established	   ex-­‐ante	   nor	   with	   the	   limited	   information	   gleaned	   during	   the	  
interviews.	  One	  might	  look	  at	  the	  outcomes	  of	  initiatives	  in	  other	  sectors	  to	  see	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wine	  industry,	  for	  example,	  found	  “that	  whilst	  these	  schemes	  do	  bring	  benefits	  to	  
those	   involved,	   they	   often	   have	   limited	   socio-­‐economic	   ambitions;	   the	   sum	   of	  
these	  benefits	  does	  not	  equate	   to	  a	   truly	  emancipatory	   form	  of	  empowerment”	  
(McEwan	   and	  Bek,	   2006:	   p.1028).	   Indeed,	  measured	  only	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	  
expenditure	   there	   is	   little	   from	   the	   BBBEE	   legislation	   to	   necessarily	   drive	  
developers	  to	  be	  concerned	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  their	  expenditure.	  In	  general,	  CSI	  
(the	  SED	  element)	  has	  become	  a	  performance	  driven	  pursuit	  among	  businesses	  
seeking	   to	   improve	   their	   overall	   BBBEE	   scores	   (Skinner	   and	  Mersham,	   2008).	  
And	   in	   the	   lack	   of	   any	   outcomes	   based	   verification	   and	   evaluation	   procedures	  
there	  are	  no	  guarantees	  that	  real	  socio-­‐economic	  benefits	  will	  be	  realised	   from	  
this	  expenditure.	  	  
It	  was	  noted	  by	  an	  expert	  on	  BEE	   interviewed	  that	   the	  multitude	  of	  challenges	  
inherent	   in	   development	   projects	   can	   make	   it	   difficult	   to	   attribute	   the	   non-­‐
success	   of	   a	   project	   on	   a	   particular	   factor	   that	   is	   related	   to	   the	   failing	   of	   the	  
company.	  He	  therefore	  considers	  it	  unlikely	  that	  the	  verification	  measures	  would	  
change	   to	   an	   outcome	   based	  measurement	   system.	   However	   that	   a	   particular	  
problem	   is	   complex	   hardly	   seems	   justification	   for	   a	   lack	   of	   accountability	   or	  
ineffectual	  promotion	  of	  successful	  outcomes.	  The	  very	  complexity	  of	  achieving	  
successful	  development	   interventions	  and	  the	  severity	  of	  the	   issues	  being	  dealt	  
with	  (e.g.	  alleviation	  of	  poverty	  in	  South	  Africa)	  might	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  even	  
more	   reason	   to	   ensure	   the	   efficacy	   of	   such	   interventions	   through	   effective	  
monitoring	  procedures	  and	  mechanisms.	  
Adequate	   performance	   monitoring	   at	   a	   project	   level	   is	   also	   crucial	   to	   assess	  
accountability	  of	  the	  policy.	  “Stewart	  (1984)	  suggests	  a	  ladder	  of	  accountability,	  
distinguishing	   between:	   accountability	   for	   probity	   and	   legality;	   process	  
accountability;	   performance	   accountability;	   programme	   accountability;	   and	  
policy	   accountability”	   (in	   Connoll 	   and	   Hyndman,	   2004:	   p.130).	   Therefore	   in	  
order	  to	  understand	  accountability	  at	  higher	  policy	  levels	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  have	  
higher	   standards	   of	   performance	   monitoring.	   Without	   proper	   performance	  
indicators	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   judge	   the	   efficacy	   of	   the	   policy.	   It	   is	   necessary	   to	  
understand	   how	   effectively	   empowerment	   initiatives	   address	   social	   problems,	  
whether	  their	  impacts	  are	  widespread	  rather	  than	  anecdotal	  and	  transformative	  
or	  marginal.	  	  
To	   be	   accountable	   both	   financial	   and	   performance	   information	   is	   necessary.	  
What	   might	   more	   comprehensive	   reporting	   criteria	   look	   like?	   	   The	   Global	  
Reporting	   Initiative	   (GRI)	   is	   an	   international	   organisation	   that	   develops	  
sustainability	  reporting	  guidelines	  for	  voluntary	  use	  by	  organisations.	  It	  sets	  out	  
guiding	  principles	  and	  suggested	  performance	  indicators	  that	  companies	  should	  
report	  on	  regarding	  their	  sustainability.	  General	  guidelines	  for	  defining	  content	  
relate	   to	   materiality,	   stakeholder	   inclusiveness	   and	   the	   sustainability	   context.	  
Disclosure	   with	   regards	   to	   social	   performance	   should	   include	   details	   of	  
implemented	   local	   community	   engagement,	   development	   programmes	   and	  
impact	  assessments	  (Global	  Reporting	  Initiative,	  2011).	  	  	  
It	   seems	   vital	   that	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   set	   of	   performance	   indicators	   is	  
developed	   as	   well	   as	   periodic	   impact	   assessments	   undertaken	   to	   ensure	   that	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assist	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	   private	   sector’s	   initiatives	   in	   the	   community	  
development	   realm	   more	   generally	   to	   inform	   future	   policy	   iterations.	   More	  
effective	  reporting	  on	  impacts	  and	  project	  performance	  is	  necessary	  to	  support	  
what	   Cloete	   (2009)	   refers	   to	   as	   evidence	   based	   policy	  making.	   	   Cloete	   (2009)	  
distinguishes	  between	  evidence-­‐based	  and	  option-­‐based	  policy	  making	  with	  the	  
latter	   based	   on	   selective	   use	   of	   evidence	   or	   untested	   ideological	   viewpoints	  
(ibid).	  Therefore	  if	  in	  general	  it	  is	  found	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  are	  generally	  less	  
effective	   at	   fostering	   small	   business	   growth	   or	   engaging	   with	   rural	   and	  
community	   development	   initiatives,	   this	   would	   be	   a	   crucial	   understanding	   to	  
guide	   future	   iterations	   of	   the	   policy	   and	   how	   these	   elements	   of	   the	   scorecard	  
should	  be	  amended	  in	  the	  future.	  
6.3. Developer’s	  approaches	  to	  community	  benefit	  schemes	  
Whether	   the	   compliance	   nature	   of	   developers’	   community	   development	  
activities	   in	   the	   South	   African	   wind	   sector	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   CSR	   depends	   on	  
whether	  or	  not	  a	  definition	  that	  is	  inclusive	  or	  exclusive	  of	  legislatively	  required	  
activities	  is	  adopted	  (see	  section	  2.3	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  
definitions	  of	  CSR).	  CSR	  is	  however	  part	  of	  the	  policy	  landscape	  in	  South	  Africa	  
through	  BBBEE	  and	  other	  acts	  and	  these	  discussions	  cannot	  be	  easily	  divorced	  
from	  one	  other.	  Further	  the	  nature	  of	  developer	  contributions	  being	  considered	  
here	   has	   to	   do	   with	   a	   business’s	   interactions	   and	   responsibilities	   with	   the	  
communities	   in	   which	   they	   operate.	   This	   thesis	   th refore	   considers	   that	   they	  
should	  form	  part	  of	  any	  discussions	  on	  CSR	  and	  its	  application	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  
Understanding	   the	   motivation	   behind	   developers’	   activities	   is	   important.	   The	  
interviews	  with	  developers	  revealed,	  as	  might	  be	  expected,	  a	  spectrum	  in	  their	  
approaches	   to	   their	   community	   benefits.	   	   Whilst	   a	   few	   developers	   strongly	  
demonstrated	  their	  commitment	  to	  the	  development	  process,	  others	  seemed	  to	  
be	  following	  a	  compliance	  approach,	  motivated	  by	  their	  scorecard	  performance.	  
Hamann	  and	  Acutt	  (2003)	  refer	  to	  more	  sceptical	  motivations	  for	  CSR	  where	  this	  
is	   not	   a	   key	   focus	   for	   a	   business.	   One	   of	   these	   motivations	   they	   define	   as	  
accommodation,	   whereby	   businesses	   take	   superficial	   actions	   to	   accommodate	  
social	  or	  political	   interests	  but	  their	  main	  focus	  remains	  on	  maximising	  profits.	  
Thus	  whenever	  a	  trade-­‐off	  arises	  between	  profits	  and	  social	  responsibilities,	  the	  
result	  will	  be	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  bottom	  line	  and	  highlight	  the	  public	  relations	  aspect	  
of	   their	   CSR	   to	   maintain	   the	   outward	   impression	   of	   their	   focus	   on	   CSR.	   The	  
renewables	  procurement	  programme	  based	  on	  price	  competition	  introduces	  just	  
such	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  price	  and	  economic	  development	  contributions	  and	  the	  
programme	   itself	   introduces	   bias	   in	   the	   decision	   by	   weighting	   price	   more	  
heavily.	  Whilst	  some	  developers	  have	  put	  substantial	   time	  and	  effort	   into	   their	  
community	  benefit	   schemes	   to	  date,	  going	  beyond	   the	  minimum	  requirements,	  
others	   appear	   to	   display	   a	   more	   accommodatory	   approach	   promoting	   their	  
social	   activities	   in	  what	   seems	   to	  be	  mostly	   for	   the	  benefit	  of	   the	  procurement	  
process.	  	  
The	   nature	   of	   most	   of	   the	   developers’	   community	   contributions	   appears	  
representative	  of	  what	  Auld	  et	  al	  (2008)	  term	  as	  ‘old	  CSR’.	  This	  is	  characterised	  
by	   businesses	   adopting	   an	   add-­‐on	   approach	   to	   CSR,	   typically	   charitable	  
donations	  external	  to	  the	  core	  nature	  of	  their	  business.	  In	  comparison	  Developer	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to	  transform	  the	  way	  they	  do	  business	  in	  order	  to	  include	  social	  considerations	  
and	  innovatively	  integrating	  the	  concept	  into	  his	  business	  model.	  Their	  company	  
recognises	  that	  community	  involvement	  in	  their	  wind	  farm	  projects	  can	  increase	  
the	   financial	   value	   of	   their	   wind	   farm	   projects,	   and	   grants	   this	   value	   to	  
communities	  as	  an	  equity	  stake	  in	  their	  project.	  	  
The	   wider	   take-­‐up	   of	   Developer	   3’s	   model	   would	   depend	   on	   the	   approach	   of	  
individual	   developers	   and	   how	   much	   value	   they	   would	   ascribe	   to	   their	  
community	   development	   initiatives.	   Whilst	   Developer	   3	   might	   attach	   the	  
maximum	  value	  possible	  whilst	   still	   achieving	  acceptable	  rates	  of	   return,	  other	  
developers	  with	   a	   compliance	   approach	  might	   recognise	   very	  minimal	   or	   even	  
no	   commercial	   value	   from	   community	   contributions.	   They	  would	   theoretically	  
contribute	  the	  minimum	  they	  could	  whilst	  still	  maximising	  their	  chances	   in	  the	  
procurement	  process.	  At	  this	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  sector’s	  development,	  none	  of	  the	  
other	   developers	   could	   of	   their	   own	   accord	   cite	   tangible	   examples	   or	   ideas	   of	  
how	   community	   contributions	   might	   add	   value	   to	   their	   projects.	   Developer	   3	  
appears	  confident	  that	  such	  a	  business	  model	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  taken	  up	  by	  
other	  developers.	  But	  this	  may	  take	  time	  and	  perhaps	  an	  up-­‐and-­‐running	  project	  
to	   demonstrate	   the	   theory	   of	   earning	   acceptable	   rates	   of	   return	   to	   make	   it	  
attractive	  to	  other	  developers	  and	  shareholders.	  	  	  
This	   issue	   of	   trying	   to	   find	   positive	   financial	   returns	   from	   socially	   responsible	  
business	   activities	   is	   one	   that	   the	   CSR	   literature	   has	   long	   tried	   to	   establish.	   In	  
general	  no	  conclusive	  or	  generally	  applicable	  link	  has	  been	  established,	  and	  the	  
evidence	   is	  mixed	  and	  context	  specific	   (Margolis	  and	  Walsh,	  2003;	  Eccles	  et	  al,	  
2009).	   As	   Developer	   3	   said,	   the	   difficulty	   for	   developers	   is	   in	   engaging	   in	  
activities	   that	   may	   not	   be	   consistent	   with	   the	   paradigm	   of	   maximising	  
shareholder	   value.	   This	   drives	   at	   the	   very	   heart	   of	   the	   shift	   to	   a	   stakeholder	  
rather	  than	  a	  shareholder	  approach	  to	  doing	  business.	  The	  stakeholder	  approach	  
would	   argue	   that	   other	   parties	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   affect	   the	   profitability	   of	  
businesses.	   Whilst	   it	   may	   be	   difficult	   at	   this	   stage	   to	   establish	   how	   a	   local	  
community	  may	  positively	  or	  adversely	  affect	  a	  project’s	  profitability,	  it	  may	  be	  
necessary	  to	  take	  the	  perspective	  not	  of	  one	  community	  and	  one	  business,	  but	  of	  
society	   and	   the	   business	   sector	   as	   a	   whole	   in	   South	   Africa.	   For	   example	   if	   a	  
greater	  proportion	  of	  the	  population	  were	  uplifted	  and	  participated	  in	  the	  formal	  
economy,	   there	   would	   be	   more	   potential	   to	   develop	   critical	   skills	   that	   the	  
country	   lacks,	   establish	   a	   broader	   consumer	   base	   for	   goods	   and	   services	   or	  
alleviate	   the	   destabilising	   symptoms	   of	   an	   unequal	   society,	   such	   as	   crime	   and	  
service	  delivery	  riots.	   	  This	   is	  described	  by	  Porrit	   (2005)	   in	  Eccles	  et	  al	   (2009:	  
p.23)	  as:	  “This	  dependence	  of	  business	  on	  a	  broader	  stakeholder	  group	  can	  then	  
be	  extrapolated	  to	  suggest	  that	  ‘healthy	  societies’	  will	  generally	  lead	  to	  profitable	  
businesses.”	   As	   such	   social	   responsibility	   could	   be	   argued	   to	   be	   an	   essential	  
component	  of	  a	  company’s	  core	  business	  strategy.	  
BBBEE	  gives	  very	  little	  specification	  or	  guidance	  on	  how	  development	  initiatives	  
should	  be	  undertaken,	   the	  efficacy	  of	   the	   legislative	  requirements	   in	  producing	  
sustainable	  outcomes	  is	  very	  dependent	  on	  individual	  developers	  approaches	  to	  
development	  and	  can	  vary	  widely	  depending	  on	  the	  effort	  and	  resources	  that	  a	  
firm	   may	   devote	   to	   their	   responsibilities.	   	   Much	   of	   the	   efficacy	   of	   schemes	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their	  development	  partners	  take.	  The	  key	  risk	  or	  shortcoming	  in	  this	  is	  that	  they	  
may	  adopt	  an	  unambitious	  charitable	  approach	  to	  development,	  of	  giving	  money	  
to	   communities	   with	   limited	   focus	   on	   capacity	   building	   and	   people	   centred	  
development.	  An	  interesting	  feature	  of	  the	  BBBEE	  legislation	  and	  CSR	  in	  general	  
is	   that	   it	   puts	   such	   social	   investment	   decisions	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   businessmen	  
whose	   field	  of	   expertise	  does	  not	   lie	   in	   social	   development.	  The	   importance	  of	  
partnerships	  with	  NGO	  or	  development	  experts	  could	  and	  perhaps	  should	  be	  an	  
important	   aspect	  of	  CSR.	  But	   there	   is	   a	   lack	  of	   regulatory	  oversight	   as	   to	  what	  
developers	   do	   and	   how	   they	   do	   it	   to	   promote	   or	   facilitate	   such	   partnership	  
approaches.	   	   Hawes	   (2011)	   notes	   that	   he’s	   heard	   of	   many	   failed	   encounters	  
where	   businesses	   have	   tried	   to	   implement	   development	   projects	   themselves.	  
There	   are	   significant	   challenges	   involved	   relating	   to	   community	   engagement,	  
appropriate	   design	   of	   development	   strategies	   and	   engaging	   in	   community	  
governed	  and	  participatory	  development	  processes.	  The	  challenge	  in	  this	  regard	  
raised	   by	   a	   few	   of	   the	   developers	   is	   that	   often	   there	   are	   no	   appropriate	  
organisations	   with	   particular	   knowledge	   or	   expertise	   in	   their	   local	   area	   with	  
whom	  they	  might	  partner.	  
The	  wind	  sector	   in	  South	  Africa	   is	  still	   in	   it	   infancy	  and	  as	  yet	   it	   is	   too	  early	   to	  
establish	  the	  impact	  of	  each	  developer’s	  benefit	  schemes.	  Significant	  amounts	  of	  
money	   will	   be	   targeted	   at	   local	   communities	   and	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   strong	  
potential	   for	   beneficial	   socio-­‐economic	   outcomes	   to	   be	   achieved,	   such	   as	  
improved	  access	  to	  healthcare	  for	  example.	  At	  a	  high-­‐level	  overview	  the	  schemes	  
have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  well	  targeted	  to	  rural	  communities,	  which	  tend	  to	  have	  
more	   severe	   poverty	   and	   unemployment	   issues.	   But	   whether	   these	   initiatives	  
will	  prove	  to	  be	  transformational	  for	  communities	  is	  not	  clear.	  There	  is	  the	  risk	  
that	   many	   of	   the	   schemes	   may	   adopt	   a	   merely	   charitable	   approach	   to	  
development.	  The	  monetary	  contributions	  from	  wind	  farms	  have	  a	  life-­‐time	  and	  
will	   come	   to	  an	  end.	  Positive	  development	   trajectories	  can	  only	  be	  sustained	   if	  
the	  development	  process	  engenders	  empowerment	  that	  enables	  individuals	  and	  
communities	  to	  be	  their	  own	  agents	  of	  change	  and	  not	  remain	  reliant	  on	  external	  
participants	   (Trialogue,	   2011).	   Empowerment	   in	   BEE	   discourse	   is	   often	  
interpreted	  as	  the	  growth	  of	  black	  business	  and	  participation	  in	  the	  mainstream	  
economy	  (Olson,	  2004).	  But	   this	  approach	  could	  perhaps	  overlook	  some	  of	   the	  
more	   fundamental	   aspects	   of	   empowering	   individuals.	   For	   example	   the	   role	   of	  
factors	   such	   as	   building	   social	   and	   human	   capital,	   participatory	   engagement	  
processes	   and	   community	   led	   development	   solutions	   are	   also	   important	   for	  
engendering	  real	  transformation.	  	  
McEwan	   and	   Bek	   (2006)	   discuss	   empowerment	   as	   “a	   consequence	   of	  
participating	   in	  collective	  action	  and	  gaining	  greater	  control	  over	   the	  means	   to	  
one’s	  livelihood”	  (McEwan	  and	  Bek,	  2006:	  p.1025).	  In	  Developer	  3’s	  broad-­‐based	  
ownership	  approach,	  people	  gain	  access	  to	  resources	  (dividends	  from	  the	  trust)	  
and	  power	  over	  decision-­‐making	  in	  how	  those	  funds	  are	  to	  be	  spent	  (through	  the	  
community	   trust	   structure).	   Community	   members	   are	   therefore	   able	   to	   make	  
decisions	   and	   take	   action	   responding	   to	   their	   own	   priority	   needs.	  Most	   of	   the	  
developers	  committed	  to	  their	  community	  activities	  saw	  ownership	  schemes	  as	  
having	   greater	   developmental	   potential	   for	   local	   communities.	   Benefits	   can	   be	  
conferred	   psychologically	   through	   greater	   and	   potentially	   transformational	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people	  access	  to	  an	  asset	  with	  which	  they	  can	  participate	  in	  the	  formal	  economy.	  
Developer	   3’s	   approach	   also	   promotes	   a	   shift	   in	   the	   role	   of	   beneficiaries	   from	  
passive	   receivers	   to	   active	   agents	   in	   their	   own	   developmental	   process.	   Such	  
schemes	  are	  not	  without	  their	  own	  risks	  and	  challenges,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  
5.4.2,	   for	  example	   the	   intrusion	  of	   local	  politics	  and	  power	  plays	   impacting	   the	  
impartiality	   of	   the	   board’s	   decision-­‐making	   space.	   This	   highlights	   the	   need	   to	  
bring	   in	   experienced	   development	   partners	  with	   experience	   in	  managing	   such	  
schemes	  and	  engaging	  with	   communities.	  There	  are	   also	   risks	   that	   in	   actuality	  
real	  empowerment	  does	  not	  pan	  out.	  McEwan	  and	  Bek	  (2006)	  describe	  BBBEE	  
ownership	  schemes	  in	  the	  wine	  industry	  which	  they	  refer	  to	  as	  a	  form	  of	  ‘pseudo	  
empowerment’,	   where	   individuals	   are	   under	   the	   illusion	   that	   they	   have	   some	  
level	   of	   power	   and	   control	   but	   in	   reality	   remain	   dependent	   on	   white	  
businessmen	   due	   to	   insufficient	   transfers	   of	   skills	   and	   knowledge.	   Again	   this	  
comes	  back	  to	  the	  dedication	  and	  commitment	  of	  wind	  farm	  owners	  in	  individual	  
projects	  to	  achieve	  true	  empowerment.	  
6.4. Recommendations	  and	  suggestions	  for	  further	  research	  
Based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  research,	  several	  suggested	  recommendations	  were	  
identified	   regarding	   the	   BBBEE	   requirements	   in	   the	   renewables	   procurement	  
programme	   and	   how	   these	   might	   better	   target	   and	   enforce	   meaningful	  
development	  outcomes	  for	  local	  communities.	  It	  is	  first	  recommended	  that	  more	  
comprehensive	  guidance	   is	   laid	  out	  on	  how	  developers	   should	  undertake	   their	  
SED	   and	   ED	   contributions.	   The	   programme	   could	   for	   example	   specify	  
requirements	   for	   community	   consultation	   and	   engagement	   and	   the	   kinds	   of	  
stakeholders	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consult.	  Furthermore	  it	  may	  specify	  what	  level	  of	  
detail	  developers	  are	  required	  to	  go	  to	  in	  their	  strategy	  formulation	  (for	  example	  
project	   identification),	   best	   practise	   to	   follow	   and	   the	   appointment	   of	  
development	  specialists	  to	  undertake	  community	  development	  and	  engagement.	  	  	  	  
It	   is	   also	   recommended	   that	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   set	   of	   monitoring	   and	  
performance	   indicators	   are	   articulated	   on	   which	   projects	   are	   verified.	   It	   is	  
recommended	  that	   the	  understanding	  of	  compliance	  be	  broadened	  beyond	   just	  
whether	   companies	   have	   spent	   a	   required	   amount	   of	   money	   but	   to	   also	  
incentivise	   a	   culture	   of	   accountability	   and	   commitment	   to	   successful	  
development	  outcomes.	  More	   comprehensive	  performance	  data	  will	   also	   serve	  
to	  support	  future	  more	  meaningful	  evaluations	  of	  the	  broader	  BBBEE	  policy.	  	  
A	   key	   area	   for	   further	   research	   is	   to	   conduct	   detailed	   impact	   assessments	   of	  
wind	   developers’	   community	   benefit	   schemes.	   Such	   assessments	   should	   take	  
into	  account	  the	  kind	  of	  development	  approach	  that	  is	  taken,	  challenges	  and	  best	  
practise	  associated,	  number	  and	  types	  of	  beneficiaries,	  improved	  socio-­‐economic	  
indicators	   such	   as	   access	   to	   health,	   educational	   outcomes,	   new	   business	   start-­‐
ups,	   jobs	   etc.	   This	   information	   would	   prove	   valuable	   to	   understanding	   how	  
effective	   the	  procurement	   legislation	   is	  being,	  what	   the	  key	   challenges	  are	  and	  
how	   requirements	   on	   developers	   in	   future	   procurement	   rounds	   could	   be	  
amended	  to	  support	  better	  outcomes.	  
It	   is	   also	   recommended	   that	   a	   broader	   BBBEE	   policy	   review	   is	   undertaken	   to	  
understand	  the	  impact	  that	  business’	  ED	  and	  SED	  contributions	  as	  well	  as	  broad-­‐
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the	   objectives	   as	   articulated	   in	   the	   BBBEE	   Act.	   For	   example	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
understand	  how	  black	  businesses	  that	  have	  received	  ED	  support	  have	  benefitted	  
by	  understanding	  the	   type	  of	  support	   they	  received	  and	  how	  this	  has	  or	  hasn’t	  
contributed	   to	   their	  business	   growth	   for	   example	  by	  measuring	   this	   growth	   in	  
terms	   of	   staff	   or	   turnover	   over	   time.	   This	   type	   of	   information	   is	   necessary	   to	  
understand	   whether	   companies	   are	   offering	   the	   right	   types	   of	   support,	   how	  
effective	  they	  are	  in	  the	  support	  they	  offer	  and	  whether	  their	  contributions	  could	  
be	  better	  delivered	   in	  other	  ways.	  For	  example	   it	   could	   inform	  questions	  as	   to	  
whether	   ED	   is	   best	   implemented	   at	   an	   individual	   company	   level	   or	   whether	  
contributions	  are	  centrally	  collected	  and	  disbursed	  to	  eligible	  black	  businesses.	  
The	   Department	   of	   Trade	   and	   Industries,	   for	   example,	   has	   established	   an	  
Enterprise	   Development	   Fund	   doing	   just	   this.	   With	   the	   current	   monitoring	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7. Conclusion	  
This	   thesis	   has	   found	   positive	   evidence	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   community	  
benefit	  schemes	  in	  the	  wind	  sector	  in	  South	  Africa.	  The	  BBBEE	  requirements	  for	  
developers	   in	   the	   DoE’s	   IPPPP	   for	   renewables	   is	   the	   primary	   driver	   for	   such	  
schemes.	  A	  number	  of	  legislative	  drivers	  were	  investigated	  for	  their	  potential	  to	  
drive	   such	   schemes.	   This	   included	   BBBEE,	   CDM	   and	   EIAs.	   The	   procurement	  
programme,	   in	   keeping	   with	   the	   objective	   of	   maximising	   the	   economic	  
development	   potential	   from	   this	   new	   sector,	   includes	   a	   specific	   focus	   on	   local	  
communities	   in	   which	   wind	   farms	   are	   located.	   The	   procurement	   programme,	  
typical	   of	   all	   Government	   tendering	   processes,	   includes	   a	   BBBEE	   scorecard	   on	  
which	  wind	  projects	  are	  evaluated.	  However	  the	  renewables	  scorecard	  appears	  
to	  play	  an	  important	  part	  in	  a	  renewed	  focus	  on	  the	  broad-­‐based	  aspects	  of	  the	  
legislation,	   as	   enforced	   by	   a	   recent	   national	   review	   of	   the	   BBBEE	   Act.	   The	  
renewables	  scorecard	  includes	  specifications	  for	  local	  communities	  in	  respect	  of	  
broad-­‐based	   ownership	   schemes,	   socio-­‐economic	   development	   and	   enterprise	  
development	   contributions.	   	   This	   approach	   to	   legislating	   social	   responsibilities	  
of	  business	  in	  all	  sectors	  definitely	  has	  a	  South	  African	  flavour,	  borne	  out	  of	  the	  
political	  history	  of	  the	  country	  and	  the	  imperatives	  for	  social	  transformation	  laid	  
out	   in	   the	   constitution.	   Whether	   other	   countries	   would	   adopt	   a	   similarly	  
proactive	   approach	   to	   enforcing	   economic	   development	   objectives	   in	   their	  
energy	   policy	   would	   depend	   on	   the	   political	   and	   business	   climate	   in	   those	  
countries.	  
The	   CDM	  was	   also	   reviewed	   for	   its	   potential	   to	   incentivise	   community	   benefit	  
schemes.	   One	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   CDM	   is	   to	   promote	   sustainable	  
development	  in	  developing	  countries.	  However	  the	  research	  showed	  that	  South	  
Africa	   does	   not	   have	   stringent	   criteria	   in	   this	   regard	   and	  most	   commentators	  
saw	  the	  criteria	  as	  more	  of	  a	  ticking-­‐the-­‐box	  exercise	  than	  having	  any	  real	  power	  
to	   incentivise	   additional	   benefits	   at	   a	   local	   level.	   This	   approach	   to	   their	  
sustainable	  development	  criteria	  for	  CDM	  projects	  is	  not	  atypical	  of	  	  developing	  
countries,	   who	   are	   all	   trying	   to	   compete	   for	   projects.	   There	   is	   also	   no	  
marketplace	   recognition	   at	   an	   international	   for	   the	   sustainable	   development	  
aspects	  of	  CDM	  projects.	  	  	  
The	  EIA	  process	  in	  South	  Africa	  was	  also	  explored	  for	  its	  potential	  to	  incentivise	  
local	   benefits.	   EIAs	   require	   that	   socio-­‐economic	   impact	   assessments	   are	  
undertaken	   in	   order	   to	   assess	   the	   impacts	   of	   a	   new	   development	   on	   the	   local	  
population	   and	   to	   suggest	   mitigation	   and	   enhancement	   measures.	   The	   EIA	  
process	   in	   South	   Africa	   was	   reviewed	   to	   investigate	   how	   they	   dealt	   with	  
community	  benefit	  schemes	  and	  whether	  such	  schemes	  could	  ever	  form	  part	  of	  a	  
report’s	   recommendations	   for	   a	   project	   where	   there	   were	   none	   or	   could	   be	  
enhanced.	   The	   review	   found	   that	   in	   general	   EIA	   practitioners	   would	   not	  
recommend	   anything	   over	   and	   above	   what	   a	   development	   might	   be	   doing	  
anyway.	  Furthermore	  it	  is	  not	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  best	  practise	  to	  include	  
these	   schemes	   when	   considering	   planning	   decisions.	   As	   such	   EIAs	   are	   not	  
considered	  to	  have	  significant	  potential	  to	  incentivise	  such	  schemes.	  
Wind	   developers	   in	   South	   Africa	   were	   interviewed	   to	   explore	   how	   they	   were	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and	   to	   try	   and	   investigate	   the	   potential	   for	   their	   schemes	   to	   contribute	   to	  
meaningful	   sustainable	   development	   outcomes	   in	   the	   communities	   they	   were	  
involved	   in.	   Developers	   varied	   in	   their	   motivations	   and	   approaches	   to	   their	  
social	   requirements	   laid	   out	   in	   the	   renewables	   procurement	   programme.	  
However	  all	  recognised	  the	  need	  for	  BBBEE	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  did	  not	  consider	  
it	  to	  be	  a	  disincentive	  to	  do	  business.	  The	  most	  interesting	  feature	  in	  the	  market	  
is	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   developer	   whose	   specific	   intention	   is	   to	   develop	  
community	  wind	  farms.	  He	  has	  developed	  a	  business	  model,	  which	  attempts	  to	  
integrate	  financial	  and	  social	  returns.	  Whilst	  not	  all	  of	  the	  developers	  recognised	  
any	   commercial	   value	   that	   community	   benefit	   schemes	   could	   have	   for	   their	  
projects,	   it	   is	   considered	  here	   that	   the	  benefits	   of	   building	   an	   inclusive	   society	  
through	  CSR	  activities	  can	  have	  significant	  and	  positive	  benefits	  for	  business	  in	  
the	  long	  term.	  	  
It	  is	  still	  early	  days	  for	  the	  development	  of	  this	  sector	  and	  one	  cannot	  determine	  
the	  impact	  that	  such	  benefit	  schemes	  may	  have.	   It	   is	  clear	  though	  that	  targeted	  
development	   expenditure	   will	   be	   directed	   to	   multiple	   rural	   communities	   and	  
there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  strong	  potential	  to	  deliver	  socio-­‐economic	  benefits.	  However	  
whether	  such	  changes	  can	  be	  transformative	  in	  communities	  and	  sustained	  after	  
wind	   farm	   contributions	   cease	   depends	   to	   some	   extent	   on	   the	   development	  
approach	  adopted.	  Sustainable	  outcomes	  may	  be	  better	  achieved	  for	  the	   longer	  
term	   if	   a	   capacity	   building,	   community	   owned	   and	   participatory	   approach	   is	  
adopted	   rather	   than	   a	   charitable	   donation	   approach.	   It	   is	   suggested	   that	   the	  
renewables	   procurement	   programme	   could	   better	   encourage	   the	   efficacy	   of	  
benefit	   schemes	   through	   the	   development	   of	   more	   comprehensive	   guidelines,	  
promotion	   of	   partnerships	   and	   the	   development	   of	   stricter	   monitoring	  
indicators.	  Furthermore	  it	  is	  recommended	  that	  longer-­‐term	  impact	  evaluations	  
of	   projects	   be	   undertaken	   to	   assess	   the	   long	   term	   viability	   of	   development	  
interventions	   and	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   business’s	   engagement	   with	   social	  
development.	   This	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   whether	   the	   proposed	  
mechanisms	   in	   the	   BBBEE	   Act	   are	   having	   an	   impact	   and	   contributing	   to	   its	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Appendix	  A	  
Details	  of	  the	  interviewees:	  
§ Scott	  Brodsky	  of	  Dewey	  and	  LeBoeuf,	  a	  regulatory	  expert	  and	  advisor	  on	  
power	  and	  renewables	  projects,	  interviewed	  23	  August	  2011.	  
§ Andrew	  Gilder	  of	  Imbewu	  Sustainability	  Legal	  Specialists	  who	  specialises	  
in	  CDM	  projects	  and	  general	  environmental	  law,	  interviewed	  3	  June	  2011.	  
§ Johann	   van	  den	  Berg,	   a	   lawyer	   and	  board	  member	   of	   the	   South	  African	  
Wind	  Energy	  Association	  (SAWEA),	  interviewed	  5	  July	  2011.	  
§ Stephen	   Hawes	   from	   Empowerdex,	   a	   BBBEE	   verification	   and	   advisory	  
agency.	   He	   is	   advising	   developers	   on	   the	   renewables	   BBBEE	   scorecard	  
and	  has	  experience	  with	  advising	  on	  other	  BBBEE	  requirements	  in	  other	  
public	  private	  partnerships,	  interviewed	  19	  September	  2011.	  
§ Dean	   Alborough	   from	   Environmental	   Resource	   Management	   (ERM),	   an	  
EIA	  consultancy	  in	  SA,	  interviewed	  9	  May	  2011.	  
	  
